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Abstract: Th is paper aims to contribute to the exploration of the nexus of poverty, migration and 
development by providing what has been lacking thus far; namely, a close ethnographic portrait, combined 
with a survey, that interprets the most typical and diverging migration trajectories and their impacts in an 
economically backward and ethnically diﬀ erentiated region in Hungary. Building on the inspirational work 
of anthropologists and mobility scholars who propose to recover a global and multidimensional perspective 
on transnational movement when exploring the nexus between migration and its consequences for 
development, we carried out multi-sited ethnography, both in the sending and in the destination localities. We 
also conducted a survey among migrants who had returned, sometimes temporarily, to their community of 
origin. Using this multi-spatial approach, we demonstrate the diﬀ erent layers of the migration-development 
nexus. We argue that, on the global level, receiving countries all beneﬁ t from the cheap and ﬂ exible labor 
of poor migrants, be they Roma or non-Roma, skilled or low-skilled mobile laborers. However, on the level 
of migrant-sending localities, due to the diﬀ erential migration patterns of local Roma and non-Roma, the 
developmental eﬀ ects of the two groups’ geographical movement cannot be taken as homogeneous or leveled. 
For non-Roma families, when men leave behind their wives and children for the sake of ﬁ nancial betterment 
of their family, there is little developmental eﬀ ect on community level, but only in a narrow ﬁ nancial sense. 
However, we argue, drawing on Appadurai’s (2004) “capacity to aspire” concept, that for a fraction of some 
kinship groups of low-skilled Roma who mainly migrate with their whole family, transnational mobility may 
not be as successful ﬁ nancially as for the non-Roma, although it has future-oriented developmental elements 
by potentially enhancing capacity to aspire for both migrants and non-migrants.  
Keywords: Transnational mobility, migration and development nexus, poverty, capacity to aspire, poor 
Roma and non-Roma Hungarian migrants 
1 Part of the research that produced the empirical material for this paper was supported by a research grant from the Hungarian 
Academy of Science, NKFIH (K 111 969), entitled “Outmigration from Hungary and its effect on rural societies.” The empirical 
findings in this paper result from the ethnographic fieldwork and narrative interviews conducted by the first author. The 
analyses of the survey data are the work of the second author. 
 We wish to thank our two anonymous reviewers for their inspiring critical comments on the first draft of the manuscript. 
We are indebted to Endre Sik who helped us restructure our survey findings. Thanks also go to Krisztina Németh and Eszter 
Berényi for their patience and valuable contributions to the final version of this paper. Finally, special thanks go to our Roma 
friends and research assistants, and the hosting families who made this research possible by opening their homes to us in Peteri, 
Toronto, and in England, and who let us take part in their everyday lives. 
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Introduction
“Th e outmigration from Peteri is not signiﬁ cant,” said the mayor of Peteri, a small 
town of almost 10,000 inhabitants in the economically backward region of North 
Hungary, to us in the Fall of 2013 when we began our ethnographic ﬁ eldwork. He 
tried to convince us that his town was not the best site for our research as there was 
not much outmigration from there. By then, half of the inhabitants of the Roma 
settlement (a segregated neighbourhood on the outskirts of the town with almost 
3000 dwellers) had left for Toronto, Canada, and when having been deported or after 
returning from there, they went on to England. 
Although the Hungarians were for long less mobile than their Eastern-Central 
European neighbors, by 2010 they had “matured for migration” (Sik 2013) according 
to national surveys measuring the migration potential of the population. Recently, 
public discourse and academics in Hungary have begun to speak about an “exodus”. 
Since 2010, 500-600,000 Hungarians have left the country to work abroad in the free 
EU labour market or in North America (Hárs 2016, 2018).
Th e Roma, the biggest, most discriminated against and socially and economically 
disadvantaged minority in Hungary, have joined this migration process – although 
their destination countries are somewhat diﬀ erent (Kováts 2002, Vidra 2013, Blaskó 
– Gödri 2014, 2016, Vidra – Virág 2013, Durst 2013, Moreh 2014).
Th ere is very little research about the outcome of this nationwide migration 
process, mainly due to its relatively new development (for the few exceptions, see 
Váradi 2018, Virág 2018, Németh-Váradi 2018, this volume). We have even less 
knowledge about the almost “invisible” cross-border mobility of poor people with low 
educational attainment. Th ese migrants seem to be invisible not only in the context 
of national survey results in Hungary – according to which the young, educated and 
professionally or vocationally qualiﬁ ed part of the Hungarian population make up 
most of the country’s emigrants (Blaskó – Gödri 2014, 2016, Hárs 2018) – but their 
movement has remained broadly unrecognized also by local governments.
Th e non-Roma Hungarian mayor of Peteri, the “ﬁ eld” of our case study, only knows 
of a few families from the Roma settlement who tried to migrate to Canada. He does 
not have ﬁ rst-hand experience about this process however, as he rarely enters the 
segregated neighborhoods of his town. On the other hand, he has more contact with 
local Hungarian families. “Unlike these few Roma, Hungarians do not migrate,” he 
said to us, “in their families it is only the men who go to work abroad to support their 
families back home in Peteri.”2 
2 All the original names of both settlements and individuals used in this paper have been modified because of the sensitivity 
of the topic. When referring to local communities, both in Peteri and its neighbouring villages or small towns, we use the 
terminology employed by the locals themselves. In this region where there is a strong binary social order between the Roma 
and non-Roma population, those who are labeled as Roma according to the politically correct language used throughout the 
European Union refer to themselves as Gypsies (Cigány), and everybody else – that is, non-Gypsies (Gadzso) – as Hungarian 
(Magyar). The distinction between the categories „Gypsy” and (non-Gypsy) „Hungarian” has until now been one of the main 
rules governing interaction and determining social position in rural societies such as Peteri in Hungary (Horváth 2012, Kovai 
2018).  
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Meanwhile the working abroad of Hungarians was seen as a (ﬁ nancially) successful 
process by the mayor, the migration of the Roma has proved to be an unsuccessful 
story from his perception. 
After a year or two, or sometimes three, the Roma families all came back to 
Peteri. And what did they bring home with them? Nothing. The only thing they 
managed to achieve with this migration is that their children missed one or two, 
or sometimes three years of schooling. Because even if they went to school in 
Canada, they came home knowing nothing. So, we must put them back in the 
class that they were in when they left. For example, if a child left our school 
after finishing Year 53 and went with her family to Canada, on her return, let’s 
say after three years, we have to put her back in Year 6 among twelve-year-
old pupils, even if she is 15 (years old). It gives our teachers a lot of headaches 
teaching these overage children… The Hungarians are more forward thinking. 
In Hungarian families it is only the father who goes abroad, mainly to Germany 
to work. The mother stays behind with the children. In this way, the educational 
paths of these kids do not get interrupted. 
Since 2011 and the beginning of mass out-migration from Hungary, hundreds of 
families or members of families of inhabitants of Peteri have experienced work-
related, trans-national or rather trans-regional (Sik – Szeitl 2015) mobility. During 
our ethnographic ﬁ eldwork, we realized that we were looking at a “migration-rich 
community” (Pantea 2013) where people have regularly practised various modes of 
‘recurring’ (Limmer et al. 2010) spatial, cross-border mobility during the last ten 
years with the aim of generating income when opportunities were scarce in the local 
labour market (Durst 2018). Even the poor with a low (primary) level of schooling 
and no command of foreign languages of whom textbooks and courses on migration 
studies speak of as “resourceless” in terms of migration (Castles – Miller 2009, 
Melegh – Sárosi 2015), have begun to exercise mobility: mostly trans-regionally 
(mainly to three destination countries) across national borders. Whether these local 
types of “migration” – or rather call it trans-regional mobilities – have spurred any 
development or social transformation in the sending community or at least on the 
individual level of the return migrants and their households is the main question 
addressed in this paper. 
Th e topic of the relationship between international migration and its eﬀ ect on 
the development of the sending, mostly underdeveloped countries (the so-called 
migration-development nexus or pendulum; Faist 2008, de Haas 2005) has recently 
attracted signiﬁ cant attention once again from anthropologists and scholars of 
migration and development studies. Th ere are two main, opposing theses about 
the direction and nature of the migration and development nexus – although many 
scholars have recently drawn attention to the multi-layered, multi-level and multi-
3 As children mainly start primary school in Hungary at the age of six in Year 1, by Year 5 they are 11 years old.
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directional nature of the relationship (Glick Schiller 2009, Faist 2009, Delgado 
Wise − Covarrubias 2009). Following de Haas’s (2008) review, on the one hand 
there is “developmental pessimism”: scholars who represent world systems theory 
(Wallerstein 1980) and segmented labour market theory (Piore 1979) argue that 
migration which is shaped by structural economic and power inequalities within and 
between societies tends to reproduce these inequalities. Th ese theories focus on “how 
the powerful oppress the poor and vulnerable” (de Haas 2008:15). Some empirical 
ﬁ ndings from South-East Europe have argued for the usefulness of these theoretical 
framework by presenting empirical evidence of large-scale depopulation caused by 
mass outmigration from certain regions of underdeveloped, peripheral or semi-
peripheral countries such as Romania (Horváth – Kiss 2015). Some of these studies, 
following Bauman (2004), also speak about the predicament of the “disposable mass 
of global capitalism,” among them poor Roma migrants who cannot be considered 
“transnational subjects… what they have is their sheer labour, that is the raw material 
that the peripheral countries oﬀ er to core states at [a] low price” (Szabó 2018: 223). 
On the other hand, in the analysis of the migration-development nexus there 
is the so-called “developmental optimism” (Skeldon 1997, Kapur 2004), which has 
signiﬁ cant support from policy-making proponents among the powerful international 
ﬁ nancial organizations such as the World Bank, and among myriad non-governmental 
institutions. Th is developmental optimism celebrates migrants as development agents 
through the remittances (ﬁ nancial and social) they send home to their “left behind” 
family members. In this discourse migrants are portrayed as achieving high social 
status not only through their remittances but also when they return, due to their 
conspicuous consumption and their construction of big, fancy new houses – the latter 
being the most common cross-cultural sign of status improvement (Grigolini 2005, 
Tesar 2016, Toma et al. 2017). Th is discourse puts emphasis not only on ﬁ nancial 
returns but also on so-called “social remittances” (Lewitt 1998): the new values, ideas, 
practices, identities, and knowledge that migrants transfer in the transnational space 
(Glick Schiller 2009) which connect them to those in their networks who have stayed 
home. In the optimistic discourse these remittances are thought to be universal and 
to have a “levelled”  positive eﬀ ect on the social and political development in the 
sending localities.
Th ere are scholars, however, especially those working in ethnically mixed 
communities in peripheral or semi-peripheral, post-socialist countries, who draw 
attention to a diﬀ erentiated migration-developmental nexus that focuses on social 
diﬀ erentiation and the social closure in localities of origin (Anghel 2016, Toma et 
al. 2017, Toma – Fosztó 2018, this issue). Th ey argue for the need to dissect the 
consequences of transnational mobility for social transformation and inequality 
regarding diﬀ erent local returned migrant groups with diverging mobility patterns, 
even within single localities (Anghel 2016, Faist 2016). Following this line of 
thinking, Faist (2016: 389) states that the social mechanism of t he partial exclusion 
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of poor return migrants of stigmatized minority background (such as the Roma) is an 
“antidote to optimistic developmental ideas in the wake of post-1989 migration from 
Central Eastern Europe.” 
In this paper, we aim to interrogate both leveled developmental pessimism and 
optimism and test the validity of diﬀ erential migration-development interactions in 
the case of our ethnically mixed settlement. With our survey we explore whether there 
are signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in the migration and remittance-sending patterns of the 
diﬀ erent local ethnic groups. Th rough our ethnographic case studies we look behind 
the survey data and analyse whether the diﬀ erential mobility trajectories of migrants 
of diverging social characteristics – that is, of Roma and non-Roma, unskilled and 
skilled laborers – lead to diﬀ erent developmental eﬀ ects on the level of individual, 
household and sending locality.  
To address these issues, in the following we ﬁ rst discuss the theoretical framework 
that we found useful for embedding and explaining our empirical ﬁ ndings. Second, 
we brieﬂ y describe our mixed research methodology, and give an introduction to the 
research setting, delineating the most typical, socially patterned migration trajectories 
from the town. Th en we present our survey results, followed by the ethnographic 
ﬁ ndings. Here we use the two locally most typical migration trajectories – those of a 
Roma kinship group and non-Roma guest workers – as ethnographic cases to explain, 
supplement, and look behind the survey results. Finally, we conclude the article by 
analyzing the multilevel consequences of migration from the sending locality. 
Th eoretical Framework
Poverty, development and the capacity to aspire
Poverty is partly a “matter of operating with extremely weak resources where the 
terms of recognition are concerned” (Appadurai 2004: 66). For policy makers and 
development experts, poverty is usually associated with powerlessness, vulnerability 
and, above all, a failure of aspirations (Ibrahim 2011). Aspirations literally mean 
“hopes or ambitions to achieve something.” An aspiration is deﬁ ned as “the perceived 
importance or necessity of goals” (Copestake – Camﬁ eld 2010, cited by Ibrahim 2011: 
3). For anthropologists, aspirations are seen as part of wider ethical and metaphysical 
ideas derived from cultural norms: “Aspirations [for] the good life are part of some 
sort of system of ideas…which locate them in a larger map of local ideas and beliefs”; 
however, they “often emerge as speciﬁ c wants and choices” (Appadurai 2004:68). 
For many poor people, the aspiration and choice to migrate represents a central 
component of livelihood strategies (Kothari 2002). 
Using Sen’s (1999) concept of development, according to which development is an 
increase in freedom (operationalized as capability) that allows people to lead the lives 
they aspire to, and accepting de Haas’s (2005) conceptualization of human mobility 
as people’s capability (freedom) to choose where to live within broader structural 
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constraints, then we conclude that an increase in the capability for mobility itself 
is a part of development (de Haas 2008). As poverty scholars have pointed out, the 
failure of poor people to achieve their aspirations can lead to a downward spiral and 
intergenerational transmission, the latter reﬂ ecting the failure of many parents in poor 
communities to fulﬁ l the aspirations of their children (Ibrahim 2011). Th erefore, some 
poverty studies suggest, building on Sen’s (1999) and Appadurai’s (2004) work, that 
development should be perceived as a cognitive process (Copestake – Camﬁ eld 2010).
Poverty scholars have also drawn attention to the issue of the formation of 
aspiration. Ray (2006) speaks about the concept of the aspiration window and 
aspiration gap. Th e former means the individual’s cognitive world and what s/he views 
as attainable, while the latter is the distance between what an individual might aspire 
to and the conditions s/he ﬁ nds herself in. Ray argues that aspirations are usually 
inspired by the lives of similar people or role models within the aspiration window. 
According to Appadurai, an important part of development is the empowerment 
of the poor. Empowerment can be translated as increasing the capacity of the poor to 
aspire. Appadurai deﬁ nes the concept of the capacity to aspire as a navigational and 
cultural capacity of a group, which concerns “how a group (and the individuals in it) 
succeed in reducing the costs of developing a culture of aspirations by envisioning 
their future, and their capacity to share this future, through… inﬂ uencing factors in 
their physical and social environment” (Appadurai 2004: 59). He goes on to argue 
that “in strengthening the capacity to aspire…, especially among the poor, the 
future-oriented logic of development could ﬁ nd a natural ally, and the poor could 
ﬁ nd the resources required to contest and alter the conditions of their own poverty” 
(Appadurai 2004: 60). Converging on this line of thinking, recent attempts have been 
made to theorize migration in the aspirations-capabilities (Sen 1999) framework and 
conceive of migration as a contextualized social process, and an intrinsic part of global 
change, social transformation, and development (de Haas 2014). Th is conceptualizes 
migration as a “function of aspirations and capabilities to move within a given set of 
opportunity structures” (de Haas 2014). 
Migration, social transformation and the new global labour regime 
During the last two decades, the set of opportunity structures for migration has 
signiﬁ cantly changed. It is a commonly accepted statement that migration is a part 
and consequence of social transformation (Castles 2010, Portes 2010, de Haas 2010). 
One part of social transformation that migration processes are embedded in is the 
restructuring of the global labour market in highly developed countries through 
economic deregulation and new employment practices such as subcontracting, 
temporary employment, and casual work (Castles 2010). On the one hand, the search 
for competitiveness in a globalized economy, combined with demographic change 
(the aging population in the developed West), are leading to signiﬁ cant demand for 
ﬂ exible and cheap migrant labour. As Glick Schiller (2009) argues, a new, neoliberal 
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labour regime has been developed. Migrant labour, which is increasingly contractual, 
meets the need of localized neoliberal restructuring – in the form of “ﬂ exible and 
politically silenced” labor (Glick Schiller 2009: 15).
On the other hand, in less developed countries such as many post-socialist 
Central-Eastern European (CEE) states like Hungary, the social transformation 
of the labour market (that is, the massive loss of jobs due to structural changes, 
including the closing down of industrial factories) further encourages outmigration 
of “superﬂ uous” former socialist workers (Melegh et al. 2018, this issue), among them 
the currently unemployed, low-skilled Roma, in search of better lives and livelihoods. 
Th ese changes in the globalized labour market have fostered new streams of mobility 
in the direction of the developed Western European countries since the 2004 EU 
accession, which provided legal rights for residence and work to the newly accepted 
EU Member States’ citizens. However, while the European political establishment 
celebrates the free movement of goods, people and ideas in the space of the European 
Union, the mobility regimes of the Member States are rather selective in terms of 
how they welcome highly educated professionals (the “global talents”) but criminalize 
and hinder the mobility of the poor (Glick Schiller – Salazar 2013). One contradiction 
in migration-development studies is that while migrant remittances are welcomed 
and deﬁ ned as vital resources for poverty reduction, those who send remittances are 
denigrated as a social threat (Glick Schiller 2009). 
Th is is particularly true in the case of the Central Eastern European poor, low-
skilled and especially Roma migrants. Scholars from diﬀ erent disciplines who have 
analyzed the transnational mobilities of precarious Roma networks emphasize the 
un/free (blocked or impeded) character of their geographical movement (Yildiz −de 
Genova 2017, Van Baar 2017, Nagy 2016, Greenﬁ elds − Dagilyte 2018, Sardelic 2017, 
Humphris 2017). Many Hungarian Roma migrants, however, are outsmarting the 
selective mobility regime (Nagy – Oude-Breuil 2015, Nagy 2016), which has a distorted 
notion about Roma migration (Kóczé 2017), considering it a “security threat” (von 
Baar 2017), by employing the tactics of ethnic (Roma) invisibility and playing up their 
Hungarian identity in public spaces, as one of our case studies demonstrates.
Research methodology
In pursuing the anthropological thread of mobility studies, following mobility 
trajectories, and studying our moving subjects, we have observed during the past 
three years two of the most typical and widespread mobility routes of social groupings, 
especially those of low-skilled mobile Roma laborers from Peteri and its surrounding 
settlements to their destinations in Canada and the UK.
Th e empirical ﬁ ndings and the argumentation in this paper beneﬁ t from mixed-
methods research: we carried out several short-term participant observations 
and periods of ethnographic ﬁ eldwork both in the sending locality (Peteri and its 
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surrounding settlements) and in the receiving ones (Toronto and an urban city in 
the UK). We also conducted 120 semi-structured interviews, focusing on life- and 
migration trajectories with trans-national migrants who had returned to Peteri, or 
relocated either to Toronto or in England. Among them, 80 interviewees were (self-
identiﬁ ed) Roma, while 40 were non-Roma. Th e participants were selected by using 
the snowball sampling method, and the selection criterion was that the interviewees 
should have had cross-border migration experience within the last ten years. Th e 
length of the interviews varied between 60 and 90 minutes. Th e interviews were 
audio-recorded and transcribed. 
Along with the qualitative research methods, and with the help of local Roma 
research assistants, we also managed to implement a survey in the region among the 
642 families who had taken part in any kind of trans-national migration since 2012.4 
We deﬁ ned the region as the area within a 70-kilometre radius of the city of Miskolc. 
People from any settlements were subject to questioning, except for those actually from 
Miskolc. Th is means that our sample contained only socioeconomically disadvantaged 
settlements, none of which had more than 33,000 inhabitants. Snowball sampling was 
applied to select the participants of the research. Th e selection and the questioning of 
the respondents was the task of the four local Roma research assistants; that is, the 
sample is based on their networks, which increased the homogeneity of our sample. 
Th e Roma research assistants also helped us achieve another goal of the sample 
design, namely, the over-representation of Roma migrants. Although the empirical 
ﬁ ndings of this paper are only valid for the studied social and spatial context, their 
relevance stems from the explorative nature of the work. 
Research setting: diﬀ erent migration trajectories
Peteri is situated in an economically backward county, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (BAZ), in 
North Hungary, according to the oﬃ  cial statistics on unemployment data. (Since 2010, 
when a new wave of outmigration has evolved, the unemployment rate was around 20% 
compared to the national average of 10%). Th is small rural town is itself not considered 
among the most disadvantaged settlements as designated by a 2015 government 
order5 regarding an oﬃ  cial, complex developmental index (compiled of diﬀ erent 
socio-demographic-, housing-, labour market-, local economic- and infrastructure-
related indices). However, regarding the other oﬃ  cial development measurement, the 
unemployment index (which deﬁ nes a settlement as disadvantaged if the unemployment 
rate of its local population is 1.75 times higher or more than the national average rate), 
Peteri is indeed a disadvantaged town. Until the end of the 1980s and the beginning 
of the post-socialist transformation, most local skilled and unskilled individuals (men 
4 The advantages and the limits of involving local Roma participants as assistants in the research is discussed elsewhere (Durst 
2017, see also Matras and Leggio (2018) for the experiences of the MigRom project).
5 See http://www.magyarkozlony.hu/hivatalos-lapok/c7906e368088af259ea68621e00e02277f38b2ab/dokumentumok/184e1f87
8cb59cd3f0dc13264dca53efedf79d82/letoltes
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and women, Roma and non-Roma), worked in nearby industrial factories. From this 
state of almost full employment, most of the local population (except the political elite 
and the the very few people with degrees who had jobs in local government and in 
schools) have now experienced some period of unemployment. Th e biggest losers of the 
transformation in Peteri, as is true of the whole country (Ladányi – Szelényi 2004), are 
the unskilled or low-skilled Roma with low educational attainment (on average having 
only completed primary school). Many of them have struggled with chronic, long-term 
unemployment until recently, when Bosch started to recruit even the unskilled Roma 
for the least prestigious work on their assembly line.6
In Peteri, along with a few other settlements in the region which are characterized by 
a high rate of out-migration, a “culture of migration” has evolved during the last decade 
– since around 2009. (See also Hárs 2016 for Hungary). Th e importance of this culture 
in promoting cross-border, geographical mobility is documented by scholars (among 
others, Kandel − Massey 2002). Th e empirical ﬁ ndings of Massey and his co-author 
show that, within such communities, transnational migration has become so deeply 
rooted that the practice of cross-border movement for work has become the norm. 
Th is is exactly the case in Peteri, and especially in its segregated Roma settlements 
where low-skilled Roma (approximately 3,000 people) live. In the locality of the town, 
as elsewhere, transnational mobility has diﬀ erentiated patterns among people of 
diﬀ erent social (and educational) status and ethnic belonging. At the top of the local 
social hierarchy are the political and economic elite, who do not migrate as they have 
reasonably good jobs locally. Neither do skilled Roma workers pursue a cross-border 
mobility strategy to improve their standard of living; they rather commute weekly 
(hetelnek) either to the capital, Budapest, or to other big and more developed cities in 
Hungary. Nowadays they can easily ﬁ nd work in the construction industry, organized 
mostly by informal labour recruiters, where there is a growing shortage of reliable, 
skilled workers due to the mass outmigration of Hungarian employees (Blaskó – Gödri 
2014, 2016, Hárs 2016, 2018). Th ese Roma men prefer not to leave their families 
behind, unlike many of their Hungarian counterparts of the same vocation. Th ey are 
also happy with their social status in their own communities and believe that given 
they cannot speak  a foreign language their status abroad would only deteriorate. As 
one of them explained to us, “Why would I be a nobody in Canada or in England when 
I am somebody at home in the town and around?” 
On the other hand, among the two most typical groups of local migrants from 
Peteri – that is, unskilled or low-skilled Roma with eight years of schooling, and non-
Roma Hungarian skilled laborers –, one can observe enormous mobility. Among the 
non-Roma, men with vocational training, mostly in their late twenties or of middle 
age, have been working for diﬀ erent German companies for three to ﬁ ve years already, 
6 Since 2008, Bosch, a multinational company, automotive manufacturer, and a leading developer of future technologies, 
has relocated its operations from Germany to Miskolc, the region’s capital city. The Bosch Group was celebrated as the 
“Workplace creator of the Year” a few years ago in the Hungarian media (Bosch Media Service 2017). Bosch seems to increase 
its competitiveness in a stagnating European market through capitalising on lower Hungarian wages. 
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mostly in construction, but some in the food industry. Th ey leave their families (wives 
with younger children) behind in the hope that they can earn enough money within 
a few years to pay back family debt, renovate their houses and educate their children. 
Th at is, they can “get ahead” ﬁ nancially. Th e basis of their conscious calculus about 
the cost-beneﬁ t of working abroad is that they can earn a salary four times as high as 
they could do at home. Th ose few non-Roma who have no vocation and only a primary 
school education (as is also the case with the vast majority of Roma in Peteri) also 
typically migrate to Germany or the Netherlands on their own, using their migrant 
friends’ or nuclear family networks. Th ey take up seasonal work as unskilled laborers. 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, but mainly in between 2010 and 2013, the most 
typical migration trajectory among the low-skilled, poor Roma involved going to Canada 
and applying for asylum as a refugee, or when being deported or coming back to Peteri due 
to homesickness or to care for an old parent who had fallen ill, to move on to England.7 
From our interview data as to why they chose their particular destination countries, it 
was clear that what mostly attracted the Roma to Toronto, apart from the ever growing 
translocal migration network (constituted by kinship ties), was the country’s humanitarian 
treatment of refugees, who were, among other things, entitled to social provisions that 
covered at least their housing costs. As many of our respondents articulated, they had ﬂ ed 
from racism, hate crime (among others the Roma murders in 2008-2009), and poverty, 
but as one put it, corresponding with a couple of others, he could not go to other countries, 
as he “ did not have the talent” (tehetségem)8 to start anew, except in Canada. In Toronto I 
had relatives with whom we could stay in the ﬁ rst few weeks. Here one can start a brand 
new life in three months – that’s how long it takes to arrange your paperwork – , and 
Canada welcomes the Roma.”
For the Roma in Peteri, as elsewhere for low-income families (Stack 1973), kinship 
network as a form of social capital is the biggest (and sometimes only) “proﬁ table” 
resource (Czakó – Sik 2003) that can be used in the process of migration. Wherever 
migrants move to, even if they have no command of any foreign language, due to 
their kinship ties they are well informed about the income-earning opportunities, and 
about strategies on how to cunningly overcome unwelcoming, restricting mobility 
policies (see Nagy 2016).9 Recently, the most common migration trajectory among the 
Roma from Peteri is their typically recurring but in some cases permanent relocation 
7 To discourage Roma from fleeing to Canada, between 2002 and 2008 Canada introduced a visa requirement for Eastern 
European citizens. In 2008 this was lifted, but again in 2013 there was a substantial reform of the Canadian system for 
determining refugees. The reform took place in addition to some political action aimed specifically at the Eastern European 
Roma who in the political discourse were accused of being “bogus” or “economic refugees” (Levine – Rasky 2016). 
8 Our informants’ use of the word “talent”should be understood as capability.
9 Those who cannot even rely on the assistance of their kinship networks as a resource for reducing the cost and risk of 
migration are the most vulnerable among the poor migrants. These are men who have gone through eight years of schooling 
who became mobile workers after commuting to Germany or the Netherlands on a six-weeks’-work, one-week’s-holiday basis, 
or most recently to Spain to perform, as they say, “even bottom-end labour.” Established, organized networks have recently 
been developed between formal employers in some Western European countries and informal recruiters (who have previously 
been employed by the former employers) to encourage unskilled people, mostly in an economically vulnerable situation, to 
temporarily work in these countries by facilitating their travel (using money informally lent by the recruiters, with added 
interest), accommodation and employment. We carried out interviews with nine of these informal labour intermediaries from 
neighbouring settlements – from all their clients there were none from Peteri. This clearly shows that potential migrants prefer 
to use kinship networks to facilitate their work-related cross border movement if they have a choice. 
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and work-related mobility to some urban UK cities with abundant job opportunities, 
facilitated partly by kinship networks but mostly by ubiquitous labour market 
intermediaries. In the following, after presenting our survey results, we explore two 
of the most typical migration patterns for Roma and non-Roma respectively, with a 
focus on their interaction with development.
Results of quantitative research 
In this section we describe whether there are statistically signiﬁ cant diﬀ erences in the 
migration patterns of our Roma and non-Roma respondents by using the results of 
our questionnaire. 
A total of 642 respondents answered the questionnaire, 70% of whom were (self-
identiﬁ ed) Roma, while 30% were non-Roma. Men were over-represented both in the 
non-Roma and Roma sub-sample (see Table 1 in Appendix). Most of the non-Roma 
(69%) respondents had completed at least vocational training school, while 31% of 
them had at most a primary school education. In the Roma sub-sample one-third 
of respondents had (at least) vocational qualiﬁ cations, and two-thirds of them had 
a maximum of primary school education (see Table 2, Appendix). Nearly two-thirds 
of the non-Roma and almost half of the Roma respondents had a permanent job: 
temporary jobs and unemployment were more frequent among the Roma (see Table 3, 
Appendix). Seventy-three percent of the Roma and 63% of the non-Roma interviewees 
had a spouse or partner. Th e average household size was 4.6 individuals in the total 
sample, being 3.9 persons in the non-Roma and 4.9 persons in the Roma sub-sample. 
We examined whether there was a signiﬁ cant diﬀ erence between the Roma and 
non-Roma respondents in terms of which destination country they prefer to move 
to. According to our results, Canada and the United Kingdom are more popular 
destination countries among Roma, while non-Roma are more likely to move to 
Germany and to “Other” countries10 (see Figure 1). Cross-tabulation analysis was 
used to study the relationship between the chosen destination country and ethnicity 
(in another study we carried out a regression analysis that proved that ethnicity is 
associated with the chosen destination country, even when controlling for level of 
education (Durst – Nyírő forthcoming 2019). 
10 We merged all destination countries into the category of “Other countries” except for the United Kingdom, Germany and 
Canada because of the low number of cases.
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Figure 1: Chosen destination country by ethnicity, N=640
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Th e survey results conﬁ rmed the experience of the ethnographic ﬁ eldwork that 
there is a diﬀ erence between Roma and non-Roma in terms of the role of kinship 
networks in the realization of migration. We found that both Roma and non-Roma 
respondents relied heavily on their social networks in their migration, although 
non-Roma mostly received help from their acquaintances and friends, while Roma 
used their family networks. For instance, most of the Roma respondents moved to 
settlements where they already had family members, while the non-Roma selected 
settlements where their friends had been living (see Figure 2). Furthermore, most 
of the Roma interviewees received accommodation from a family member at the 
beginning of their time abroad, while the majority of non-Roma interviewees stayed 
at a place provided by their workplace (see Table 4, Appendix). Finally, we found that 
Roma respondents typically relied on their family for job-seeking, while non-Roma 
respondents mobilized their friends in order to ﬁ nd their jobs (see Figure 3). 
Figure 2: Distribution of respondents according to whether family members or friends lived 
in the settlement the respondent arrived at before the respondent moved abroad, N=636
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Figure 3: Distribution of respondents according to who helped them to ﬁ nd a job when they 
ﬁ rst moved abroad, by ethnicity, N=580
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Another diﬀ erence between the migration patterns of Roma and non-Roma 
respondents is that most of the Roma migrants moved abroad with their families, 
while the majority of non-Roma migrants migrated alone. 
Figure 4: Moving abroad with or without family, by ethnicity (%)
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Regarding the practice of sending remittances, we found that almost the same 
proportion of non-Roma (69%) and Roma (70%) respondents sent remittances to 
their home country. However, there were diﬀ erences between the two sub-samples 
according to the aim of the remittances, with a signiﬁ cantly higher proportion of 
non-Roma (40%) sending money to their family members than Roma (31%). Debt 
repayment was more frequent among Roma respondents (18%) than among non-
Roma (9%). Finally, Roma migrants were more likely to send remittances to further 
their own goals (e.g. home purchase, renovation) compared to non-Roma (44% vs. 
35%, respectively) (see Table 5-7, Appendix).
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In summary, we found several  diﬀ erences between the migration patterns of Roma 
and non-Roma migrants. First, regarding diﬀ erent destinations countries; second, 
Roma respondents mostly relied on their kinship networks in the realization of the 
migration, while non-Roma migrants received assistance from their acquaintances 
and friends; and third, their practice of sending remittances were also distinct. 
However, as we mentioned earlier, the presented results only describe the ﬁ rst 
steps of our quantitative research, thus further analysis of the database is needed. 
Ethnographic ﬁ ndings
Roma migrants from Peteri with whom we had regular contact through our ﬁ eldwork 
are concentrated in low-wage, low-skilled, labor intensive jobs in a few English urban 
cities, along with other mobile CEE migrant laborers working in the UK (Ciupijus 
2011). For these individuals, “whose bodies are historically marked by their racialized 
darkness” in their home societies (Grill 2017), moving to the UK provided an escape 
from ethnic labeling and stigma – although simultaneously exposing them to diﬀ erent 
categorizations; that is, the inferior label of “Eastern-European migrants” (Grill, 
2017) (meaning in many cases, an unskilled, ﬂ exible and exploitable work force). 
Most of them, even those who had been working in England intermittently during the 
past few years, oﬀ ered their labour as agency workers at signiﬁ cantly lower wages than 
contracted (mainly “native” English) workers on multinational factories’ assembly lines in 
urban cities in the UK (Durst 2018). Part of the social transformation of the “glocalised” 
(Robertson – White 2007) labour markets in England is that practices of ﬂ exibility 
dominate corporate strategy across many sectors of the economy. At the forefront of 
these changes is the fast-growing institution of labour-market intermediaries (Enright 
2013) that are used by migrant workers to enhance their chances of ﬁ nding work on an 
unknown, volatile foreign labour market. For most of our interlocutors, these recruiting, 
temporary staﬃ  ng agencies facilitated their mostly temporary but, in some cases, 
permanent employment – despite the language barrier. 
Laló, a 28-year-old man from the segregated neighbourhood of Peteri, can be regarded 
as a typical low-skilled Roma migrant agency worker with a transnationally mobile life. He 
ﬁ nished eight years of schooling and is a father of two young children, aged eight and ten. 
Laló was twelve when he left the Roma settlement for the ﬁ rst time in his life, for Canada. 
He had been there with his parents and siblings for two years when his mother decided 
to come home to look after her terminally ill father. “I think they just missed giving our 
family a chance,” Laló told me when we spoke about his Canadian experience that he still 
cherishes. When they came home, Laló had to go back into year six of primary school 
where he had been studying when they left. Local schools in Peteri do not acknowledge 
school certiﬁ cates from abroad. Laló, being a big 14-year-old boy, hated going to school 
and being put back into a class with kids two years younger than him, so his mother 
arranged for him to be a private pupil. At the age of 18, Laló ﬁ nished the compulsory eight 
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years of primary school, thanks to a governmental initiative supporting adult education. 
He went on to do seasonal jobs locally, got married and had children. 
In 2010, when many of his Roma kin and friends from the settlement started 
to move to Canada again, this time in massive numbers, he decided to join them. In 
the transnational space (Glick Schiller 2009) created by the constant communication 
through social media (Facebook, Messenger and Skype chats) between migrants and 
family members left behind, his aspirations for a better life emerged, to be achieved 
either in Canada or in England, where many Roma from Peteri had carried on their 
sojourns after coming home or being deported from Toronto. This second time he 
spent two years in Toronto and saved enough money from combining “oﬀ -the-books” 
(Venkatesh 2006) casual work with welfare – as many people of a marginal position 
do all over the world (MacDonald 1994) – to renovate his dilapidated house before he 
came home. “Th e heart pulls most of us back home,” he recalled, explaining why they 
returned to Peteri. 
After a few months, when the family had spent all their savings from Canada, they 
went on to Nottingham in England. When we asked him why Nottingham, he replied, 
as if it went without saying, that: “It’s obvious: one goes to cities where one has kin, 
where the rent (for private apartments) is aﬀ ordable, and most importantly, where 
there are jobs.” He was ﬁ rst recruited by the agency that his cousin introduced him to 
and the agency sent him to a pizza factory. But after three months the factory gave up 
all agency workers, keeping only its own contracted workers as there was low demand 
on the market for its product. Th en he went to Nelson where his other cousin lived, 
who introduced him to his local agency. Th ere, in a “biscuit factory,” he worked as a 
packer on the assembly line, along with many other Hungarian co-workers. He only 
managed to work for four days a week, whenever the agency called him, but after a 
few months, the “work stalled again.” Even if Laló moans about the situation that “in 
England there is only seasonal work,” he still considers working there much better 
than in Hungary. 
We met Laló a few weeks ago when he went home to Peteri for a while since his 
work in the biscuit factory had come to a halt. Laló tried to ﬁ nd a job nearby, so as 
to be close to his family. He went to Bosch, which had recently become the biggest 
employer in the whole region, to work on the assembly line. But he could not endure 
more than four days there. “England is hundreds of times better,” he reasoned to me 
about why he left Bosch. 
In England there is equality. Over there, when my Polish co-workers once tried to 
call us “stinking Gypsies” (büdös cigány) and started to bully us, I reported them 
to my boss, and they got a warning. Th e next day they apologized. Here in Miskolc 
[where the factory is situated], a Gypsy is never right. Also, in England, they treat 
their workers better. Here at Bosch, in your twelve-hour shift, you have two fi ve-
minute smoke breaks plus one half-an-hour lunch break. Th ere are women who 
faint on the assembly line. Th e ambulance is there daily. And for enduring all that 
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work, you get a salary of 120,000 forints (appr. 400 euros). You earn four times 
more for less work under better conditions in England. 
Laló, like many of his Roma fellows, says that if there were opportunities locally 
to obtain a decent job with a reasonable salary that one could support a family with, 
people would not go abroad to work. 
Why would I go?! Everybody likes to stay around his family, help his parents in 
their old age. But we have no other choice but to work abroad. It’s not only that 
you can earn four times more in England. But it is also how they treat you. Okay, 
there is racism everywhere in the world. But in England it is not so bad as it is in 
Hungary. In England, you are equal, they do not care whether you are darker: you 
are not a Gypsy  here but a Hungarian, a human being. Th ey are only interested in 
whether you can work hard or not. 
Living and working in England for many years, Laló, like many other Roma return 
migrants, can no longer imagine himself in the “modern sweatshop” (modern robot 
világa) as he calls Bosch. He intends to carry on with his trans-regionally mobile 
workers’ life, meaning labouring in England for ﬁ ve to six months a year while he is 
“compelled to do that” (rákényszerül).
Unlike Laló, some older Roma non-migrants still consider Bosch their only 
opportunity to ﬁ nd employment. Th ey argue that this is the only local company that 
oﬀ ers a chance to make a livelihood even to unskilled people and especially to Roma, 
who are not likely to ﬁ nd any employment elsewhere in the region because of their 
low level of schooling and dark skin. In contrast, many return migrants, including 
Laló, underwent a perceptual shift as a result of working abroad. Th ey have greater 
expectations now about how a human being needs to be treated, whether Roma or 
non-Roma.  
Th is self-developmental trait can be traced in the narrative of a few local members 
of Laló’s kinship network from Peteri. Karol, a middle-aged woman of four children, 
believes that the Roma have “developed since they started to migrate,” for the ﬁ rst 
time in their lives, as they have experienced “what it means to be treated equally, as 
a human being, and not as an inferior Gypsy.” She went to Toronto in 2011 with her 
husband and kids following her sister’s family, who helped them during the ﬁ rst few 
weeks by accommodating them and by introducing her husband to work in the same 
carrot factory at which her brother-in-law was a day-laborer. 
Karol recounts her family’s positive experience during their two-year stay in 
Toronto.
I think that by going to Canada we put something in the hands of our children. 
First, they learnt English in the school over there. But, even more importantly, 
by showing them that there is a bigger, different, and better world outside our 
contained Gypsy settlement, their eyes have opened. They can now compare the 
life here in Peteri and over there in Canada. They now dare to aspire to have 
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a vocation with which they will try to find a job abroad. Maybe in England or 
Germany. 
Nowadays, in the Roma settlement of Peteri, many youngsters, among them Karol’s 
two older children, students at nearby vocational secondary schools, agree with Laló 
that workplaces such as Bosch do not oﬀ er a reasonable opportunity for people who 
would like to get ahead in life. Th ese teenagers, themselves having spent 1.5-2 years 
in Toronto on average, are pushed by their parents to obtain vocational skills so they 
will have a future.  Th ey have started to develop bigger aspirations, thanks not only 
to their own experience abroad but also that of their relatives with whom they are in 
everyday contact through social media. Karol’s daughter plans to be a chef, and her 
18-year-old brother a welder. After ﬁ nishing their vocational training in the nearby 
town’s secondary school and working for one or two years in Hungary to get work 
experience, they both plan to move to live and work abroad − the boy in Germany and 
the girl in England. When we asked the girl why she had chosen England, she showed 
us some pictures of her uncle’s house in Liverpool, saying that they had managed 
to create a much nicer life and even support their daughter’s further education by 
working hard. A life that one cannot even dream of in Peteri. 
A similar, frequently told story in the settlement among the local Roma is the 
success in higher education of the daughter of Laló’s relative, Robi. Th e story of this 
case has travelled throughout the whole settlement as a good example of “what a 
Gypsy kid can achieve” if they are in an accepting social environment. Most of Laló’s 
kinship network seem to know, even those who have never actually met Robi’s family, 
how successful their migration has been. 
I have now known Robi and his family for years. During my ﬁ eldwork in the English 
city to which they relocated their family to work in a factory to build a livelihood and 
create a better future for their children, it was obvious to me that they use the strategy 
of ethnic invisibility cleverly in public spaces in England (see for similar experiences 
Nagy 2017). Being aware of the distorted media images about CEE Roma migration 
(Kóczé 2017) – called “Romaphobia” by many scholars (Tremlett et al. 2017) – Robi 
and his family play up their Hungarian identity in England in certain situations when 
they need to get better treatment. Th e following story is a case in point. 
One day we accompanied them to the gym in their English city’s immigrant 
neighbourhood, which is populated, among others, by many Romanian Roma migrants. 
Th ey asked us to help them enrol in the gym. Th e receptionist found their darker skin 
complexion similar to that of the Romanian Roma, some of whom are members of the 
gym, and inquired as to whether they were Roma too. “No, no, no Roma, Hungarian,” 
explained Robi and his wife, almost immediately to the receptionist, articulating 
loudly their nationalities. Being a Hungarian is of much higher value in England than 
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being Roma (which word is often confused in English people’s minds with the word 
Romanian; see Guy 2003, Durst 2016).11 
Robi’s daughter educational success, the exact details of which people back in 
Peteri do not know about, was due partly to Robi’s strategic planning as to which 
school he sent his children to. After learning from their other migrant Roma friends’ 
and neighbours’ bad experiences about how “Hungarian Gypsy kids are badly treated 
by their English teachers in the local school (which is full of the children of migrants) 
when they are in group,” Robi and his wife did not let their kids attend the local school 
but found another one, although much further from their residence, that welcomed 
their children as the ﬁ rst Hungarian kids in their institution. Th e teenage children 
learnt English ﬂ uently and left that secondary school with good experiences. Robi’s 
daughter, Marika, a 17-year-old girl, is continuing her studies at a BTEC secondary 
school on a business course, which may lead to further education. “Th is is the ﬁ rst 
time we had a Hungarian girl in this school,” said her form teacher with a kind smile 
when we accompanied Marika with her mum to a recent parent’s evening. “Marika has 
established a very good reputation for Hungarian pupils. She is industrious, proactive 
in her studies, and she herself did all the research necessary for her university 
application next year.” 
In Peteri, however, non-Roma migrants only got the “rumours public” (Harney 
2006, Humphris 2017, Durst 2018) about how successful Robi’s daughter is. 
Th ese stories, mostly heard of through Facebook, or in rare cases due to ﬁ rst-hand 
experiences on the occasion of personal visits, have been circulating persistently 
among the Roma in the settlement. Th ey inspire and develop the imaginations of the 
younger generation of local Roma (migrants and non-migrants alike), encouraging 
them to form aspirations that they have not before imagined: the thought that such 
success could be a real possibility for Roma with a poorly educated family background. 
Using Sen’s (1999) co ncept of development, we can interpret Laló’s and his Roma 
network’s recurring migration (facilitated by the support of their kinship and the 
labour demand of their destination regions) as an enhanced capability of mobility, and 
an increasing practice of agency. Th eir very act of geographical movement, especially 
trans-nationally, or rather trans-regionally (recently, between Peteri and one or two 
English cities where they have relatives), against all structural constraints, restrictive 
mobility regimes (Glick Schiller – Salazar 2013) and despite their lack of ﬁ nancial 
resources and command of English, can be considered a form of development. 
Agency here is understood as both the intention and the practise of acting in one’s 
own self-interest and the interest of one’s family or household (Castree et al. 2004, 
cited by Rogaly 2009, Emirbayer – Mische 1998). In the case of our low-skilled Roma 
11 It should be noted though, that not all Hungarian Roma can resort to the tactics of ethnic invisibility. In this very same English 
city a more traditional Vlach Roma group from South Hungary reside in the close vicinity of a Romanian Roma kin network. 
The latter are infamous in the neighbourhood for their informal income-generating practices. Because of this particular, 
denigrated residential address, some highly educated members of this southern Hungarian Roma group complained to us that 
even in England they couldn’t escape the stigma of being Roma. 
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migrant research participants who live in Peteri, a local society “in which the future 
has become synonymous with geographical mobility” (Narotzky – Besnier 2014:2), 
one’s agency is deeply connected to one’s spatial mobility. 
As this case study shows, we can regard labour migration as “an act of hope” (Pine 
2014) for people struggling with poverty, such as those in our studied Roma kinship 
networks. Th e latter believe that with the blocked ﬁ eld of opportunities in their 
homeland, the only way to achieve a better life both for their households but especially 
for their children is to pursue a strategy of cross-border mobile work. We argue that 
their very act of moving not only involves resilience (Acuna 2016, Levine –Rasky 2016) 
but is also a small development in itself: an enhancement of their own and perhaps also 
their network’s capacity of aspiring to escape poverty and get ahead in life. 
We believe that the thesis that (increasing) mobility in itself can be considered 
development (see also de Haas 2008) is valid in our case, even if we are aware of the 
fact that Central Eastern European Roma’s mobility is “contained” (van Baar 2017), 
both in terms of the Canadian asylum-seeking (Ciaschi 2018) and in the European 
free labour movement context (van Baar 2017, Yildiz – De Genova 2017, Nagy 2018), 
due to selective mobility regimes. Our Roma research participants’ geographical 
movement as an act of hope is a result of their choice of a mobility strategy – even 
if this choice is “constrained”. Widmer et al. (2010: 114) draw attention to the fact 
that all seemingly free decisions result from adapted choices within a system of 
constraints. Th is is particularly true in the case of our low-skilled Roma migrants 
whose decisions to migrate are adapted choices to the shrinking opportunity ﬁ eld in 
their home country. 
For non-Roma Hungarians from Peteri, trans-regional mobility, or working abroad (as guest 
workers), is also a constrained choice, similar to that of many other precarious Hungarian 
migrants (Németh − Váradi 2018, this issue; Melegh et al. 2018, this issue). However, their 
migration trajectory is diﬀ erent, and so are the characteristics of their migration network 
and the outcomes of their geographical movement. 
Zoltan’s trans-regional work-mobility trajectory can be considered typical in Peteri 
among the skilled, non-Roma Hungarian men. Zoltan is a 41-year-old carpenter and 
has completed vocational secondary school. He has been working in Germany for the 
past three years as a skilled labourer at a local ﬁ rm in the construction industry. He 
found his job with the help of an old friend who had worked for the same company. 
He has been married for 25 years to a saleswoman from Peteri, and they have one 
daughter, aged 19. 
Recalling the reasons he was “compelled” (rákényszerült) to ﬁ nd a job abroad to us 
in an interview, he said that he did it for his daughter. 
I and my wife concluded three years ago that we must do something to be able 
to support our daughter’s secondary education. That was when I called up my 
friend to help me to find a job in Germany. We decided that my wife should 
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stay at home to look after our daughter while she is studying; it is the only way 
that working abroad is worth it financially… Here in Hungary you cannot earn 
enough to keep a family. And my daughter’s high school was demanding... It 
was a medical vocational school, where teachers and your classmates expect 
you to dress properly; there were school trips, extra curriculum expenses, and 
the monthly travel cost from Peteri to Miskolc [where the school is based]. If 
one added it all up, the 130,000-forint salary that I could earn in Hungary was 
enough for nothing. Since I am the man of the house, I had to sacrifice myself for 
our daughter’s future.  
Zoltan has been working for the same German ﬁ rm for the last three years, six days 
a week, for 8 - 10 hours a day. He earns 1500 euros (450,000 forints) per month – 
almost three times more than he used to earn at home, but less than his “native” 
German workmates earn for the same labour. Out of this sum, he monthly remits 
1000 euros (300,000 forints) to his family. His daily menial work is tedious and hard 
to endure, his housing is nothing compared to his family house in Peteri. He shares 
a room with two other Hungarian workmates who are there for similar reasons as 
Zoltan. On their only spare day, Sunday, they do not want to do anything but cook, eat 
and have a rest. Zoltan can only get a one-week holiday once every four months, when 
he goes home to Peteri to see his family. “I do not carry on with this working abroad, 
away from my family, from any sense of pleasure (jókedvemből),” he said to us last time 
we met, a few days after Christmas when he was back home for a couple of weeks due 
to the winter closure of his company. 
I do it for my family to get ahead. Since I’ve been working abroad we have managed 
to renovate our house and bought a new car. But I do it mainly for my daughter’s 
future, for her to have a better life than we have. Although she misses me, she 
knows that it is out of necessity, a constraint (kényszer). Yes, it is a constrained 
choice (kényszerű választás) of my wife and me. I must take this job in Germany 
which pays three times more than I can earn in Hungary if we do not want our 
daughter to have such a hard life as we have had. What can one do if he has 
no other choice but to work abroad where his labour is decently paid? I cannot 
imagine myself coming back to Hungary and working again for ten hours per day 
for 130,000 forints. And I am pessimistic about this situation changing in the near 
future. I am not alone in this opinion. So many people leave Peteri to go abroad, be 
they Roma or non-Roma, to create a better livelihood for their families. 
Th e downside of Zoltan’s working abroad, in his account, is that he feels that he and 
his wife have become alienated for the last three years. 
It is not the same between us as it used to be before I left. Even my daughter feels 
this. It was, however, our mutual choice, so I am hopeful that my marriage will 
survive this period, me being away. One has nothing more important than their 
child and her future... I’m happy to see that my daughter is making progress with 
her studies; she is now in higher education, training as a medical masseuse. She 
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sees her future as working abroad later, as she says, because with her qualifi cation 
she can earn six times more than in Hungary. I understand her intentions. Since 
she has studied that much and since I have invested so much money in her studies, 
and I have sacrifi ced myself and my marriage for this, I would like to see that it is 
worth it. Th at she can  get ahead in life. 
Zoltan’s labour migration strategy can be considered typical among the many 
Hungarian skilled laborers in Peteri. For them, labour migration is a constrained 
choice – a deliberate and conscious strategy, that is, however, strongly limited by 
structural constraints. Namely, by the lack of jobs with a decent salary in the proximity 
of the home town, enough for one to support a family according to family members’ 
aspirations. Zoltan’s and his other guest-worker mates’ remittance-sending strategy 
aims to contribute to the ﬁ nancial betterment of their nuclear families and to facilitate 
their children’s further education. In their narratives about their migration history, 
the word “sacriﬁ ce” comes up often. Th is is a household livelihood strategy which 
has a very narrow developmental eﬀ ect, and mainly in a ﬁ nancial sense. It cannot 
also be considered a transnational life in the sense that recent migration studies 
argue. Namely, that in the new globalized world there is a “transnational turn” and 
the lives of migrants are increasingly characterized by circulation and simultaneous 
commitment to two societies and to adopting transnational identities (Glick Schiller 
et al. 1991, Guarnizo et al. 2003, Vertovec 1999, De Haas 2005). For Zoltan, as for 
many of his local friends in similar social circumstances, Germany represents a place 
where they do not want to integrate but rather to work to earn enough money to 
make a better life for their families they have left behind. However, this household-
level ﬁ nancial advancement (“development” in the narrow sense, as international 
ﬁ nancial institutions understand it) does not seem to lead to development in the 
migration-sending community level. Not only due to its huge social price in respect of 
the decline of his marital relationships. Zoltan, along with his other co-guest workers, 
also do not plan to invest in any local businesses or enterprises at home except in his 
children’s education (however, his daughter also plans to work abroad after getting 
qualiﬁ cations in Hungary).
Zoltan’s case, along with that of many other Hungarian skilled labourer migrants 
from Peteri, supports another observation. Namely, that the nature of the migration-
development nexus is fundamentally contingent on more general developmental 
conditions in the sending region (De Haas 2008). In other words, development in 
migrant-sending localities is a prerequisite for return and investment (De Haas 2008). 
As Zoltan put it: “Th ere is no point in investing in a life at home in Peteri. I cannot 
imagine myself coming back and working for that small amount of money again. I do 
not see any sense in returning. Only if the situation and the economy improves. But I am 
rather pessimistic in this regard. I think we are the victims of the system in Hungary.” 
25Judit Durst - Zsanna Nyírő: Constrained choices, enhanced aspirations
Migrants as “agents of development”? Remittance-sending 
behaviour in Peteri 
As we have shown earlier, according to our survey results most migrants from Peteri 
send remittances to their hometown. However, there are diﬀ erences among Roma 
and non-Roma remitters’ practices regarding how this money is spent. On the basis 
of our interview data we can add there are also diﬀ erences in the amount of regular or 
less regular monthly remittances. 
From our ethnographic ﬁ eldwork it is clear that migrants’ remittance-sending 
patterns are linked to their migration patterns. First, to the conditions they experience 
in their destination locality (see also Glick Schiller 2009). Second, to the characteristics 
of their migration (for example, whether they moved with their nuclear or extended 
family, or they left behind other family members).  
In Peteri, according to our interview data, non-Roma Hungarian skilled migrant 
workers, similarly to Zoltan, send remittances home of signiﬁ cantly higher amounts 
than Roma low-skilled mobile workers. While the members of the former group 
regularly send most of their monthly salaries back to Peteri to their wives (on average, 
as the wives we interviewed reported, around three hundred thousand forints), the 
low-skilled Roma, the majority of whom move together with their whole families, 
send only small amounts home. Th e conditions they experience in their destination 
countries do not make it possible for them to remit regularly. In Canada, many of them 
spent huge amounts of money on lawyers to help them navigate the very complicated 
asylum-claiming legal process. In England, unlike in Germany, employers do not 
provide them with accommodation, therefore they need to spend a good portion of 
their salary on renting a ﬂ at. Although many of them are entitled to housing beneﬁ t 
due to their low income, this form of government aid has constantly been cut back 
for migrants in recent years (see also Greenﬁ elds – Dagilyte 2018). Th erefore, it is 
no wonder that, unlike the non-Roma, low-skilled Roma migrants do not remit on a 
regular basis but mostly only to help in crisis situations concerning their non-migrant 
extended families (for medicine or hospital treatment, to buy wood for heating a house 
during a cold winter, towards the cost of surgery of an ill child within the kinship, 
etc.). However, those Roma in Canada who plan to come back in the near future to the 
settlement send regular smaller amounts (less than one hundred thousand forints 
every few months) to a trusted close family member’s account (mainly their parents’) 
for the purpose of renovating their own houses on their return. 
For non-Roma skilled laborers, their remittance-sending practices have developmental 
eﬀ ects, but mainly in ﬁ nancial terms, associated with materially getting ahead. Th eir 
families use the remittances to refurbish their houses, educate their children, repay 
debt and increase their consumption (see also Váradi 2016). However, this material 
advancement comes in some cases at a huge price. Fathers who are away for three to ﬁ ve 
years, and who visit home only for one week every eight weeks, can only take part in the 
lives of their children and wives through regular Skype conversations. Divorces occur due 
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to these long-distance relationships. As one of the local Hungarians said to us when we 
asked whether he was planning to work abroad, he would never do that without his family, 
as “it is like the life of the lorry drivers. Out of ten, six are divorced.”  
For low-skilled returning Roma migrants, not only is their migration pattern diﬀ erent 
but also its ﬁ nancial outcome. In a ﬁ nancial sense their transnational mobility is not as 
proﬁ table and rewarding as it is in the case of non-Roma Hungarians. Many of them say 
that they feel that they “are stuck,” or “spinning around in one place” ( with their “constant 
wandering” (kóborlás), referring to their recurring work abroad. Th e majority of them, 
however, mention that they would never have dreamt of owning a house if they had not 
gone to Canada (or England). Th ey all stated that from low-paid, menial wage labour one 
cannot send home remittances to other extended family members, or only in situations 
of crisis. However, one should also see that their trans-regionally mobility strategy helps 
them and their close relatives to get by in the shrinking opportunity ﬁ eld in Hungary. 
Conclusion: Exploring the migration-development nexus in 
Peteri 
Based on our empirical ﬁ ndings, we argue for the diﬀ erential developmental eﬀ ect 
of migration regarding Roma and non-Roma migrants or trans-regionally mobile 
workers in the context of the small rural town of Peteri. Our survey results support 
the hypothesis that local diﬀ erentiation (in our case, based on ethnicity) between 
diﬀ erent social groups has a signiﬁ cant eﬀ ect on the pattern and organization of their 
diverging migration trajectories. We found several diﬀ erences between the migration 
patterns of the Roma and non-Roma migrants in our studied locality. First, the two 
groups choose diﬀ erent destination countries. Second, Roma respondents from Peteri 
mostly rely on their kinship networks in the realization of their migration, while non-
Roma migrants receive assistance from their acquaintances and friends. Th ird, their 
practices of sending remittances are also distinct. 
In addition, our ethnographic ﬁ ndings, through exploring both the causes and 
consequences of the local population’s migration, have delineated the mechanisms 
through which diﬀ erent migration patterns produce diﬀ erent impacts at the 
individual, household and local community level.
While our ﬁ ndings support the diﬀ erential migration-development interaction 
thesis, they reject purely pessimistic developmental ideas common among researchers 
who study Roma return migrants in residentially segregated sending communities in 
post-socialist Eastern and Central Europe (for Romania see Szabó 2018, Anghel 2016, 
Horváth – Kiss 2015). Our North Hungarian case study draws attention to the fact 
that the impact of migration in the case of poor Roma migrants and their non-migrant 
networks is more complex than suggesting it only served to reproduce their poverty 
and inequality. Along with some prominent labour geographers’ attempts (Rogaly 
2009) to focus on the low-key and often invisible ways by which people with very 
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limited material means practise agency and rework their positions to make a more 
viable life (Butler 2004) – one, that is in their view, worth living –, we have shown 
that even those migrants who returned to the segregated Roma settlement in Peteri, 
with just enough savings to renovate their dilapidated houses, and whose migration 
stories appear unsuccessful in the eyes of their local mayor, have experienced a kind 
of development. Th eir  enhanced practice of agency – the very act of the geographical 
movement –, especially trans-nationally, or rather trans-regionally, against all 
structural constraints, and restrictive mobility regimes, coupled with a lack of ﬁ nancial 
resources and command of English, can be considered a form of development. 
However, we must add that, up till now, only on an individual level can we see social 
development, and only in the case of a small fragment of the local Roma community. 
Th is development can best be tracked on a cognitive level as a perceptual shift, as the 
cases of Laló’s and Karol’s teenage children with their growing “aspirations window” 
have demonstrated. 
On the contrary, for a larger segment of the Roma community, going on to generate 
income or work in Canada and in England, this was just another workplace where they 
did not even learn the language, and their children were too small to beneﬁ t from a 
more inclusive and equal education system. Th ese Roma migrants’ social interaction 
was conﬁ ned to the circle of Hungarian, and, in particular, Roma migrants and they 
did not beneﬁ t from their migration in more than a narrow ﬁ nancial sense – if at 
all. (Th is same statement applies to those non-Roma Hungarian men who have been 
working in Germany during the last few years).  
On the downside, concomitant to the cross-border or trans-regional mobility of 
Roma families, is that much of their children’s primary education was interrupted. 
Th ese children, faced with the lack of a national re-integration program, have dropped 
out of school, ﬁ nishing only eight years of study at an older age, if at all. However, 
we might say cautiously on the basis of our interviews that the Roma children who 
migrated together with their families seem to have paid less of a price for the move 
as regards their psychological well-being than those who were left behind by their 
migrant parents.
From our empirical ﬁ ndings, explored in this paper, a couple of statements from 
the current academic literature about the nexus between migration and development 
can be supported. First, that the nexus should be analyzed at diﬀ erent analytical 
levels as it is muti-layered, and multi-directional, and that the transfer of resources 
should be explored as a two-way ﬂ ow (Delgado Wise − Covarrubias 2009, Faist 2009). 
Exploring the consequences of Peteri outmigration from a global perspective which 
addresses the movement of people and proﬁ ts across national borders (Glick Schiller 
2009), it is clear that the Peteri migrants, be they low-skilled Roma or skilled non-
Roma laborers, are not only remitters but also contribute to the development of the 
receiving countries “through their capital accumulations… by their transference of 
their ‘surplus population’… as an overall cheapening of the workforce” (Delgado Wise 
28 Review of Sociology, 2018/4
− Covarrubias 2009: 85). Our case studies have shown that one of the roles that Peteri 
plays in the global economy in recent years is providing cheap and ﬂ exible, mobile 
laborers for global assembly lines.  
Second, the stories recited above can also be read as a case in point that 
underdevelopment is a catalyst for migration to developed countries (Delgado Wise − 
Covarrubias 2009). However, we would not call it “forced migration,” as Delgado Wise 
– Covarrubias denominate it, nor would we label it “involuntary mobility,” as some 
anthropologists do (among others, Nagy – Oude-Breuil 2015). Rather, we would view 
it as a result of “constrained choice.” 
On the regional and national level, the mass outmigration of locals from Peteri 
(along with many Hungarians) has indirectly contributed to the increase in labour 
demand and therefore of income for those who have stayed in their hometown. As 
the local Roma recall, there was no precedent to what is happening now: “Bosch sends 
free buses to almost every nearby settlement for its commuters, even if there are 
only two workers in one village, as there is such a shortage of laborers.”  Many non-
migrant Roma who used to previously complain about not being able to ﬁ nd any jobs 
on the formal local labour market because of their low level of schooling and dark skin 
(a hint as to the labor market discrimination against Roma in Hungary, see Kertesi 
2005) are now employed by Bosch, or currently work as unskilled day laborers in the 
construction industry.
On the local level, in the settlement of Peteri, out-migration, or rather trans-
regional work mobility, similarly to informal income-generating practices, has a “buﬀ er 
function” (Portes 2010) in terms of alleviating poverty, mainly through migrants’ 
remittances. Th is is true for both Roma and non-Roma, skilled and unskilled, returned 
and current mobile workers’ households. 
All in all, we conclude that in the context of the economically disadvantaged rural 
town of Peteri, migration has a diﬀ erent developmental eﬀ ect on the groups of its most 
numerous migrants, the precarious Roma and non-Roma households. Non-Roma 
Hungarian skilled labourer, the so called new European guest-workers, through their 
regular monthly remittances, justify their stays abroad as helping their families to get 
ahead, but mostly in a material sense. In contrast, in the community of the low-skilled 
Roma we see some real developmental impact in the sense of increased capabilities 
(Sen 1999) and, on the cognitive level, in the sense of empowerment (Appadurai 
2004). Return Roma migrants seem to achieve much less migration-induced ﬁ nancial 
advancement than their non-Roma skilled local counterpart. Unlike in other countries 
(for Romania see Tesar 2016, Toma et al. 2017), in Peteri, no conspicuous houses have 
been built to show their return migrant dweller’s migration-induced increased status. 
Returned Roma trans-nationally mobile workers have not (yet) managed to move out 
of their segregated neighbourhood, either, unlike successful migrants in other CEE 
countries.  
29Judit Durst - Zsanna Nyírő: Constrained choices, enhanced aspirations
However, we consider the low-skilled Roma’s very act of moving (out of their 
conﬁ ned, geographically and socially segregated settlement on the outskirts of Peteri) 
not only as a form of resilience (Clave-Mercier – Olivera 2018, Durst – Nagy 2018) but 
as a kind of development – in the sense that the former are increasingly putting into 
practise their freedom (albeit constrained) to choose where to live and work, and that 
they have taken a step towards enhancing their own and also their network’s capacity 
to aspire. Having said that, migration has not only empowered Roma individuals to 
dare to aspire higher. Th ere is also the hope that the enhanced aspirations of return 
migrant teenagers, through their networks which comprise their migrant and non-
migrant kin and friends, and which are reinforced by their everyday contact through 
social media, might contribute to the strengthening of their community’s capacity to 
aspire (Appadurai 2004). If this happens, there is a chance that these young adults 
will indeed be able to “get ahead,” and to escape poverty should socio-political and 
economic circumstances change in Hungary. 
Appendix
Table 1: Distribution of respondents by gender and ethnicity (%)
  non-Roma Roma Total
  N=190 N=452 N=642
women 28,9 38,5 35,7
men 71,1 61,5 64,3
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
Table 2: Distribution of respondents by education and ethnicity (%)
   
non-
Roma
Roma Total
    N=189 N=452 N=641
no more than primary school 
education
less than primary school education 4,8 9,1 7,8
primary school education 25,9 57,7 48,4
at least vocational education
vocational qualiﬁ cation 51,3 28,1 34,9
at least high school education 18,0 5,1 8,9
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
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Table 3: Distribution of respondents according to whether they have a job and by ethnicity (%)
  non-Roma Roma Total
  N=177 N=418 N=595
permanent job 66,1 49,3 54,3
temporary job 14,1 19,9 18,2
no job 19,8 30,9 27,6
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
Table 4: Distribution of respondents according to who provided them with accommodation 
when they ﬁ rst moved abroad, by ethnicity (%)
  non-Roma Roma Total
  N=180 N=437 N=617
family members 25,6 66,6 54,6
acquaintances, friends 6,1 9,2 8,3
workplace 46,1 11,2 21,4
rented apartment 20,6 7,1 11,0
other 1,7 5,9 4,7
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
Table 5: Sending remittances to accomplish their own goals (e.g. house renovation) by 
ethnicity (%)
  non-Roma Roma Total
  N=190 N=452 N=642
no 64,7 55,8 58,4
yes 35,3 44,3 41,6
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
Table 6: Sending remittances to family members by ethnicity (%)
  non-Roma Roma Total
  N=190 N=452 N=642
no 60,0 69,2 66,5
yes 40,0 30,8 33,5
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
31Judit Durst - Zsanna Nyírő: Constrained choices, enhanced aspirations
Table 7: Sending remittances to pay debts by ethnicity (%)
  non-Roma Roma Total
  N=190 N=452 N=642
no 91,1 82,1 84,7
yes 8,9 17,9 15,3
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0
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Abstract: Migration has a signiﬁ cant impact on the home communities of the migrants through ﬁ nancial 
and social remittances. Th ere is an ongoing debate about the eﬀ ects of migration on local development 
between proponents of approaches inspired by “development optimism” on the one hand, and those that are 
focused more on the negative consequences. Our study is focused on the ways mobile Roma are repositioning 
themselves within two ethnically mixed localities in Transylvania. Returnees take advantage, reorient 
and navigate between local social categories, challenging them to rely on the resources at their disposal to 
improve the situation of their families and communities. Social networks facilitate migration and also serve 
as support for the renegotiation of social categories at home. We distinguish between two main patterns of 
network development. On the one hand there are localities where network ties crosscut ethnic boundaries 
and facilitate intense exchanges and communication between diﬀ erent segments of local society. In the other 
case, network ties tend to be tight between members of the same ethnic category, but ties that cut through 
ethnic boundaries remain weak. We discuss the implications of these patterns for the local development 
paths of the home localities of the migrants.
Keywords: Migration, Networks and Categories, Social Distance, Local Development, Roma in Romania
Introduction
The demise of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe and the expansion of the 
European Union in the region created the conditions for a new wave of migration. 
Emerging east-west migration have contributed to a renewed scholarly and public 
discussion not only about the future of the EU as a political and social project, 
but also about the impact of massive population mobility on social inequality 
and development in the eastern part of the continent. During these debates, 
the demographic and socioeconomic development of the states on the eastern 
1 The research leading to the present publication results from the research effort “MigRom – The Immigration of Romanian 
Roma to Western Europe: Causes, effects, and future engagement strategies,” a project funded by the European Union’s 
Seventh Framework Programme under the call “Dealing with diversity and cohesion: the case of the Roma in the European 
Union” (GA319901). We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers as well as to Judit Durst and Krisztina Németh for their 
editorial comments and patience.
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periphery of the EU, Romania among them, is rarely presented in an optimistic 
light (Horváth – Kiss 2016).
This developmental pessimism dominates most of the analyses regarding the 
migration and return of the most impoverished Eastern European social groups, 
Roma among them. A large part of the scholarly literature concerning the migration 
of Roma highlights the limitations of European citizenship regarding the effective 
protection of the rights of the most vulnerable during their sojourns within the 
European Union (van Baar, Ivasiuc, and Kreide 2019), and demonstrates that their 
social mobility is stalled in their destinations and that their exclusion continues or 
even intensiϐies after they return home (Creţan – Powell 2018). Moreover, there 
is cumulative evidence of the failure of policies promoted by the EU to combat 
discrimination and facilitate social inclusion or community development among 
the Roma “on the ground” in the context of their home countries (FRA 2018). 
Most of this literature highlights how persisting social exclusion of the Roma 
hinders socioeconomic development in Romania and has only contributed to the 
“racialization” of the Roma (see Yıldız – De Genova 2018).
In this article we challenge the approaches that argue that the intra-European 
mobility of the Roma has only worsened their exclusion by showing that the effect 
of mobility is multidimensional and goes beyond mere economic changes and 
exchanges. Focusing mostly on a comparative discussion of two ethnically mixed 
localities in Transylvania, we argue that migration and return have far more diverse 
local effects due to a speciﬁ c combination of economic and non-economic factors that are 
able to produce social transformations. We highlight the role of non-economic factors, 
such as hierarchically organized ethnic categories, the social distance between 
these categories, and the existence or scarcity of social networks and exchanges that 
crosscut ethnic boundaries, in order to show how they also shape the different paths 
of local development. We propose a typology of the development paths in ethnically 
mixed localities, aiming at creating more nuanced approach to addressing changes 
in social relations induced by migration. The empirical data presented here emerged 
from the MigRom research project (see Matras – Leggio 2018).
The paper is structured as follows: ϐirst, we present the research design 
and provide a short literature review about the existing research and quest for 
conceptual tools for our analysis. We then introduce the data from the ϐield-sites, 
followed by a discussion of the ϐindings. 
Research design and methods
The ethnographic and statistical data presented in this study come from the 
MigRom project. As the Romanian partner of this collaborative project we selected 
ϐive localities – three medium-size towns and two villages, covering different 
regions of Romania – in order to investigate the local effects of migration of the 
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Roma communities. We employed mixed methodology, using both quantitative 
(surveys) and qualitative (ethnographic ϐieldwork and conducted qualitative 
interviews) research between 2014 and 2016 in all the localities. 
We designed a survey using two questionnaires. First, we used a household 
survey to elicit basic demographic data and present questions related to the 
migration experiences. This form was used in as many households as possible.2 
Second, on a sample of Roma households we applied a more detailed questionnaire 
about income types and spending in the households, remittances, utilities, housing 
conditions, migration history and intentions, destination countries, social networks, 
and relations with local administration. This questionnaire was carried out on a 
sample of the majority population in the two villages as a control group – including 
an additional block of questions on social distance, everyday attitudes and contact 
between members of different ethnic groups. The ϐieldwork for the survey was 
organized during the winter months (November-February) to ensure we could 
reach migrants involved in circular migration. We worked closely with both local 
Roma and non-Roma research assistants at every phase of the research. We followed 
the same principles as in the case of the majority sample regarding eliciting attitudes 
towards the Roma.3 This study is focused on the two villages from Transylvania.
Literature review 
While there are recurrent discussions about the migration–development nexus and 
different approaches ϐluctuate between developmental optimism and pessimism, 
it is important to identify how additional resources brought in by mobility are 
distributed and invested (de Haas 2010). It is worth considering the classic example 
of the half-full or half-empty glass, and identifying how local society pours and 
ϐilters “the liquid” (material and non-material resources) through the channels of 
social relations. Development, broadly deϐined, is the cumulative result of social 
changes through which improvements in the economic and social context can be 
observed at a local level, and in which different types of resources are mobilized. 
The local articulation of social change depends both on local social divisions and 
the context in which it occurs. Ethnic categories historically play an important role 
in the production and maintenance of the inequalities between different segments 
of local society (Roma/local majority). 
In terms of conceptualizing the role of categories in producing and maintaining 
social inequality, the work of Charles Tilly has inspired recent theoretical 
2 In the villages we tried to undertake a community census, but we can only approximate the size of the Roma population 
in both cases as we could not reach those households whose members were abroad for a longer period of time. Thus we 
collected data on 1041 persons in Baratca and 672 in Bighal. In our reports and articles we use pseudonyms for the localities to 
protect the identity of the communities. 
3 We are grateful to our research assistants and research participants in all localities for the help they provided during these 
months and for accepting us into their day-to-day lives.
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discussions. Tilly summarized the structure of the main elements of his relational 
theory of inequality4 in a short article published in Anthropological Theory: 
Controllers of valuable resources who are pursuing exploitation or 
opportunity hoarding commonly invent or borrow categorical pairs, 
installing them at dividing lines between greater and lesser beneϐiciaries 
from products of those resources. In this broad sense, inequality by 
gender, race, ethnicity, class, religion, citizenship, lineage, and many other 
categorical principles follows common causal patterns. Explanation of 
inequality and its changes must therefore concentrate on identifying 
combinations and sequences of causal mechanisms – notably exploitation, 
opportunity hoarding, emulation, and adaptation – within episodes of 
social interaction. (Tilly 2001: 368)
For the purpose of our study, as well as more generally for migration studies, the 
concept of opportunity hoarding provides an important theoretical point of entry. 
Rogers Brubaker suggested in his critical review of Tilly’s theory that opportunity 
hoarding by “categorical bounded networks” should be further reϐined:
[T]he notion of “categorically bounded networks” conceals a tension, joining 
elements with quite different logics that may work separately in practice. 
Categories are deϐined by commonality, networks by connectedness. 
Categories are classes of equivalent elements; networks are sets of 
relationships. Category members are not necessarily connected to one 
another, and relationally connected people need not belong to the same 
category. Deϐinitionally positing “categorically bounded networks” as the 
agents of opportunity hoarding elides the difference between network-based 
and category-based modes of social closure and forecloses the question of 
whether, when, and how categories of difference are involved in insiders’ 
efforts to monopolize goods and opportunities. (Brubaker 2015: 16) 
Many forms of categorical exclusion were delegitimized in most of the societies 
of the Western world (and beyond) during the second part of the twentieth century; 
formal social mechanisms which produce or maintain inequality based on categories 
like sex, ethnicity/race, and religion are illegal in all European countries today. 
However, one particular form of categorical discrimination has remained largely 
unchallenged: this is discrimination based on citizenship (Brubaker 2015: 45).
A large part of the literature about the recent mobility of the Roma has its focus 
at this level: it discusses issues connected to the process of European enlargement, 
the extension of EU citizenship, and the consequence of this in core EU countries. 
Several thematic issues of journals and an edited volume have covered the issues of 
the emergence of European policies and the local context of Roma migration with 
particular focus on the destination countries (Clough Marinaro – Sigona 2011; 
4 A full elaboration of this theory may be found in Tilly’s book Durable Inequality (1998).
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Sigona – Vermeersch 2012; Nedelcu – Ciobanu 2016; Yıldız – De Genova 2018; 
Asztalos Morell, Greenϐields – Smith 2018; van Baar, Ivasiuc – Kreide 2019). There 
is broad agreement that the European Union follows the blueprint of a “neoliberal” 
project (Sigona – Trehan 2009), a logic that on the one hand promotes a free ϐlow of 
capital and labour, but also builds obstacles against the poor and underprivileged 
to prevent their mobility. Moreover, these populations (in particular the Roma and 
Muslims) are racialized, and their exclusion is more severe than before (van Baar 
2017). 
Case studies demonstrate that, along with the extension of EU citizenship, the 
categorization of citizens is undergoing changes that render large numbers of 
migrants undesirable in their destination countries. However, these processes of 
categorization do not stop Roma from migrating and this has led Nicolas De Genova, 
one of the most ϐiercely critical voices of this citizenship regime, to concede: 
[W]e are reminded that, no matter how abject their citizenship, and no matter 
how effectively un/free their mobility, as EU citizens, many Roma migrants 
nonetheless appropriate their putative right to ‘free movement’ and migrate 
in order to realize their various aspirations and ambitions for a way of life 
free from the asphyxiating constraints of their racial subjugation ‘at home.’ 
(De Genova 2019: 38)
Local studies approach the mobility of “new EU citizens” from a different 
angle and focus on the categorization and repositioning strategies observable 
on the ground within the communities. They reveal that Roma individuals and 
communities do not subject themselves passively to the home conditions, but 
rather use their mobility to challenge and overcome local categorical hierarchies. 
Similarly to these ethnographic case studies from Transylvania (Cingolani 2012; 
Anghel 2016; Voiculescu 2004; Kinda 2011; Peti 2017; Szabó 2018) and elsewhere 
(see the thematic double-issue of Intersections edited by Durst and Nagy 2018), 
we describe the agency of the migrants, and their strategies of resisting and 
challenging the existing local order in their quest to improve living conditions. 
Repositioning strategies take many forms, from more isolated and individual to 
more widespread within the home communities (Szabó 2018: 220; Kinda 2011; 
Kiss – Kiss 2017; Kiss 2015), and can be accompanied by challenges to the local 
hierarchy, the crossing of ethnic boundaries, or exiting altogether and migrating 
permanently (Anghel, forthcoming).
One particular set of repositioning strategies triggers spontaneous residential 
desegregation processes. Using resources from their migration, Roma acquire 
houses or plots, move to central locations in the localities, or build their own large 
houses. Similar developments occur among ethnic Romanian migrants, since they 
also move to more prestigious spaces and build bigger houses. However, the case 
of Roma houses or “palaces” is peculiar, since they attract much criticism. Based on 
their urban ϐieldwork in Timișoara, Reșița, and two other smaller settlements in 
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the Banat, Crețan and Powell argue that Roma, despite being “wealthy” and owning 
large houses in the city centre, still cannot escape group stigmatization (Creţan and 
Powell 2018). Others view the conspicuous architecture as a way for these Roma 
to formulate claims to citizenship (Tomlinson 2007), while others wonder if these 
constructions become “magnets for hate” of the local majority (Nemeth and Gianferro 
2009). It is noteworthy that “Roma palaces” are not randomly scattered but clustered 
in localities distributed all over Romania (Gräf 2008). Their emergence is connected 
to the internal structures and ideas within the particular Roma community (Tesăr 
2016; Benarrosh – Orsoni 2015) and their relationship to the local majority. 
Speaking about the role of networks, Maria-Carmen Pantea highlights their 
importance as informal “migration infrastructure” (Pantea 2013). Péter Berta 
focused on a highly mobile Roma group and their ways of accumulating relational 
capital and cultivating networks that enable them to practice intermediary 
commerce (Berta 2014).  Similarly, the migrant Roma described by Cătălina Tesăr 
(Tesăr 2011; Tesăr 2016) use their mobility abroad to maintain their cultural 
autonomy in the communities of origin. These later cases could be seen as coming 
closest to what Charles Tilly called “categorically bounded networks;” however, in 
these cases the economic strategies of the groups rely on maintaining ties outside 
the community. Roma moving between different locations manage to keep apart 
spheres of production and consumption; in their productive activities they depend 
on outsiders, but they still celebrate their putative independence in the spheres of 
consumption and ritual (Stewart 1997).
There is a set of network ties that systematically crosscuts ethnic categories: 
these are informal relations with particular members of the local majority who 
represent or work within local institutions. Often, the effective operation of social 
rights depends on these networks. In addition, institutions legalize dwellings, 
issue permits, or extend communal infrastructure, which activities are crucial in 
creating the legal frame for local development. 
Local networks maintain the heterogeneity of the population within the 
broad category of citizenship. These are framed by different local institutions, 
in particular churches, as already described (Fosztó 2003; Kinda 2007; Fosztó 
2009), while the translocal role of these networks during migration has also been 
highlighted (Peti 2017; Lipan 2017). 
In our previous publications (Toma – Fosztó 2018; Toma, Tesăr, and Fosztó 
2018) we described and analyzed the emergence of migration among the Roma 
segments of population inhabiting ethnically mixed localities in Romania. The 
migration of the Roma in increased numbers started later than the migration of 
other Romanians. Local ethnic relations and, in particular, the social distance 
between Roma and the majority has an effect on how migration networks develop 
(Toma and Fosztó 2018). Taking our argument one step further, we show below 
how the local context can shape the effects of return. We argue that in localities with 
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rather heterogeneous populations, as is often the case in Transylvania, shifting 
networks and the negotiation and re-negotiation of local ties and categories 
should be discussed as part of the local development process.
Th e communities in transformation
In order to analyze the role of the categories and networks that produce and 
maintain social inequality during the migration process we will look at the 
case of two ϐield-sites. Starting from the processes described by Charles Tilly as 
opportunity hoarding through “categorical bounded networks,” we problematize 
the relationship between networks and categories following the suggestion by 
Rogers Brubaker. Our empirical case exempliϐies the dynamic processes that not 
only rely on the existing categorical divisions within the localities, but also shape 
the potential development paths of the communities of origin. In one of the cases 
the developmental effect of migration fosters more convergent social categorization, 
while in the other case it reinforces more divergent interpretations that challenge 
the preexisting categories. Accordingly, social networks develop either in a 
more encompassing manner or narrow down along categorical distinctions 
(represented by the vertical axis of the ϐigure below). The migration-induced 
transformations can produce rather competitive relations, but can also encourage 
cooperation. Here we understand competition and cooperation in a broad sense 
that is not limited to economic behavior; it rather represents a general attitude of 
acceptance or contestation of locally imposed symbolic hierarchies and categories 
(represented by the horizontal axis). 
Figure 1.: Migration-induced development paths in ethnically mixed localities
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Baratca and Bighal are villages of between 3000 and 3500 inhabitants. 
Hungarians form the dominant local majority in both cases and there is a 
signiϐicant Roma population (about 35% of the total inhabitants of Baratca and 
around 20% of Bighal). The Roma in both localities are engaged in rather intense 
international mobility. Most of the Hungarians in Baratca belong to the Lutheran 
Church, while Roma are traditionally Orthodox Christians but have increasingly 
converted to Pentecostalism in recent decades. They speak exclusively Romanian 
as their native tongue. In Bighal most Roma are native Romani speakers, also 
proϐicient in Hungarian and Romanian. Traditionally, Roma and Hungarians are 
members of the Reformed (Calvinist) Church, but more recently membership of 
neo-protestant groups (i.e., Pentecostal and Baptist) has increased among the 
Roma community.
The localities are situated in relatively well-developed counties in Transylvania 
– Baratca in Brașov county and Bighal in Sălaj county (Benedek, Cristea, and 
Szendi 2015: 25-26; Teșliuc, Grigoraș, and Stănculescu 2016:274). Nevertheless, 
according to the Atlas of Rural Marginalized Areas the rate of marginalization of 
above 24% in Baratca corresponds to severe marginalization, while in Bighal the 
rate of marginalization falls between 6.1 and 12%, which roughly corresponds to 
the county average.5
Our ϐield research conϐirmed these data. 
Th e competitive architecture of Baratca
When approaching Baratca by car or by train one inevitably observes the poor and 
segregated area on the fringe of the hill with scattered one-room wooden or cob 
buildings. There are no paved streets leading to the hill settlement, and practically 
no access to basic infrastructure (running water, electricity, a sewage system). 
There are also some newly renovated or unϐinished and relatively bigger houses 
on the main (national) road. These are houses that used to be the property of local 
Hungarians, bought by better-off Roma families who managed to save enough 
money by working abroad more or less regularly. 
The ϐirst interviews revealed that Roma started to migrate due to the declining 
local formal or informal employment opportunities. They used to be employed 
as non-specialized or qualiϐied workers before 1989 in nearby industrial centers, 
but these dissolved soon after their privatization following 1990. Others were 
agricultural workers, who now occasionally rent plots of land from the villagers 
and garden them. Approximately 60% of the surveyed households (households 
number 240 in total in Baratca) had one or more household members working 
abroad after 2007, while none of them had migration experience before that year. 
5 These indicators of marginality are built by using data about human capital (such as education level, health, and family size or 
number of children), employment situation and housing situation (Teșliuc, Grigoraș, and Stănculescu 2016, p. 21).
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We documented the case of Skinny during our ϐieldwork in the village. This 
case can be seen as an example of a successful migrant career:
Skinny, a young Roma man, was the pioneer of looking for opportunities in 
Great Britain, and considered that it was more convenient and worthwhile 
for the family to stay together there, so he took his whole family. Slowly, 
through him more and more people from the extended family, and later from 
the community, started to make use of his network relations in London. 
He became the job intermediary for this network, invested in renting 
accommodation in London and then sub-renting to his co-villagers. Soon, 
the demand grew considerably, therefore the transportation businesses 
invested in regular bus connections between the village and London and 
Paris,6 making it easier for the locals to travel, but also to send smaller or 
bigger packages. 
Most of the investments go into buying consumer goods, making improvements 
to homes, or acquiring new houses. For many families these are the urgent 
demands, while only a few families have managed to use ϐinancial remittances to 
start a business.7 One family invested in agriculture, renting plots in the village or 
in the nearby village and buying 50 sheep. Some other families invested in opening 
small shops (“magazin mixt”) in the close vicinity of the segregated neighborhood, 
to the deep discontent of a middle-aged, non-Roma woman who used to have a 
similar small shop right in the center of the village. She complained that after the 
opening of large shopping malls with a huge diversity of merchandise, the local 
majority population changed their shopping habits, buying everything in the city. 
Before migration started, she could rely on the shopping demand of the Roma, but 
now “those ϐive Gypsy shops have taken over all the clients.” They have the relative 
advantage of being closer to the settlement, and make offers adjusted to the needs 
of clients and offer informal credit to reliable customers. 
Some admire the skills that the Roma have acquired during their trips abroad 
while working in constructions. These masonry skills are most visible in the 
segregated neighborhood where huts are gradually being replaced with small, 
but modernized brick houses. This is the neighborhood where change is most 
noticeable for the locals, as the appearance of new buildings contradicts the 
stereotype of the Roma as negligent with their environment. Consequently, it is 
recognized that the mobility of Roma produces changes in local society through 
their making use of social and ϐinancial remittances. We may expect that these 
6 We should mention here that the migration network to Paris has a different development history.
7 Describing pessimistic views of migration and development studies, de Haas (2010:236) mentions that there is a widespread 
tendency to artificially differentiate between “conspicuous consumption” and non-productive spending of remittances and 
productive investment of money. Nevertheless, Conway & Cohen (1998:28) underlined that in the case of poor households/
communities the importance of consumption expenditure should not be underestimated. Similarly, investment in health and 
education should also be defined as productive investment. 
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changes go beyond the immediate familial context, impacting the broader 
community, including non-migrants (Taylor – Dyer 2009; Elrick 2008). 
They come home with quite a good amount of money, they buy  houses and 
cars here, so you can already see that there is another mentality, they think 
differently. Of course, there are also those who go and do the same things 
that they used to do here, begging or stealing, and with this of course they 
darken the situation of the others (…) For us as a commune and community, 
I consider that it is a good step that they are going to other worlds so that 
they can see these other worlds; they come home with a different mentality. 
(Representative of local institution, an ethnic Hungarian man)
Improvements are apparent not only in terms of the material situation but also 
in terms of this “different mentality” – what we could call social remittances (Levitt 
and Lamba – Nieves 2011; Levitt 1998). “Seeing other worlds” is highlighted as 
an opportunity for learning new things and broadening the perspective when 
returning home. Another interlocutor explained in more detail the changes she 
has observed, and even distinguished between segments of the community:
(...) and you can see the difference here in the village as well because they go 
abroad, and you can see it in the houses. (…) there are two communities...
there are the very poor, who do not have anything, but there are also those 
who are better-off. They have houses following the style they saw abroad, 
with a large living-room, in which the kitchen is combined with the living-
room – the majority of them have it like that, they have big rooms and 
bathrooms. So they have [these new living] conditions, and you can look 
at those who have [such] conditions [and see] that they wash themselves, 
they aren’t like they used to be before. But those who don’t want to do 
this – because there are those who don’t want to – they learned this [these 
earlier habits] and stay like this, [they] have houses of 16m2 and live even 
ten persons or even more in a single room. (Representative of institution, 
ethnic Romanian woman)
Nevertheless, these changes are not perceived equally positively by all 
segments of local society. The beneϐicial effect of migration is recognized, but in 
the meantime the stereotypical representation of “the Gypsies” (what the locals 
call the local Roma population) is also reiterated. Some Hungarians complain 
that the Roma families who move to more central spaces in the village “invade 
the village,” ultimately becoming the dominant population. A parallel process is 
that the increasing number of Roma who declare Romanian ethnicity during the 
national census make local Hungarians even more anxious, as revealed to us by 
the local census-taker. Regionally (in Brașov county) Hungarians are a minority 
and are aware that their local political dominance is rather fragile. The most 
characteristic response of the majority to the rise in visibility of the Roma and 
their physical proximity is increased social distance. Our attitude survey revealed 
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that more than 60% of the non-Roma sample from Baratca state that they would 
not even accept Roma as citizens of the country. Virtually no respondent would 
accept Roma individuals as family members (1.1%). This categorical refusal 
contrasts strongly with results from Bighal: there, roughly half (48.9%) of the 
majority sample expressed a willingness to accept Roma as family members, and 
not a single respondent said that they should be excluded from Romania (see 
details in Toma and Fosztó 2018). 
Cooperative exchanges in Bighal
The migration of the Roma in Bighal in Sălaj County follows a rather different path 
and the effects of return are also different. As the general data show, the rate of 
marginalization in Bighal is considerably lower than in Baratca, and this fact is 
apparent immediately when entering the village.  On one edge of the village there 
is a Roma-only settlement, but in a different location there is an ethnically mixed 
neighborhood. Generally, the locality gives the image of a developing village; at 
least as concerns public investment into infrastructure. The national road crossing 
the village is maintained, there are well-groomed green areas, a recently built and 
enlarged administrative ofϐice, and a new kindergarten. Soon one learns that in a 
relatively short time after a new mayor was elected, even more public money was 
invested into different domains, also beneϐiting the segregated Roma community. 
This settlement, in contrast to Baratca’s Roma neighborhood, shows clear signs of 
planning. It includes rows of relatively bigger houses, and courtyards with fences. 
There are some gardens with signs of subsistence agriculture. On the margins of 
this settlement a number of social houses were built during the 1990s as part 
of a project. One of the buildings functions as a community center that also has 
public bathing facilities. During the last two years (2016-17), the mayor’s ofϐice 
has started to pave the sidewalks in the Roma communities. 
Traditionally, the local Roma used to be brick-makers, supplying the market 
demand of the region. Later, during the socialist period, some of the Roma – while 
also continuing to produce bricks – were employed in small factories in the nearby 
towns, while others worked in a local agricultural cooperative or on farms in the 
west of Transylvania. After the dissolution of the agricultural cooperative and 
re-privatization of the land, the Roma continued to work on the ϐields for local 
owners as day-laborers. Some others found informal employment in construction 
and in households. The economic crises in the middle of the 2000s represented a 
serious setback not only in terms of the job-market, but also of opportunities for 
investing to earn a more or less regular income. The migration of the Roma started 
in this period and, similarly to in Baratca, approximately 60% of households have 
migration experience abroad following 2007. Nevertheless, a considerably higher 
percentage of households (87.2%) declared that they spent money resulting from 
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the migration of household members. Thus, they are able to cover most of the 
basic needs of the family. Many others had the chance to invest in a long-cherished 
dream, or plan improvements to their houses in the neighborhood (a new room or 
bathroom, improving the roof of a building, building a fence, or changing the gate 
of a courtyard, changing windows or doors, connecting to the water and electricity 
supply or sewerage system). 
A wander around the fair (a tradition with roots dating back as early as the 
ϐifteenth century) that is traditionally held every ϐirst and third Wednesday of the 
month is a good occasion to feel and experience how migration is a constitutive 
part of local lives. Although local fairs have declined in national and regional 
importance, they are still busy events where, beside buying, selling, negotiating 
or just simply browsing, you can meet with fellow villagers and talk about 
important things and exchange information. In the usual hubbub, amicable and 
curious questions are raised regarding the migration and work experience of 
others. Answers ϐly around in a casual way that afterwards becomes a good basis 
for gossip with neighbors or relatives, or formulating appreciative or condemning 
assessments of one’s success or, on the contrary, failure. It was on one of these days 
that we joined a Roma family (husband and three children), under the leadership 
of Maria (a woman in her late 30s), going to market to buy the immense amount 
of vegetables needed for the traditional zacuscă8 that is usually prepared for the 
winter period.
At home the men prepared the vegetables on a stove in the courtyard, and 
the typical hurly-burly started. Women from the neighborhood (Roma and 
Hungarians alike) dropped by and stayed for an hour or two to help with cleaning 
the grilled vegetables. Being late autumn, a period when some of the men were 
still abroad, the wives of the former were waiting for their return; they discussed 
new migration routes or opportunities for the coming year. Raising the issue 
of money was inevitable, as some were concerned about the amount of money 
their husbands would bring home. Would it be enough to cover their plans for 
improving their household’s lives? Some complained that the hourly wage of 
seven euros is rather low, and it is not enough to make it worth staying in Italy 
any longer; others replied that it is still more advantageous and safer to do this 
than to go to Hungary or the Czech Republic to work in agriculture. The women 
commented with amazement that a male from the community chooses to stay at 
home, claiming he considers the former wages too low. Another woman said that 
in Poland the salaries in the construction industry had also dropped recently. Now 
her husband receives only 1300 euros/month. They are planning for him to try his 
luck in Italy next year, hoping that despite the deprecating gossip, salaries are still 
much higher than in Central-Eastern European countries. 
8 A very popular vegetable spread in Romania, variations of which can be found throughout the Balkans and Turkey. 
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The women were well informed about migration-related opportunities, 
networks and risks. They appraise what is worth doing and what would not be 
good enough for their households. They were planning to invest the money – 
besides the usual spending on daily needs – in building an additional room as the 
children were growing.  The roof of the house also needed improvements. Others 
wanted to change a fence, or to build a bathroom. Schooling “eats more and more 
money as the children grow.”9 Another woman – the health mediator for the Roma 
– warned about the negative side of having access to more money from migration: 
not everybody is careful spending their money; some of the men have serious 
issues wasting it on gambling machines or have drinking problems. The more they 
earn, the more they spend on these “stupid things.” Locals – Hungarians and Roma 
alike – are very critical about the way money is spent, both when abroad and after 
it is bought back home. Irresponsible expenses (spending too much money on 
expensive food and drink abroad, or gambling) are the target of intense gossip.
Challenging social and ethnic categories
While in Baratca the main way to display the wealth of the household and success 
in migration was related to the house – newly built or re-furnished –, or in some 
cases the launching of a small business, in Bighal the marketplace is a space and 
occasion for evaluative chats and displaying success. The fair traditionally has 
a strong interethnic character. It is an arena where the habitual stereotypes of 
the majority regarding the Roma can be slowly dismantled and deconstructed 
(“Finally, the children were dressed in clean clothes!”...“You bought a whole 
sack of eggplants, you must be a good housekeeper!”...“Can they afford a coffee-
machine?”...“Ah, your husband is abroad? Good for you!”) Nevertheless, the fair 
is more than simply a moment or a place for displaying status. It is also the place 
for encounters and where information-exchanges regarding job opportunities 
happen.10 We can contrast the intensity of these local exchanges with the relative 
isolation of the two communities in Baratca. There, the lack of opportunities for 
interethnic exchange and shared events that could facilitate these exchanges 
redirects resources from mobility into more non-verbal displays of status such as 
the built environment. 
In other contexts though, ethnic categorization and stigmatization proves to 
be more resistant to challenges due to its situational character, as in the following 
case of racial stigma (Goffman 1963): 
One afternoon we were sitting in the kitchen of a local Roma family in Bighal. 
We discussed experiences of mobility, and how migrants cope with the external 
9 The education of children is a recurrent topic in discussions.  
10 Informal exchanges of information can help individuals in their job searches, especially if they lack the necessary educational 
level or professional skills to obtain employment on the formal job market (Sanders et al. 2002: 282).
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perceptions they encounter during their stays abroad. Our host, a jovial Rom in 
his early forties, told us the story of his interaction with a Hungarian brigade with 
whom he engages in seasonal migrant labor within Romania, but also occasionally 
abroad: 
We went to Hungary to work on a construction project there. After the work 
day [had ϔinished] we had a beer together and the Hungarians started to 
talk to each other, complaining: “If we are at home, in Romania, we are 
called ‘bozgori’ by the Romanians [an insulting and derogatory term for 
Hungarians] so one has to stay silent. When we come here to Hungary, they 
[the Hungarians from Hungary] call us Romanians. You cannot feel good 
anywhere. Our host laughed at them: “You see – I do not have this problem. 
When I am home they call me ‘țigan’ and that’s it. When I am here in Hungary 
they still call me cigány!”
This episode exempliϐies that ethnic and national categories do not offer constant 
shelter from denigrating ascriptions. Situational stigmatization is not limited to 
the Roma; others are also subject to stigma, like the Magyars ('Hungarians') from 
Transylvania in this case. The inconsistencies in these ethno-national categorizations 
remind them of the social insecurities involved in the mobility process. 
This episode can be also a reminder that both groups (Magyars and Roma) are part 
of a larger political space; they are Romanian citizens within the enlarged European 
Union. When travelling to Hungary, local Magyars are reminded of their differences, 
which bring them symbolically closer to the locally rooted categories. Migrating as 
part of a mixed network has beneϐits for both Magyars and Roma in terms of sharing 
the migration experience and being able to closely negotiate their interpretations.  
In contrast to this example, migration sustained by ethnically separated 
networks, as happens in Baratca, increases the divergence in local negotiations 
of social categories. Mobility unsettles locally rooted social categories in the 
communities of origin. Returnees challenge the local order and express new forms 
of belonging, so stay-at-home members of these communities are faced with these 
challenges. Roma from Baratca can claim “Romanianness” with more conϐidence 
after their western European sojourns, since in many cases this identiϐication is 
accepted as their main identity in the destination context. These claims, validated 
by their symbolic social ascension within the village, feed into the challenges to 
the old hierarchy of categories which are perceived by local Hungarians as signs of 
their growing insecurity within the village. 
To make things appear worse, the local effects of the “securitization” of the 
Roma migrants within the western member states of the EU appear in rather 
palpable forms.
During out ϐieldwork, locals told us about an “internationally organized” event 
within the segregated Roma settlement of Baratca which happened before we 
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started our ϐieldwork. Our ϐield assistant who was involved in this event explained to 
us that this event was an “awareness raising seminar” organized by the police with 
the collaboration of their colleagues from England. This seminar took place after 
the ϐirst signiϐicant wave of outmigration of Roma from Baratca reached England. 
Migrants were very visible on the streets of the English city and were begging, so 
the police forces decided to visit their home community and inform them that they 
do not welcome begging, and that this activity even borders on illegality in England.
After this ϐirst wave, migrants reoriented their activities mainly to construction 
work and other menial jobs using the opportunities offered by their consolidating 
migratory networks. Still, local Hungarians perceived the visit of the British police 
as just more proof of the “illegal activities” of Roma migrants abroad and reinforced 
their anxiety related to their Roma neighbors. 
Another speciϐic form of coping with stigmatization is born-again Christianity 
after the religious conversion of the Roma to neo-protestant denominations, most 
typically Pentecostalism. The related churches are present in all ϐield sites, and 
we could observe their inϐluence in terms of how they offered a new outlook on 
personal identities, but also by offering entry into a super-ordained category that 
could transcend local ethic categories and lead to the subordination of the converted. 
Development paths: the mobilization of diversity
Contrasting the developments in these two villages within the broader 
framework of the processes that can be observed in other localities, we can 
distinguish between situations where the developmental effect of migration 
is perceived in a more convergent manner versus places where the inϐluence of 
migration creates more divergent interpretations that challenge the hierarchy 
of categories. We can distinguish two dimensions of these developments. On 
the one hand there are the more cooperative relations maintained by ethnically 
mixed networks, as opposed to more competitive relations between increasingly 
separated networks (see Table 1). 
Cooperation and competition not only unfolds between individuals, but between 
different segments / networks of local society, and our observations are focused at 
this level. When social changes in a locality point in a cooperative-convergent direction, 
conforming to “others” does not necessarily involve the abandonment of ethnic 
belonging. It can take the form of negotiating a social identity that is considered 
adequate and is mutually accepted by each segment of the local community. In this 
case, being part of an ethnic group and displaying one’s ethnic identity can remain 
at a secondary level of importance. The focus is placed on the well-being and the 
maintenance of a relatively peaceful coexistence in the locality. This requires that 
local actors concur regarding aims and priorities, and they can be induced and 
reinforced by local institutions. Nevertheless, we should underline that, in our 
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case, because the local ethnic groups are hierarchically deϐined, or Roma are even 
stigmatized, these social relations are never mutually equal.
Table 1. Conditions for cooperative / competitive local social relations and their connection 
to categorization processes
Social relations
Identity formation
Cooperative Competitive
Convergent
-non-exclusive rather 
“hyphenated” identities
- dense everyday contacts 
and prevailing interethnic 
networks 
- involvement of local 
institutions
- identities appear mutually 
exclusive 
- low degree of cooperation 
across categories
- low involvement of local 
institutions
Divergent
- identity as valued diversity
empowerment
- physical separation does not 
mean lack of social relations
- everyday contacts continue
- interethnic networks are a 
resource
- increasing social distance
- physical separation, no 
contact 
- group antagonism
- assumed identity as threat to 
others
Bighal is a locality that can be best described in terms of cooperative social 
relations, but there are also signs of developing divergence in the local social 
categories. Compared to other localities, Bighal emerged as having a high level 
of acceptance of differences, or in other words, the social distance between 
different ethnic groups is rather reduced (Toma and Fosztó 2018). This does not 
mean that we cannot ϐind there a variety of stigmatizing situations and prejudiced 
attitudes, or even discriminatory behaviors towards the Roma. Still, everyday 
contacts prevail, Roma accept the public dominance of the Hungarian language, 
and there are also rather intense symbolic and ritual exchanges mediated by local 
institutions (for example, common religious denomination). Among our Roma 
sample, 44.4% of households have at least one Hungarian godparent. There were 
no open or violent ethnic conϐlicts in the village. Migration patterns are deϐined by 
these local relationships, involving migration through interethnic networks, often 
even in ethnically mixed groups. 
During the past years, the investment of remittances has contributed to the 
overall betterment of Roma neighborhoods in Bighal. These developments, 
complemented by the recent infrastructural investments of the local authority, 
have contributed to the stability of life in the neighborhood, also meaning that 
residents did not express a desire to “move out.” Living in the neighborhood – 
while in some cases considered a stigmatized territory – does not necessarily 
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involve social marginality and segregation, compared to many other cases. One of 
the possible bridges for overcoming the undeniable reality of living in an ethnically 
segregated area is becoming an active member of the local community through 
different channels.
Changes in the ethnic landscape of the locality – including improvements in the 
Roma neighborhood – are not perceived by the local majority as a threat to their 
own identity or space. Among those members of the majority who have more or 
less daily contact with local Roma, relationships are mostly deϐined in terms of 
trust and mutual respect and avoidance of conϐlict; and more than that, belonging 
to an ethnic group – while remaining important – is of secondary importance. Still, 
there are signs of diverging identity constructions enacted through cooperation 
between different groups. The local community – Hungarians and Roma together, 
with the support of the local administration11 – obtained funding for a cultural 
project that involved the acquisition of “traditional ethnic costumes” for the Roma 
dance ensemble. Local Roma had no memory and could not ϐind evidence that 
their ancestors had dressed in ethnically distinguished clothing. Still, everybody 
agreed that such costumes should be produced for the dancers. This ofϐicial 
encouragement of a public display of ethnic difference – even if an invention of 
new traditions – can be seen as cooperative divergent process. However, it may also 
be recognized that designing the costume involved a balancing act, since local 
Romungre do not want to dress in the long colorful skirts of the “more traditional” 
Corturari Roma who live in the neighboring village. In these cases, for the local 
Roma (who are Romungre or magyarcigányok), belonging to dual ethnic categories 
(Roma and Magyar) is not exclusive. Even if there are moments when social/
ethnic identity becomes more divergent and the importance of group membership 
increases, maintaining contacts is constant and identity construction is rather 
cooperative, strengthening and reinforcing common belonging.
In contrast, Baratca can be seen as site of competitive social processes involving 
divergent social categorization. Returnees increasingly challenge the local 
hierarchical ethnic order, refusing to be seen as stigmatized Roma and channeling 
their material resources into promoting residential desegregation. The woman 
shopkeeper we described earlier complained that the relationship between the 
locals and the Roma had deteriorated lately and they were increasingly alienated 
from each other, as more and more families move “into the village.” An elderly 
woman, a former primary school teacher, stated that “The mayor is too much of a 
gentleman. The Gypsies are generally kept tight, but not controlled enough.” This 
“loss of control” also implies to others that they cannot rely on the labour of Roma 
as before. We overheard the following statement in a bar from a middle-aged 
and older man who were organizing their work: “We will have problems when 
11 The mayor is ethnically Romanian and speaks Hungarian very well.
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we need to load the cart as we do not have neighbors – only the Gypsies.” While 
it may be an implicit assumption that when more difϐicult jobs arise around the 
household and an extra hand is needed, you may ask your neighbors to help, in this 
case, interaction between ethnic groups is increasingly difϐicult and Hungarians 
maintain a very high degree of social distance vis-a-vis the Roma. 
Roma in Baratca prefer to assume a Romanian identity during the population 
census and in their public interactions. This makes local Hungarians anxious, as 
they see their status of local majority threatened. However, this does not mean that 
the local ethnic Romanians have signiϐicantly different attitudes toward the Roma 
compared to the Hungarians. This feature of the competitive-divergent scenario 
reminds us of the difϐiculty of overcoming the consequences of “exclusionary 
closure:” when members of one ethnic group try to monopolize opportunities and 
resources for members of their own group (Waldinger – Lichter 2003: 98). Open 
confrontations also occur: we witnessed a scene at the Social Department of the 
Mayor’s Ofϐice: a well-dressed Roma man was informed that his social beneϐits had 
been cut because he was working abroad and he no longer qualified for them. He got 
very angry and raised his voice, annoyed because he was aware that many families 
who are involved in migration do not lose their beneϐits. At one point he yelled at the 
(even angrier) social worker that: “You are not respected, because you don’t respect 
us!” Claiming Romanian national identity is one form of creating respectability.
A closer look into aspects of cooperation and competition within local society and 
the social categories the different segments negotiate reveals a more complex 
picture. In Baratca, in addition to the dominant processes along the competitive 
and divergent dimensions, there are features that could be classiϐied as competitive-
convergent. Roma have not only opened businesses and moved inside the village, but 
have started to use traditional Hungarian funeral signs (so-called kopjafa) in their 
own cemetery, adding Romanian language inscriptions to them. However these 
signs of convergence are not viewed approvingly by the local majority: “They have 
the nerve to do that!” (Erre van eszük…). The new gates in front of the renovated 
houses resemble Saxon-style entrances, and local Roma buy furniture from the 
most expensive company – a Hungarian woman observed with slight jealousy 
when talking to us. The dominant climate of competition and the perceived threat 
of “the emerging other” overshadow these incipient signs of convergence or even 
are seen as illegitimate appropriation. It is not only interpersonal relations that 
are challenged by the Roma returnees in Baratca. 
They pride themselves on their improvements to their homes and repeatedly 
call on local authorities to expand the communal infrastructure to provide them 
with services. Those who build their small new brick houses on the top of the hill 
within the segregated Roma settlement create the relevant installations within 
their houses in the absence of a proper electricity or water supply and consider 
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this the ϐirst step towards development, thus it is now it is the turn of the mayor’s 
ofϐice to do its part. Whether local authorities decide to follow the path opened by 
the returnees or prefer to concentrate investment into different areas  remains an 
open question at this moment.
Conclusions
We started this article by considering that the increased mobility of the Romanians 
has an important ϐinancial and social impact on the home communities. Romanian 
Roma started to participate in this mobility relatively later, but by the time of our 
ϐieldwork in the area we could observe patterns of intense migration and return. 
We focused on the ways in which mobile Roma communities are repositioning 
themselves within two ethnically mixed localities in Transylvania. Returnees take 
advantage, reorient and navigate between local social categories, challenging 
them by relying on the resources at their disposal to improve the situation of 
their families and communities. These changes can be described at the level of 
segments of local society, composed not only of communities but also the networks 
that facilitate migration and also serve as support for the renegotiation of social 
categories at home. 
We distinguished between two main patterns according to which networks 
develop. On the one hand there are localities where network ties crosscut ethnic 
boundaries and facilitate intense exchanges and communication between the 
different segments of local society. Roma and their non-Roma neighbors often 
share their migration experience and its interpretation. The other pattern is rather 
different: network ties tend to be tight between members of the same ethnic 
category but ties that cut through ethnic boundaries remain weak. The social 
distance between the categories is kept considerably higher in the second case. 
The role networks play is important in the reorientation of the returnees: 
on the one hand there are attempts at categorical redeϐinitions that challenge 
local ethnic hierarchies, or even reverse the old patterns; on the other hand, 
the order of categories remains or is even reinforced. More precisely, ethnically 
mixed networks enable individuals to transcend categories in particular types of 
exchanges. The ways of repositioning of the mobile Roma within local society have 
consequences for the development paths that local society might take. 
Focusing on the non-economic resources that are available (skills, networks, 
and social categories) the paths of development can be described along two axes: on 
the one hand, more cooperative vs. competitive social relations and the reinforcement 
or emergence of more convergent vs. divergent social categories. Along these 
dimensions we can interpret the different processes generated by mobility which 
are heterogeneous (i.e., can move in different directions), but some dominant 
tendencies were distinguished at the two ϐield sites: Baratca seems to be dominated 
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by competitive processes coupled with the development of more divergent social 
categorizations. This is observable in the reconϐiguration of the built environment, 
as more and more returnees renovate and repaint their houses and move to more 
central areas in the village. This spontaneous residential desegregation goes along 
with increased social distance between the Roma and their Hungarian neighbors 
who look anxiously to the future of their local community. At the other ϐield site, 
Bighal, social development is less divisive; we describe this in terms of cooperative 
relations and convergent social categorizations. There is no fear of “the other” in 
this case, and social distance is reduced. There exists a large variety of ethnically 
mixed encounters, while residential segregation remains in place. 
The heterogeneity of the Roma population is an important condition in 
orienting these development paths. In the two cases that are compared the 
Roma are rather similar demographically (relatively younger, less educated, 
and more impoverished) and have different cultural proϐiles (languages spoken, 
religious belonging, and ritual exchanges with the non-Roma). Local majorities 
are also diverse. Taking into account our ϐindings in the other MigRom ϐield sites, 
the diversity is even wider. In the Transylvanian localities there is a Hungarian 
majority, but in the southern Romanian site we only ϐind Romanians and different 
Roma categories. We found that repositioning is present amongst the Hungarians 
as well (even if identifying this was not the analytical focus). Still, the direction of 
local development can be interpreted within this framework which offers a chance 
for a more nuanced interpretation of local effects than previously proposed models 
of “racialisation” suggest (Yıldız – De Genova 2018).    
The role of local institutions and, in particular, the local administration in 
shaping the direction of local development must be highlighted. Mayor’s ofϐices 
can take a leading role in the modernization of more underdeveloped parts of the 
locality and a proactive stance by providing infrastructure and communal services. 
They can also assist by fostering the most effective investment of the resources 
that “pour in” from the migration of the less well-off members of the locality. If 
they can do this consciously, we may hope to see that local migration’s half-full 
glass is not spilled.
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Abstract: In an era of globalization, the institutional sys tem of mass migration is being substantially 
reorganized: its intensity and the variation in its forms are increasing. Global production chains combine 
diverse areas and diﬀ erent forms of work with varying wage levels by forming worldwide networks. In 
the Eastern European region, the growing level of emigration and  relatively low fertility are leading to 
population loss. Hungary is not among the Eastern European countries with a high level of emigration; 
nevertheless, it faces serious challenges, particularly in some regions where after the transition losses of 
jobs wer e massive, and a greater proportion of people live under the poverty line than the national average. 
Our analysis is based on interviews, containing narrative and semi-structured parts, among domestic 
workers working mainly in Austria and Germany. Th e paper reveals possible causal mechanisms and the 
political economic structures behind this type of labour migration. We seek to understand how migration-
related decisions are embedded in a global and highly unequal economic order. 
Keywords: labor migration, rational choice, historical-structural analysis, domestic work, working class
***
In an era of globalization, the institutional system of mass migration has become 
substantially reorganized and its intensity and variation are increasing. Globalization 
can be interpreted as a cycle of capitalism in which the increasing freedom of 
movement of capital maintains free trade, which in turn enables mechanisms of 
reproduction that in turn reorganize global manufacturing and service industries 
and move them to new territories. As a part of this process, global production chains 
combine diverse areas and diﬀ erent forms of work with varying wage levels within 
worldwide networks. In addition, the freer movement of capital and labour also aﬀ ects 
welfare and social systems by depreciating and partly eliminating welfare services and 
“surplus” wages (i.e. rents) in the case of richer Western nations/societies, as well as 
1 The research this paper refers to was carried out by a research group within the frame of the Hungarian Demographic Research 
Institute (HDRI). The field work, the interviewing, and the related research were managed and to a very large extent performed 
by Dóra Gábriel who published key results of the research in a HDRI Research Report (Gábriel 2018). The professional leader 
of the research was Attila Melegh, who wrote the below text based on his own analysis of the interviews, and from new 
analytical perspectives Gabriella Gresits contributed to this text through her specific analysis and together with Dalma Hámos 
participated in the research and analysis through her work on the narratives and biographies in the interviews.
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the socialist Eastern Bloc. In the frame of a neoclassical macro theory of migration, 
Szelényi and Mihályi, for instance, argue that migration has facilitated the reduction of 
“rents” (i.e. unearned income of  individuals due to  privileged global positions) from 
European workers. At the same time, these geographical areas have been signiﬁ cantly 
transformed demographically. Since the 1980s, Western and Southern Europe has 
counterbalanced low levels of fertility by increasing migration rates. In opposition 
to this tendency, in Eastern Europe growing levels of emigration and a rapidly aging 
population coupled with relatively low fertility rates are all contributing to population 
loss. It is highly likely that a demographic crisis will evolve given that in certain 
countries the active population will not or will hardly exceed the number of people 
born in the country but living abroad and the number of dependent elderly people. 
Th us, Western European governments that are anxious about maintaining welfare 
services are seeking well speciﬁ c working populations for their corporate spheres 
by extracting migrant labour from areas that themselves face major demographic 
problems (Melegh 2016, 2017).  As a result of this, new cycles are opening up in the 
global economy in which wage diﬀ erentials play a very important role.
Hungary is not among the countries with very high levels of emigration in Eastern 
Europe (according to the UN, almost 7 percent of the population born in Hungary live 
outside the country; UN 2017); nevertheless, it faces serious challenges, particularly 
in those regions where after the transition job losses were massive and more 
individuals live below the poverty line than the national average. Th e targeted area of 
our research, Baranya County in Southern Transdanubia, is one such deprived region. 
Its industrial capacity – mines, the main manufacturing enterprises, and textile plants 
– have been closed down and have not been replaced by more signiﬁ cant industry, as 
opposed to, for instance, the Northern regions of Transdanubia. According to the 
regional inequality indicators, a major part of the region is seriously disadvantaged, 
and faces social problems related to poverty and employment (Obádovics et al. 2011).
Th e research problems and related theoretical frameworks 
Th e present analysis is based on interviews with narrative and semi-structured parts 
conducted among domestic workers who work abroad. Th ese people count as short-
term circular migrants as most have spent more than three months abroad at least 
once, their gainful and principal employment is abroad, and they have left and returned 
to Hungary several times, with a cumulative time living abroad exceeding a year and, 
in some cases, even years (UN 2016). Th us, they constantly live in a transnational 
space, albeit without giving up their stable residence at home. It is also important to 
note that these migrants are the older age groups of the potentially active workforce, 
and in some cases are even beyond retirement age. Th us they also represent the 
phenomenon of “care drain” as they are not available to take care of other family 
members. Th ey are also people who face the relatively high risk of not ﬁ nding a job 
Attila Melegh – Dóra Gábriel – Gabriella Gresits – Dalma Hámos: Abandoned Hungarian... 63
due to their age. Th us, our group is rather special in the sense that they represent a 
somewhat speciﬁ c group of circular migrants who are not younger members of the 
workforce, unlike most other migrants.  (Blaskó – Gödri 2014)
In order to reveal the potential causal mechanisms and links to political economic 
structures behind these forms of labour migration through the analysis of interviews, 
we need to clarify what theoretical and methodological frameworks are appropriate 
for this purpose. In this analysis we argue that in the case of such types of circular 
migration, we need to utilize various perspectives (household economics, and the role 
of historical macrostructural factors) to understand the complexity of the process 
as presented by individuals and families. We also claim that in these complex and 
historically contextualized processes, neoclassical, micro-level rational decision-making 
is just one, speciﬁ c perspective that is associated with speciﬁ c conditions if interviews 
are analyzed. We also investigate what structural factors and what elements in the life 
histories of interviewees might have led them to construct their perspectives. 
Th roughout the research, one of our main goals was to reveal how care worker 
interviewees who come from a relatively depressed region present their decisions in a 
complex way in qualitative interviews about their life histories. We were particularly 
interested in how the global and highly unequal economic order appeared in these 
texts and narratives (Parreñas 2011, Sarkar 2017). Moreover, we were eager to see 
under which conditions the individual stories of care workers actually ﬁ t the rational 
choice framework, and when they opt for work abroad. 
In doing so ﬁ rst, let us clarify how the approach of rational individuals can be 
operationalized and criticized and how this issue is described in the Hungarian 
literature on emigration, especially concerning the migration of domestic workers. 
According to Massey and his colleagues, the basic assumptions of micro-level 
neoclassical theory are the following (Massey et al. 1993): “Costs” should not exceed 
“proﬁ ts” in the long term; migrants are required to make individual decisions on the 
basis of expected individual beneﬁ ts. In addition, it is necessary for them to have 
information not only about the cost of being abroad and wages in the target country, 
but also to realize and evaluate the total cost of migration at home. Th e total cost 
should include all material and non-material costs (including “forgotten” material 
costs, the extra costs of family members left behind, the costs of emotional distress), 
and such circular migrants should strive to maximize proﬁ tability in the long-term. 
Th ey also have to choose a country according to these rational calculations. Th us, 
in the interviews we looked for evidence (ideas and formulas) in migrant workers' 
argumentation that they had engaged in such general calculations. We also examined 
in which interviews this phenomenon occurred and in which interviews it did not, 
and in what contexts.  
Th e theory of rational choice has been widely criticized by researchers. According 
to Portes and Böröcz, it involves a post-factum approach that cannot explain the 
degree and direction of migration between individual countries and diﬀ erences in 
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the willingness of individuals, at least in the sense that we cannot predict migration 
in cases of similar beneﬁ ts (Portes – Böröcz 1989). In the criticism put forward in 
the theory of the new economics of labour migration, the emphasis is placed on the 
fact that migratory decisions are not made by isolated individuals, but by households 
and families who, through a wide range of activities, try to minimize risks and pool 
incomes from diﬀ erent sources. Very importantly, the household economic approach 
also argues that the gains of migration are much less decisive and much smaller in 
reality than expected (Massey et al. 1993; see also Szelényi 2016). Th us during our 
analysis we made a special eﬀ ort to cross-check the calculations of the interviewees 
(in the form of a complex Excel sheet containing data about costs and beneﬁ ts) and to 
identify which cost elements were mentioned and which elements were “forgotten” in 
order to analyze calculations beyond data about wages.
In thinking about actual cost-beneﬁ t calculations, we should also point out that 
joint family activities can have micro-economic consequences; namely, certain familial 
work and social activities do not have a price and thus cannot be taken into account as 
wages or  costs. Th us, instead of maximizing “proﬁ t,” a family may follow inner feelings 
about “self-exploitation,” as Alexandr Chayanov speciﬁ ed in the 1920s (Chayanov 
1966). It should be noted that the relationship between these Chayanovian insights 
and the new economics of labour migration has not been systematically utilized yet. 
All of these analytical perspectives deal with “forgetting,” and partly “hiding”  costs 
(see Nagy et al. 2012). Costs may be hidden because the additional family labour of 
maintaining a household strategy is not counted as a wage or cost, thus in this micro-
economic frame it is not possible to calculate “net proﬁ t,” thus a feeling of being 
exploited may guide economic-migratory manoeuvring. All these considerations 
are extremely important to us, thus we sought to identify in our interviews when 
this feeling of making a “sacriﬁ ce for the family” occurred, and how it was related to 
interviewees’ life histories. 
Concerning joint familial decision-making, in a novel way we also used Tamara 
K. Hareven’s notions of the conjunction between individual, family, and industrial 
cycles, according to which decisions are not born only as part of an individual cycle, 
but the family life cycle also plays an important role by interacting with the industrial 
cycle – namely, with wider cycles of economic requirements and necessities (Hareven 
1982). Th e huge role of family and household decision-making mechanisms has also 
been widely demonstrated historically and over geographically wide areas (McKeown 
2004, Stark – Bloom 1985). Following these considerations, these life cyclical linkages 
were also observed in interviews when we analyzed how the life cycles and biographies 
of family members were interlinked with the life histories of the families and 
macrostructural changes. For instance, we analyzed how individual events aﬀ ected 
family life, and how work abroad ﬁ tted into these developments. One example of this 
is the labour migration of a female partner after a male partner becomes sick or loses 
Attila Melegh – Dóra Gábriel – Gabriella Gresits – Dalma Hámos: Abandoned Hungarian... 65
his job during an economic transition. We also analyzed in which cases do linkages 
between various life cycles become evident.  
Beyond micro theories, there is also a need to look at macro-level changes, and 
how they are incorporated in the interview texts and individual life histories and 
whether they are used as an alternative to rational familial and/or individual decision-
making, even over a longer time period. World system theory emphasizes the external 
environment and its systemic change in its criticism of neoclassical frameworks. Th is 
we consider important because, as a prerequisite of migration, it emphasizes that world 
economic impacts (such as the collapse of socialist industry) must ﬁ rst uproot people 
from their ”traditional” lifestyles, and that some of those who are thus aﬀ ected will leave 
(Sassen 1988, Melegh 2013, Melegh 2015). In our analytical perspective the mention of 
macrostructural changes and historical links by interviewees cannot be ignored during 
the exploration of possible chains of causality in the interview texts. In other words, we 
also sought to look at particular and historically evolving social relations that produce 
the conditions among which individuals manoeuvre, and thus make migration highly 
likely, and how this phenomenon appears in interview texts. We also analyzed in what 
interview texts and in what circumstances these linkages arise. 
Th e Hungarian literature on emigration tends to accept the rational choice 
hypothesis in terms of longer term migration (Blaskó ‒ Gödri 2014, Hárs ‒ Simon 
2015)  although scholars who work on the migration of domestic labour emphasize 
additional factors. 
After conducting an analysis of the short-term, cyclical migration of domestic 
workers, Váradi and her colleagues came to a partially diﬀ erent conclusion (Váradi 
et al. 2017). Th e authors believe rational considerations are important, but they also 
emphasize the relationship between agency and structure, and the role of “forced” 
decisions. Th ey argue that life situations make the combinations of aspirations and 
capabilities speciﬁ c, and emphasize the role of networks. 
In her complex analysis Turai refers to the links between individual and family cycles and 
the role of the economic decisions of a family in her research based on more than 200 
interviews conducted among domestic labour migrants from Hungary, Romania and 
Moldova. It is worth citing here a longer argument of hers that indicates the complexity 
of causality which  includes an assessment of what motivations are seen as legitimate:
Concerning the causal mechanisms of migration, mostly material motivations are 
visible or they are made visible. Livelihood constraints, unemployment, debt, housing, 
and home purchase are economic needs that play an important role in the decision 
of the family to incorporate migration into their future strategies. [...] Financing 
children’s higher education, family reunion, wedding, nesting, repayment of foreign 
currency loans, purchase of cars, supporting grandchildren etc. are strong arguments 
for participating in the global labour market. However, it has become obvious during 
the fi eldwork that the mention of these causes is strongly related to their social 
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legitimacy. In the social acceptance of migration, fi nancial problems are seen as 
legitimate factors: if somewhere material problems emerge, action becomes necessary 
and positive content is associated with those [who act]. Financial problems can also 
derive from non-material family crisis situations. Th e reduced working capacity of 
the spouse, a broken partnership, or an inadequate contribution from an alcohol-
dependent husband to living costs are such situations in which women have to cope 
with extra burdens. Divorce, the burdens of one-parent households, and housing 
problems put extra burdens on certain segments of society who have limited access 
to resources anyway. Private aff airs without material consequences are also part of 
mobility motivations. Foreign absence can temporarily solve a permanently disorderly 
and chaotic partnership situation in a social environment where divorce is negatively 
evaluated or when there is family pressure not to do so or a husband’s aggression rules 
it out. (Turai 2018: 151-152)
Based on the above considerations, in the analysis below we focus on these issues and 
explain how the historically determined, gendered political economy of reproductive work 
is viewed and understood by the interviewed group (Parreñas 2001, 61-79, Turai 2018). 
Research methods
Th e empirical research took place between March and August 2016. Th e research 
involved 21 interviews2 in total. Following the theoretical and methodological 
approach of the FEMAGE project (Kovács – Melegh 2007), we applied a combined 
interview technique. At the beginning of the interviews, we asked the respondents to 
tell us their stories of how they became caregivers. Afterwards, we asked them to talk 
more about those biographical elements that were not narrated in a detailed manner. 
Th e narrative part of the interview was followed by a semi-structural part that 
addressed issues relating to studies, previous work, family background, the decision-
making process of migration, working abroad, wages abroad, social status and future 
plans. Th e period of interviewing was inﬂ uenced by the so-called refugee crisis in 
2015 and 2016, accompanied by a powerful socio-political debate; thus, we included 
questions related to opinions about the arrival of asylum seekers in our interview 
guide. Th e interviews were analyzed using the method of objective hermeneutics, 
namely, we systematically reconstructed the structure of interviewees’ life histories 
based on the ﬁ rst narration (to see the key structures of self-representation and the 
complex motivational aspects freely presented), and then we carried out analysis 
also based on biographical elements (Rosenthal 1993, Kovács – Melegh 2000). For 
the later analysis we used the information found in the narratives and also in the 
structured parts of the interview to identify the types of such biographies. 
2 For information about the respondents, see Table 1. Interviews were conducted by Diána Árki, Dalma Hámos, Dóra Gábriel, 
Gabriella Gresits, Attila Pirmajer and Eszter Ungi-Nagy. 
Attila Melegh – Dóra Gábriel – Gabriella Gresits – Dalma Hámos: Abandoned Hungarian... 67
We also conducted four partner interviews. At the beginning of these interviews, 
the partners of care workers were asked to relate the stories of how their partners/
spouses had became care workers abroad, and then we used the same structural 
interview guide. In interviewing partners we wanted to address the issue of how “left-
behind” relatives interpret and narrate the familial aspects of migratory decisions. 
An interview was also carried out with a labour migrant who later established an 
agency for the foreign employment of care workers, which gave us insights into 
the functioning of the relevant labour-market segment from the point of view of 
an agent, the role of whom is becoming crucial in building migration infrastructure 
(Xiao-Lindquist 2014).
Our ﬁ eldsite was Baranya County, chosen not only due to the fact that it is an 
economically depressed region of the country, but also due to the Swabian ethnic 
groups living in some of its areas. We assumed that in this part of the country, 
based on the presence of a long-standing ethnic network, the number of elderly care 
workers commuting to Austria and Germany would be numerically higher. We applied 
the snowball method to identify our respondents. 
Wages and beneﬁ ts
Concerning the motivation for migration, the most common claim is that it is worth 
working abroad due to the wage diﬀ erentials. Looking at the interview texts closely, 
we can see that after all social and pension contributions and travel expenses are 
covered, the interviewees earn approximately 600-800 euros of net income per 
month in the given migratory space (see Appendix 2). Th is amount is typically earned 
through shift work (the time of which generally increases as time spent in this career 
increases).3 It is very important to note that respondents mention their daily wage 
for the shift period, but very often it is only revealed later that the stated amount 
also includes the period they are at home. Anna,4 for example, proudly says that she 
earns “57 euros” or “17,000 forints” daily, but if we do all the calculations, including 
deducting travel expenses and social insurance, her net monthly salary is about 450-
500 euros. In the case of Anna, a lower-class Roma woman, this illusion of higher 
earnings can be interpreted as her having a hierarchical expectation of work in the 
“West” that legitimizes her leaving. Moreover, the feeling can be also perceived that 
she, as a lower-class rural person and a Roma woman, was also able to achieve ﬁ nancial 
success (Durst 2013, 210, 217-220).
It should be noted that the initial wage or retirement/social beneﬁ ts in Hungary 
that our interviewees received (if any) was usually worth 150-300 euros, so the 600-
900 euros (converted into a monthly amount), and the frequently mentioned 700-
3 In other cases, they work in monthly shifts and earn proportionally more. However, the increase in salary must also include 
budgeting for a whole month of staying at home between shifts, and must cover regular (housing) expenses when migrants 
are abroad.  
4 For detailed information concerning the wages and expenses of the respondents, see Table 2. 
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euro salary of a care worker (including accompanying meals) is signiﬁ cantly higher. 
In this respect, the neoclassical expectation of wage diﬀ erentials playing a crucial role 
in this migratory space prevails according to the interviews. However, the migration 
process and its political economy are far more complicated, and ignoring the other 
factors creates a misleading picture. Th is is why it is worth carrying out a more complex 
analysis to fully understand this mass social action, the related social relationships, 
and their historical and structural determination.
One of the most interesting observations from the interviews is that people 
talked positively and openly about wage and non-material beneﬁ ts in their narratives 
when their background and work careers were stable.5 Such interviewees opted for 
migration very often after retirement, and they evaluated the available opportunities 
positively. Th is is how Lídia explained her decision:
Well, after retirement, then after three weeks? ... I said that being constantly at 
home is so tedious, all the domestic work. And then I decided once to try it – either it 
would work or not… It is not just about the money. It also motivates me, as you can 
help the grandchildren more, but the work itself and the beautiful places, and it’s not 
so boring when one comes home for two weeks, then it’s diff erent again, diff erent 
here and diff erent there. Th ere are also nice and good things there, and at home too. 
I like doing it. Really. (Lídia, 67)
It is important to notice that in this case we do not simply see the story of an 
individual seeking to maximize her income, but the story of an aging but vigorous 
grandmother, already with stable living conditions, who mainly wants to help her 
grandchildren. However, even in her case we can identify factors that go far beyond 
the neoclassical framework. Both her and her husband’s Swabian origins played 
a major role in their foreign labour, such as the husband’s formerly (ethnic-kin-
organized) period of work as a stonemason in Germany. Th e following case also shows 
the complexity of the problem, and the necessity of the integration of new factors and 
analytical levels. 
A former hairdresser, Csenge, states very ﬁ rmly that she had a very low salary at 
home, which is why she had to leave. However, her income considerably increased 
after commuting abroad:
Good. So, in fact, I came out to Germany because I was working as a hairdresser and 
we were earning very little. Th e more clients we had, the less we were earning... And 
then I went to work in the vocational school, to the kitchen, and the work was very 
hard there too, and everything, and, well, I thought that many people go abroad, 
I should try. And I tried, and I got an extraordinarily good job, I was there for six 
months, but not like six months in a row, but two months there and two months 
here, because my husband was at home and he was sick and that’s why I had to come 
5 Somewhat similar observations have been made by Váradi et al. 2017, who emphasized that young people see migration as an 
opportunity. It is not clear though if the same perspective would remain after a longer period of struggling to find a job. 
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home. I was well paid, of course, compared to what I earned at the hairdresser’s, fi ve 
times, ten times more, if I can say that. (Csenge, 74)
Th e interviewee exaggerates when she says that her new salary of 600-700 euros 
per month was ﬁ ve or ten times more than her original salary, but clearly it increased 
considerably. She started her job after having retired, during which time her earlier 
period of work (which lasted for 35 years) was gradually devalued in terms of income, 
and her salary even diminished towards the end of her career. Th is latter factor also 
aﬀ ected her retirement income. Th us, the structural transformation (as we return to 
later, involving the devaluation of the related service sector) had a signiﬁ cant impact 
on the course of her life. In addition, her husband’s illness and his relatively quick death 
at the beginning of the migration process could also have represented a ﬁ nancial crisis 
which increased her willingness to migrate, or maintained it. However, it is important 
to note that Csenge was in a stable situation and was able to experiment, not being in 
real need. Perhaps this might be one of the perspectives that can be employed when 
attempting to describe wage diﬀ erentials clearly. It can be hypothesized that some 
interviewees talk about “proﬁ t maximization” and “utilizing wage diﬀ erentials” who 
choose to migrate among relatively stable circumstances. 
Another perspective arises: when a crisis occurs, and then this social action will 
have a diﬀ erent meaning. A widow, Beáta, does not mention wages.
Th e interviewee starts her story by talking about a period of unemployment and 
migration after a longer period of struggle, thus in principle her narrative accords 
with the neoclassical theoretical perspective, as she was signiﬁ cantly able to improve 
her situation. Meanwhile, we should see that her work history reveals long-lasting 
eﬀ orts to ﬁ nd a stable job, and note that Beáta had only short-term jobs, which may 
indicate that her migration in 2009 was not only the result of a quick decision; she 
had to be uprooted ﬁ rst. Beáta's daughter also went abroad in the same year. Th is was 
probably a coordinated crisis measure that did not reﬂ ect  the respondent’s income 
maximizing intentions as she did not really want to go, but she found she had to 
give up “home”. Moreover, the main concern for her was occupational security. In her 
narrative she is truly disappointed, and speciﬁ es that job stability was a crucial factor 
in her migration narrative.
I think it came when (I was) unemployed. Or... not for the first time. So you do 
not know what to do. Yes, if at home I had a job that fitted me, I’m sure that I 
would not go away. And that’s what I say, until this day I say that if I could get 
a job at home that was certain... but you cannot find it in this world, I’m sure, 
I do not believe in this anymore. To be at home... sure. This option has already 
gone for me. (Beáta, 56)
For this group of cyclical labour migrants who were socialized under state 
socialism the security of jobs was important. Th is preference is also consistent with 
the fact that in Hungary the general appreciation of job security was higher than that 
of wage security among manual workers (Burawoy 1987). Th e disappearance of this 
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security may be a factor behind mass migration, which is evaluated negatively by the 
interviewees.
Th e motivation of avoiding working for low wages is also present in an interview 
with an unskilled worker, Anna, as mentioned above. 
Nonetheless, when analyzing the rather long ﬁ rst narrative closely and carefully 
tracing all the follow-up answers, we ﬁ nd that her motivation includes a lot more 
factors involving pressure for a longer period of time. Also, according to an interview 
with her husband, who started the narrative interview by mentioning these elements, 
one of the most important factors is that the family started a small business during the 
transition from state socialism. After the breakup of the collective farm, they failed in 
this entrepreneurial attempt, which led them into serious debt. Th is debt was further 
increased by various members of the family who had entered into a very serious debt 
trap by the end of the 2000s. Th e crisis was further deepened by the serious illness 
of the husband, which led to his dismissal and receipt of a disability pension. So 
the change of regime resulted in breaking point, after which loans covered the gap 
between incomes and needs for a while. Th e job in Austria has actually consolidated 
a longer-term crisis, thus the process is an extended one. Anna also explicitly raises 
the issue of the reference point for wage diﬀ erences, since while the wage advantage 
exists today, the interviewee did not consider it valid; the salary from the poultry 
processing industry in the 1980s was the best she had:
Yes, yes. In the poultry processing plant, because they sent people away. Th ere were 
three shifts there. From 6 a.m. - 2 p.m, from 2 p.m - 10 p.m, and from 10 p.m. - 6 
a.m. in the morning. We had to work in three shifts. But it was good. Th at wage was 
worth more than any you can get now. It was better than anything, since because its 
[relative] value was greater. (Anna, 53)
Th e devaluation of the wage advantage in the above-mentioned example also occurs 
in many other cases, such as in the case of Katinka. Katinka can also see that instead of 
the 100 euros payment for public work in Hungary, the monthly salary of 400-450 euros 
she earns while abroad is a major step forward, which she accepted because her son who 
lives at home does not have an income. It is an important consideration nonetheless 
that she perceives her migration as being forced, and ﬁ nds the cost of it to be very high, 
and the amount of so-called “clean” money [net earnings] as not very good:
Th e money, that is. Because if there was a job here, I’m sure I would not do this [go  
abroad]. For sure.... So, I’m sure that I would not go. Sorry.
When discussing wage advantages, we should mention one of the additional 
advantages; namely, the Austrian pension. Obtaining a pension from abroad is an 
important element in the calculations of care workers, which is why the legality of 
their work abroad is an important question. Is it declared to the public authorities? 
During our interviews, several respondents expressed disappointment about the 
fact that they would have been due an Austrian pension a long time ago if they had 
not started to work illegally. More interviewees reported that after ﬁ ve years of 
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employment in Austria they expected a pension of around 30-60 euros per month, 
which increases in proportion to the number of years of employment.
Constrained labour and becoming uprooted
Mahua Sarkar has written a very important study on Bangladeshi migrant workers 
working abroad in which migratory processes and various institutional processes 
blur the line between free labour and forced labour (Sarkar 2017). It seems that East 
European women are also reporting about how they have become uprooted and how 
this has led to “voluntary” labour abroad. 
Th e narratives of Csenge, Anna, and Katinka have already indicated the role of an 
accumulation of disadvantages produced by the transition to capitalism, and during 
their migration stories they return to describing the shock caused by the change of 
regime and to the radical transformation of local economic structures at that time. 
The massive corporate bankruptcies, particularly in the textile industry, and the 
system of unfavourable loans and other structural constraints all point to the external 
mechanisms of the globalization process.
Katinka draws attention to the importance of her former employment in a glove 
factory in the 1980s, which, though it damaged her eyes, still provided her with a 
stable livelihood. In the early 1990s the wages and opportunities at the factory were 
declining due to huge global competition. It is also apparent that after this episode 
the interviewee could not really recover and got into serious diﬃ  culties as a worker, 
even leading to her exclusion from the social beneﬁ t system.
I commuted to the glove factory to work for 23 years. Th en I could not tolerate this 
physically, my eyes went really bad and my husband said that I should not continue. 
Actually, I had been already working at home, I received a [sewing] machine at home, 
but in the countryside there were things to do in the vegetable garden during the 
day, there was the family, there were two little children – three-and-a-half-year-old 
twins – and then my husband said there was a bus attendant job in the neighbouring 
village. Th at the kindergarten kids needed to be watched, and my husband told me to 
go there and do it, it would be better. I listened to him, hmmm, but the money was too 
little, they counted only four hours, and the money was not enough. Th en a German 
fl ower shop opened, and I went there, and then it went bankrupt, and I could not 
fi nd a job because I was over forty, with a rural background, and I was not hired any 
more. Th en I had a long period of unemployment and claiming benefi ts. When this 
(Inter)City railway job started, I came here, I got hired to clean; I had a permanent 
nightshift here, while we were getting divorced. And then we got the money in hand 
and I did not pay the tax on it, but I invested it in the house.… Th en they dismissed 
me saying that they could not hire entrepreneurs who had public debts. But everyone 
had public debt! [smiles]. Ahm... so, not just me, almost everyone had. And I could 
not get any benefi ts like that, because entrepreneurs do not receive any benefi ts. 
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Th en there were some occasional jobs such as cleaning in the construction industry, 
illegally.… So, I was sent away. And this friend told me, she convinced me to leave 
from here because, because I would see how good it can be. (Katinka, 61)
It is also important to know that the shock of the regime change led to an earlier 
migration attempt in Katinka’s life history and also in other cases, but paying agency 
fees proved to be problematic at that point and migration was not accomplished. 
Th is early experiment also shows that at that time the “infrastructure of migration” 
was relatively undeveloped compared to the circumstances today (Xiang – Lindquist 
2014).
This early attempt occurred during the ﬁ rst wave of emigration that started in 
the second half of the 1980s and which appears in the Austrian and mainly German 
statistics (Melegh 2015), and it was just an initial reaction. Th e initial shock was not 
enough to produce migration in the sense of the “uprooting” process described by 
world system theory (Sassen 1988, Massey 1993). It happened more slowly, when 
the “struggle,” the almost constant crisis caused by disadvantageous circumstances, 
became permanent, at least according to the testimony of these interviewees. 
Fanni also talks about a similar shock during the change of the regime and also 
points at an additional crisis in 2008 when she launched a small business with her 
husband, and how the related family crisis led to the decision to migrate for work:
Well, I was working as an administrator at the state farm in B. before I fi nished… 
in ’70…, from 1974, I worked there for 17 years, then the farm, privatization came, 
then it fi nished up unfortunately. We would have never believed that such a big state 
farm, where 1000 people were employed, could suddenly... this was not so, we did 
not believe that it was happening. We were even happy that it was so good for us, 
we did not have to go to work, you were unemployed for a bit, but then you got the 
surprise that this was it – it really is, what will happen now? A few months, and then 
what will happen? Because if you were on the treadmill, it was so good, you rested a 
bit, you were at home – and afterwards? It was a great shock. (Fanni, 60)
It can be stated that both the interviewees report and their biographies show that 
the radical transformation of the external environment at the time of the collapse 
of state socialism in the given migratory space uprooted people from their former 
stable positions and resulted in a long-lasting period of insecurity as reported in their 
interviews. We can also call this process becoming “disembedded” from a customary 
and stable situation, as Hann would call it on the basis of the conceptual framework 
of Karl Polanyi (Hann 2018). This feeling of being uprooted for a longer period 
can lead to such narrations as the former ones, as opposed to stable life histories. 
In these cases, migration can be interpreted as a long-term response to insecurity. 
In other words, transformations driven externally from the point of view of the 
local community are taken into account and perceived in the narrations. According 
to the interviewees, the latter created constraints over time, which processes may 
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have involved several coercive mechanisms, at least according to the interrelations 
observed in the interviews.
In the interviews, one of these mechanisms of insecurity (as we have already seen 
above) is the decrease in wages and even the non-payment of wages: Th ese problems, 
together with the deterioration of other circumstances (debts, deterioration in health, 
etc.), actually led to a pre-migration crisis which cannot be interpreted as migration 
generated by low wages, but by constraints of livelihoods and precarious states (see 
for example Szépe 2012). Th is is well illustrated by Ilona’s case. She describes in her 
own words how, following the example of her sister, she escaped from a very hard 
situation.
I went abroad after working in catering, then my husband became very ill and had to 
sell the business after 23 years; that was the [breaking] point, and after that it was 
hard to fi nd a job again. And then, I was originally from the village, but the point of 
the whole thing was that we were searching, and then I settled in a place, in a (good) 
bakery. I was a shop assistant, a bakery shop assistant, so I worked like a slave… since 
I did not get paid, I did not get days off , I did not get money on days I did not work, so I 
thought that was it. In the meantime, an acquaintance said that one could go to work 
to Germany, as I had intended to do before, and at the age of 50 I went to Germany to 
work on a ’Hof ’. Afterwards, I said I would not go anymore, as it was slavery at that 
time and it was very, very diffi  cult. I lost 24 pounds [in weight] in the three months, 
I broke my knees, so long, it did not matter, it was over, and then my sister who was 
already working in Germany as a nurse [carer] said ‘Ili, this money could be earned 
more easily’ (hmmm), and then I started to work as a nurse. (Ilona, 57)
In this case, the escape was from one vulnerable situation to another, when the 
interviewee engaged in care-work after experiencing very harsh working conditions. 
Similarly, Diana interprets her migration in the 1990s as a case of being hit 
by a crisis. For her, the constraint was the crash of the social system following the 
introduction of the so-called Bokros package, named after the minister of ﬁ nance of 
that time. During this period of “shock therapy,” certain stable elements of the social 
welfare programs were cut or reformulated. Th erefore Diana, who slowly became 
an agent organizing care-work, explained the changes in her migration steps and 
commuting in relation to the emerging economic hardships.  She also conﬁ rms this 
from her role as an agent who made use of these factors:
Because unfortunately in Hungary, no matter how much you work, you cannot make 
enough money. I just don’t wonder that many of them leave their home country, 
and many of them just wander, which is a very bad thing. They will not come back, 
because if they move out, the whole family will move out. (Diana, 41)
According to Diana, it is not wage diﬀ erentials and wage maximization that 
matter, but the fact that ﬁ nancial insecurity leads to mass migration. Feelings of 
economic insecurity also become dominant in the interviews when interviewees 
report to struggling with other crises, the most important of these being connected 
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to the family. Vivien interprets her own story quite dramatically and recounts how 
she was forced to leave not only because of vulnerability and insecurity at work, but 
also due to a sudden family crisis.
Well, it’s been a long time since one bought a house in cash, it’s impossible, we don’t 
earn so much in today’s world. I had a job in the catering industry, I worked down here 
in the pub for a while, also before and after my daughter’s birth, but on the one hand 
working conditions changed a lot, the salary became very low. I was almost never at 
home – as you might know, in catering there are no weekends, no holidays, nothing 
– I was not at home, I was not paid, and in the end I had to do everything, so the line 
had been crossed. I quit, but work was needed. Th en, my mom. She was an alcoholic 
and she was in very bad shape so I took care of her, but she needed support, although 
she was working at the local government, but it was not enough for anything. Th en 
I worked for Eckerle for a while, this company produced gadgets, but I did not feel 
okay, so I fi nished after three months. Meanwhile, my mother moved away because I 
wanted to control her drinking, but she drank, so we did not understand each other, 
and when she moved home she managed to get so drunk that she died. So, to tell the 
truth, I had no money for the funeral, so one week after her death I left, because 
there was no choice, I had to pay for the funeral, and when I came back after the fi rst 
two weeks, we buried her. So, I left to go abroad exactly because there was nothing 
for covering this. (Vivien, 27) 
In this case, additional factors, namely former migration patterns, social ties and 
former migratory networks, played a role. Before her migration Vivien’s mother had 
also worked harvesting asparagus in Germany, and her brother had worked abroad 
as a stonemason. Th is explains why these family members could leave in the given 
situation, but not others (Portes 1995, Portes – Böröcz 1989, Gödri 2010, Blaskó – 
Gödri 2014). Th us the case involved not only a need to reduce costs, but migration 
was probably one of the (often postponed) solutions. Almost all the interviewees drew 
attention to the role of historical and ethnic networks. Th ese also involve regional 
characteristics, such as the Swabian-German relations that already existed during the 
time of state socialism and which impacted the lives of  interviewees (Blaskó – Gödri 
2014, Feischmidt – Zakariás 2010, Váradi et al. 2017, Gábriel 2018). Th us ethnic and 
migratory patterns in the migratory processes are also major structural factors in 
migration, which according to the interviewees become factors with a direct impact 
in serious crisis situations (Feischmidt – Zakariás 2010). In fact, such a coexistence 
and correlation of factors can be observed in other cases of ﬁ nancial insecurity; for 
example, when crisis occurs due to debt.
Similar to other factors, the crisis can also be connected to the factor of age, as the 
interviewees repeatedly indicated that they could not ﬁ nd any work at over 50 years 
of age. Age-related discrimination was also a factor, in their opinion.
Divorce plays a role in many cases... so if someone has just divorced, many of them 
are with children, they have to be cared for, and it is typical that the children of 
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caregivers [who go abroad] are the youngest children, who are in the third or fourth 
year [of school]. I heard about one who was two years old. I have a care-worker now 
where the child is younger,  another is starting school now. Variable. Variable. So this 
is a problem. Th e older age group is just before retirement and they cannot get a job 
in Hungary at the age of 55-56. (Diana, 41)
To sum up, the above interviewees do not portray themselves as  free and rational 
decision makers. In their reports family crises are the key factors, related to various 
wider structural causes and changes (see also Váradi et al. 2017). It is important to 
note that the "crisis narratives" in themselves could also be a legitimating tool in a 
discursive space that does not support migration, as found in earlier research (Kovács 
–Melegh 2000, Turai 2018). It can also be  argued that migrant workers try to justify 
their moves through such crisis narratives. Th is fact may also play a role, but it must 
be pointed out that the above-mentioned coexistence of multiple biographical events 
suggests that these crises are not (or only partially) re-evaluations, or means of 
legitimizing decisions in hindsight, but refer to real and serious hardship.
Ignoring costs, and the family economy 
One of the last elements in the micro economics of migration in any given space is 
that interviewees often ignore a signiﬁ cant number of costs (e.g. they do not take 
into account the fact that they are providing a 24-hour service when they talk about 
wages), or they do not associate their work with other “costs” and “beneﬁ ts”; namely, 
their micro-economic calculations are not complete. Th ey treat the fees of brokers 
relatively consciously, and the receiving families or agents handle insurance and travel 
expenses.
One of the most important elements regarding the “forgetting” of costs is that 
interviewees rarely mention the fact that they are not able to take their family 
members with them, and members cannot get jobs in the same place. Th is situation 
is largely incompatible with information about wages and conditions, as the agent of 
the caregivers explains: 
Many people call me, saying that ‘I want to do care work, but I want to go with my 
husband.’ Of course, I’m not partner to these things. First, I don’t deal with organizing 
this, that someone gets a job in the same city, in the same place. I would like to tell 
you that we recruit people for this intensive care through partnerships. In Austria 
we send people directly to families. So I cannot fi nd a job for someone’s husband, and 
in such cases I tell them [the applicants] that they should try elsewhere. Th ere is no 
way to do that... We send people abroad, not families. (Diana, 41) 
Th e diﬃ  culty which is touched upon above indicates that these costs are not 
accounted for but become a part of familial self-exploitation, in the sense that 
Chayanov used the term in the case of peasant economies (Chayanov 1966). If taken 
into account these costs would signiﬁ cantly reduce the “competitiveness” of net 
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salaries of 140-240,000 forints which migrant workers try to boost via “forgetting” 
the time they spend at home between shifts. Th e dilemma of how to reconcile one’s 
duty to care for one’s own dependent parents with care work abroad is  regularly seen 
in the literature, but often forgotten. 
Similarly, work-related health problems and their consequences can also be added 
to the costs. Serious work-related acute and chronic illnesses are reported by the 
interviewees, although their consequences are scarcely mentioned and they are not 
included on the migratory balance sheet.
Katinka lived in a house in a forest with her patient, where she had to work and 
sleep in a temperature of 13 °C due to poor insulation. Th e cold temperatures played a 
role in the  emergence of inﬂ ammation and benign tumors, which trouble her during 
her everyday life. Réka talks about a herniated disk and recurrent panic disorder: 
Due to necessity... In 2005, I went to Tirol, I worked in a four-star hotel as a maid. In 
October 2009, I went home, (I was) burnt out, sick, with a herniated disk. I could not 
get a job at home, I set up a business, I made frames and cleaned with my mother, the 
two of us. Th is was my job for two years. Th en the jobs ran out because people saved 
money when they could. I’ve been working my whole life and I won’t be a parasite... 
Th en in 2008 I changed my working schedule, which was then not seven months, but 
only three-and-a-half or four-and-a-half, but in 2007 it became clear that I had a 
panic disorder due to stress. But at that time it didn’t occur to me that a doctor would 
be needed, and I had no idea at all that this was the case, [that this was why I was 
getting dizzy], I got sick: I slept and kept on going.... (Réka, 54)
To sum up, some of the costs and diﬃ  culties of working abroad arise from sharing 
in the household. Th e leaving behind of one’s own family is constantly forgotten, or 
the situation is considered only as the diﬃ  cult and inevitable consequence of the 
migration situation. In other words, the strengths of family relationships, the work 
itself, the distinctions between work and health impacts handling the two separately 
all hide some of the costs and thus make jobs abroad less “proﬁ table.” This “ignorance” 
of interviewees was also due not only to family microeconomics but also to the desire 
to show that that they were being successful in managing very diﬃ  cult situations or 
unprivileged social positions.  
Th e organization and institutionalization of labor migration 
among care workers
One of the most important issues concerning transnational care work is the fact that 
among many migrants who work abroad, including many of our respondents, the 
arrangements do not involve free, non-commodiﬁ ed-type agreements between two 
households, where one household shares its income with the another to get certain 
activities done. Th erefore, such care-work it is not a “traditional” form of work, and 
is distinct from the classical, commodiﬁ ed wage labour described by Marx or Karl 
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Polanyi (Polanyi 1844/2001, 76; Szigeti 2017, Turai 2016). It involves transactions not 
only in the informal market or outside of the market, but a form of institutionalized 
market where very often, and very importantly, a proﬁ t-orientated agency network 
utilizes wage diﬀ erentials and the welfare beneﬁ ts given by the receiving state, and 
brokers obtain a signiﬁ cant share of the rent (unearned income) from migration. 
Principally, it is the receiving state and booming recruitment activity that capitalize 
on hierarchical wage relations and extract the rent from a globally unequal system. 
Th us this activity and the activity providers become (using Polany’s term) ﬁ ctitious 
commodities and part of the multiverse of global work (see for the role of “migration 
infrastructure,” Xiang – Lindquist 2014, 123-125; for global work, van der Linden – 
Roth 2013, 448, 457, 458; for ﬁ ctitious commodities, Polanyi 1944/2001, 75, 79). 
Th us, from the perspective of the theory of migration, this mass process cannot be 
described as merely a mechanical product of the decisions of migrants, as assumed 
by scholars that promote neoclassical models to explain migration. In many respects, 
the process is driven to a large extent by demand, and a speciﬁ c set of agents; namely, 
it should be seen as a type of segmented labour market model (Parrenas 2001, Turai 
2018, Massey 1993, Gábriel 2018). Our interview with an agent illuminates the 
process of objectiﬁ cation (“human traﬃ  cking”) and also the logic of payments, which 
reveals (through a process of magnifying beneﬁ ts again) that a monthly wage of only 
700 euros may be obtained (based on 24-hour service for the period of work), after 
travel costs and social contributions in the host country are paid for.  Th e following is 
what our agent interviewee says about this process: 
In Austria in competing companies people have been quasi-traffi  cked; they treat 
nurses [carers] like... they mediate, and they pay wages that simply [would not be 
paid] in the normal process of labor recruitment. 
It should be noted that on a macro level, it is also clear that, due to uneven 
exchange between the two countries, Austria skims oﬀ  a signiﬁ cant social transfer 
as it earns hundreds of euros per month and per capita per migrant worker from 
the Austrian social and retirement scheme, as under the relevant rules hardly any 
beneﬁ ts must be paid to them (ﬁ ve years of employment and a higher contribution 
into the system are required before any serious retirement beneﬁ ts can be obtained).6 
Th us, some part of the ﬁ nancial payment made by the host state (550 – 1100 euros 
per month) is also recouped by the host state, while due to “care distraction,” vacant 
care worker positions, and absent roles within the family in the sending countries, 
deﬁ ciencies may arise in connection with care (Turai 2018, 182–190). 
Th e interviews with the migrant labour agent are also very informative as the 
agent also “forgets” to mention her own fees, although these sums can be huge. In 
many cases, at least in this migratory space, these costs are paid by the host family, 
but it frequently occurs that the workers themselves have to pay 100-200 euros per 
6 On a macro level see: https://g7.24.hu/elet/20180102/az-osztrakok-kiszamoltak-mennyit-hoz-nekik-egy-bevandorlo-es-
mennyit-visz-egy-menekult/ (Last download: 2018.05.27)
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month (110,000 forints annually), or 10 percent of their salary. This sum is usually 
not included in the often-mentioned net salary of 700 euros per month, but it is 
sometimes debited from the net wage. In exchange, the interviewees receive not only 
addresses from the agent but they are also assured that in the event of their or their 
shift-partner’s illness (absence), they will not need to organize a substitute. Th us, the 
situation clearly shows the existence of a secondary, private redistribution system, as 
national social services do not cover these labour relations. 
Competition among labour migrant groups
Based on the interviews, we can state that the related wages are only relatively 
high before the full range of accounted- and not accounted-for (“forgotten”) costs 
are considered (24-hour shifts, and all the physical and psychological hardships, 
particularly among aging, 50-60 year-old women). One of the reasons for this is that, 
in the given migratory space, host families are likely to try to manage within the limits 
of the state beneﬁ t they receive for elderly care as described above (i.e. they try to 
keep the gross labour costs of care work to less than  1100 euros), and to ﬁ nance only 
the smallest part of the cost of care from their own pockets. Obviously, the situation 
is variable, and while there are families which treat care-workers humanely and fairly, 
there are also very unpleasant families that try to save every penny. Via this beneﬁ t 
system the Austrian state generates demand for migrant labour from low-income 
countries; labour that is also an important and indispensable part of the social care 
system in the sending society. Th erefore, the process involves the conscious, state-
supported use of wage diﬀ erences, so we should not speak about the functioning 
of a neoclassical market model of supply and demand. Without this beneﬁ t-driven 
demand, there would not be such massive migration within the given migratory space.
Wages are kept low due to another mechanism as well. Th is is wage competition 
between  various labour migrant groups. Competition is linked to the employment 
of cultural prejudices against “problematic” groups of workers (regarding such 
competition, see Feischmidt 2004 and Feischmidt – Zakariás 2011; with a focus on 
Eastern European care givers see Turai 2018, 11). Th e cost of this competition is borne 
by the migrant groups as a from of externality of the market system, and can involve 
direct ﬁ nancial losses for the migrant labourers. Moreover, ﬁ nancial disadvantages 
can also be indirect: in such fragmented labour market segments, rivalry certainly 
reduces the ability of migrants to enforce related interests concerning working 
conditions in a diverse and fragmented social space (Hoerder et al. 2015, 5-20). Th is 
rivalry, which reduces not only employees’ but also agents’ commission and income, 
was explained by the agent we interviewed as follows:
I have the minimum wage here, I do not even get this; last month, this month my 
salary was 79,000 forints, and I have been doing this for fi ve years. Th is is not 
going well, even with us [agents] anymore, so you have to know that we – from our 
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partner company’s commission, and the families... the family will pay us the monthly 
commission as long as our service is used. So many families, many families would 
be needed to be make a profi t, and then after taxation I would be able to make a 
living. Because if I earn ten million (forints), half of it goes to the state as tax. And 
how can you produce ten million extra a year, when I need almost 500,000 forints 
a year to rent [the offi  ce]? Forty-fi ve thousand forints is the rental fee for this offi  ce 
that needs to be paid. Th e wages have to be paid, I pay almost 100,000 forints in 
social contributions each month. Th en, the wages and other things, I count all of 
this... to have ten million extra, I would need so many families. There is a great deal 
of competition, as I said, a good deal of competition, it’s very competitive. Well, 
nearly 400 companies are registered in Austria, not to mention the Polish, and I am 
not speaking about the Romanians, Bulgarians, Croatians, and Hungarians, these 
fi ve countries, neighbouring countries, with hundreds of companies, recruitment 
companies specialized only in elderly care. In Romania, in only one county, we have 
less than a quarter [of employees] in fi ve counties than in Romania from one county. 
Th ere are plenty of agencies, lots of people who deal only with elderly care. Th ey 
mean competition not only for us as a company, but also for the employees, both for 
the employers and the employees. So the Slovaks, Polish, Romanians are the biggest 
competitors in the fi eld of 24-hour care in Germany. (Diana, 41)
Beyond the “normal” entrepreneurial complaints about costs and the lack of proﬁ t, 
we can clearly see that there is a need to increase the number of clients as much as 
possible and that the number of competing agencies and the labor force they control 
serves as a factor in controlling wages. Th is section of the interviews gave clear signs 
that one of the factors that maintains high levels of migration is the development of 
the “migration infrastructure” and the dramatic increase in agencies, as Xiang and 
Lindquist also argue concerning this era of globalization (Xiang – Lindquist 2014, 
123-125). Th is situation is also recognized by the interviewees. 
A care-giver also talked about the same phenomenon. Th ey put it the following way:
Th en Ukrainians come, Poles, there are a lot of Poles out there, Romanian girls, 
Romanian girls undertake [this work] for very little money, because there is 
absolutely no opportunity to work in Romania. (Fanni, 60)
Due to the institutionalization of this competition it is not surprising that 
interviewees also feel that their position is important to them. Th is competitive 
struggle and its ideology are well illustrated by the fact that almost every interviewee 
talked about the refugees who had appeared in their destination space in a particularly 
negative way. Th e disapproving attitudes in the interviews were not only due to the 
perceived or actual social costs of people arriving from elsewhere, but also originated 
in perceptions about work ethics and the hierarchical position assigned by host society 
to caregiver migrants and incoming groups in relation to the locals. Nonetheless, the 
above-described political economic mechanisms are not necessarily related to the 
perceived positional insecurity of the East European migrant workers. Lídia, one of 
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the most positive workers who looked for nice places where she could  work outside 
of home, says the following:
I do not really understand this now. Everyone is already coming. It is not true that 
all of them are refugees due to wars. And they have so much money, and I can see 
that in Austria. Th ere, there are a lot of them in Leoben, and I was there as the 
middleman called [am asylum seeker] to help a stonemason, because they live there 
and were moved there. He [the asylum seeker] said he receives meals all day, receives 
breakfast, lunch and snacks, gets coff ee, gets fi ve euros, and just something; he’s 
a waiter, he does not work. (...) It’s awful that they’re loud, we see them, they are 
moved into such large houses – I do not meet them by the way, but we can see them 
there. And they’re really grumbling there, because they have got smartphones, they 
get a fl at, but not any kind of apartment but a big detached house, their children get 
their food in the school for free, and the families are supposed to get 1,500 euros of 
pocket money.
Th e interviewee is not worried about actual competition with her, but just about the 
welfare beneﬁ ts the asylum seekers receive (i.e. the rents they are required to share).  
Sometimes the link between feeling “disembedded” and complaints about 
“refugees” is apparent. Réka, representing one of the interviewees who has 
encountered a lot of hardship in terms of health, family and jobs, quite openly links 
the local welfare system to support for refugees, which also shows the rivalry among 
the groups. In addition, she also involves her hardships in her complaints.
Well, if we let them in, Hungarian woman will start to think about how many 
babies they will have to deliver.... Many of them cannot even read or write, what will 
happen if they start to reproduce themselves? Let’s see, these refugees, they come 
with four or fi ve children, these children must be fed, dressed, educated. I almost 
died when I tried to educate my two children by myself. Should I work for others’ 
children?! Th e Austrian pension has not increased, they raised the Austrian pension 
only by 0.8%, hundreds of euros a month. For one person. Who would like to work to 
support them? Come on! (Réka, 54)
To sum up, transnational elderly care is organized as part of an institutionalized, 
hierarchical competition which signiﬁ cantly determines the wage and cost conditions 
of care work, and the type of demand that is generated. Th ese institutional frameworks 
are constantly inﬂ uencing and at the same time sustaining and facilitating the process 
of mass migration, which, as such, can hardly be thought of as the mechanical result 
of aggregated rational/welfare decisions, as we demonstrate through our interviews 
and the reactions of interviewees. 
Conclusions
Th e interview texts we have analysed are rich sources for understanding how 
interviewees construct their own very complex perspectives of migration and work 
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abroad, which are reactions to cultural patterns and their own life histories embedded 
in larger-scale social changes. In our qualitative sociological research we have tried 
to understand and identify the internal mechanisms of these “ideational” processes 
as complex reactions to past and  present circumstances. We have also tried to show 
what new perspectives need further analysis on a larger scale – or should involve 
going beyond interviews – to obtain a fuller reconstruction of the process itself. 
As evidence from the interviews indicates, the short-term circular migrant 
labour of care-worker commuters is often embedded into perceptions of a highly 
institutionalized hierarchical order within historical structures and processes and in 
gender-fragmented migratory spaces. Even if the interviewees dwell on numerous 
labour-market-related or familial crises most of them do not see themselves as 
individuals seeking beneﬁ ts in a rational manner. Th e perception of making rational 
choice plays a role only when the interviewees have memories of a longer-term, stable 
job. In other words there were only a few interruptions in the employment history they 
recall. Th us, on the basis of the  interviews we conducted, the decisions themselves 
are presented as being more complex than neoclassical theory assumes, suggesting 
that wider, historically developing structural causes and social changes may also play 
a major role by laying the ground for socially contextualized migratory decisions. 
Th e interviews suggest that when analyzing such processes it is pertinent to look at 
longer-term historical causes of migration and possibly even at the structural changes 
of previous decades.  If interviewees report to having experienced multiple crises 
in their life (work, family, debt, etc.), and this knowledge is coupled with a pattern 
of outmigration by other family members or by individuals from a closer network 
then it seems, we need to take a longer term historical perspective. With further 
research we may thus develop a new understanding of this type of migration and 
constrained short-term cyclical migrant labour and we can reconstruct the experience 
of abandoned workers in post state socialist Hungary.
Th e targeted group itself might be important, since it is likely that former working 
class people, unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the various declining professions 
deserve special attention. Qualitative research can only argue that a systematic 
connection is possible between the eﬀ ects of globalization and migration. Th us, some 
of the women who are leaving a labour market that is declining due to globalization 
occasionally try to ﬁ nd employment in the service industries, while eventually they 
enter into this global labour market through utilizing certain family, ethnic and local 
patterns and relationships, especially when after a longer and more stable period 
they become vulnerable ﬁ nancially for a longer period of time. Th e issue is not the 
coexistence of diﬀ erent forms of work and inequalities, as suggested by the critical 
literature on global labour (van der Linden 2013). Here, in the given migratory space, 
these diﬀ erent forms of work and the related inequalities can be linked by a historical 
logic, as we learn from the interviews. Th e migrant women we interviewed had stable 
jobs in late state socialism which were later ruined by the globalization of the textile 
Review of Sociology, 2018/482
industry or other declining or very competitive service industries, and then a longer 
struggle started. Some of these workers have moved slowly from the marginalized 
sectors into global care work: this is how they become transnational actors.
Th is painful process of structural transformation could be the space in which 
individual interviewees manoeuvre. Th e  changes they have experienced and the forces 
uprooting them produce a lot of bitterness among them, whilst the transnational 
life and entering the global market have also brought inner joy and satisfaction to 
these women. In the meanwhile, their situation has only partially improved, and their 
vulnerability may have just been restructured, thus overall we are witnessing the 
personal records of the reproduction of various subordinated positions. 
We could also reconstruct from these interviews that some of the costs of these 
decisions or work abroad are hidden even to the interviewees themselves, which 
situation we hypothesized to be linked to the structures of family economies which 
follow a diﬀ erent logic than “proﬁ t-making” organizations. Th eir prime motive of 
the former can thus be the level of subjectively felt self-exploitation as described by 
Chayanov and as originally applied to peasant families. But it seems that migrant 
labour to large extent controlled and organized by the family and not the individual 
may have some elements of the model described by Chayanov. Th is model and several 
other mechanisms (such as migrants trying to show the positive outcome of migration, 
or even an improvements of status) can lead to the “suppression” of some costs which 
makes the analyzed decisions even less “rational” in an individualist sense. Th us, on 
the basis of our research it can be claimed that the household economics model may 
be a key model in such analysis as middle aged and elderly family members also react 
to a combination of individual and societal level changes, including declining health, 
various family crises involving divorce and debt, and the loss of jobs. Along these 
linked cycles they manoeuvre, most probably trying to minimize their losses and 
risks as far they are able to do so in a highly competitive sphere of work. Surely this 
situation needs further research using data and observations that goes beyond the 
interviews we have analyzed in a speciﬁ c region.   
References
Blaskó Zs. – Gödri I. (2014): Kivándorlás Magyarországról: szelekció és célország-
választás az új migránsok körében. Demográfi a, 57 (4): 271–307.
Burawoy M. (1987): Th e Limits of Wright’s Analytical Marxism and an Alternative. 
Berkeley Journal of Sociology, 32: 51–72.
Chayanov A. (1966): Th e Th eory of Peasant Economy. Eds. Th orner, D., Kerblay, B. H., 
Smith, R. E. F. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Durst J. (2013): „It’s better to be a Gypsy in Canada than being a Hungarian in 
Hungary”: Th e „new wave” of Roma migration. In Vidra Zs. (ed.): Roma migration 
Attila Melegh – Dóra Gábriel – Gabriella Gresits – Dalma Hámos: Abandoned Hungarian... 83
to and from Canada: Th e Czech, Hungarian and Slovak case. Budapest: CEU-CPS, 
203–248. 
Feischmidt M. (2004): A határ és a román stigma. In Kovács N., Osvát A., Szarka L. 
(eds.): Tér és terep: Tanulmányok az etnicitás és az identitás kérdésköréből. Az MTA 
Kisebbségkutató Intézetének évkönyve; 3. Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 43–58.
Feischmidt M. – Zakariás I. (2010): Migráció és etnicitás – A mobilitás formái és 
politikái nemzeti és transznacionális térben. In Feischmidt M. (ed.): Etnicitás. 
Különbségteremtő társadalom. Budapest: Gondolat, MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet 
2010.
Gábriel D. (2018): A Magyarországról Ausztriába irányuló idősgondozói migráció – 
Egy kvalitatív kutatás eredményei a dél-baranyai térségből induló idősgondozói 
migráció mechanizmusáról. KSH NKI Kutatási Jelentések, Budapest: KSH 
Népességtudományi Kutatóintézet. (In print)
Gödri I. (2010): . KSH NKI Kutatási Jelentések 89. Budapest: KSH Népességtudományi 
Kutatóintézet.
Hajnal L. E. (2012): Romák Kanadában. Kivándorlás Magyarországról az 1990-es 
évek második felétől In Sik E. (ed.) A migráció szociológiája 2. Budapest: ELTE 
TÁTK, 60–83.
Hareven T. K. (1982): Family Time and Industrial Time. Th e Relationship Between the 
Family and Work in a New England Industrial Community. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hann, Chris (2018): Maﬁ a State or Populist Re-Embedding? Hungary Th ree Decades 
after Socialist Collapse. University of Essex, Mark Harvey Retirement Meeting, 
October 5th, 2018, Manuscript
Hárs Á. – Simon D. (2015): A munkaerő-migráció változása a kétezres években 
Magyarországon. Vizsgálat a munkaerő-felmérés adatai alapján. Magyar 
Tudományos Akadémia Közgazdaság- és Regionális Tudományi Kutatóközpont 
Közgazdaságtudományi Intézete, Budapesti Corvinus Egyetem Emberi 
Erőforrások Tanszék. 
Hoerder D. – van Nederveen Meerkerk E. – Neunsinger S. (eds.) (2015): Towards a 
Global History of Domestic and Caregiving Workers. Leiden, Th e Netherlands: Brill. 
Kovács É. – Melegh A. (2000): „Lehetett volna rosszabb is, mehettünk volna Amerikába 
is – Vándorlás történetek Erdély, Magyarország és Ausztria háromszögében. In Sik 
E. –Tóth J. (eds.): Diskurzusok a vándorlásról. MTA Politikai Tudományok Intézete 
Nemzetközi Migráció Kutatócsoport Évkönyve, 93–154.
Kovács É. – Melegh A. (2007): In a Gendered Space – Forms and Reasons of Migration 
and the Integration of Female Migrants. Demográfi a English Edition, 50 (5): 26–59.
Massey D. – Arango J. – Hugo G. – Kouaouci A. – Pellegrino A. – Taylor, J. E. (1994): 
An Evaluation of International Migration Th eory: Th e North American Case. 
Population and Development Review, 20 (4): 699–751. 
Review of Sociology, 2018/484
Massey D. – Arango J. – Hugo G. – Kouaouci A. – Pellegrino A. –Taylor, J. E. (2001): 
A nemzetközi migráció elméletei: áttekintés és értékelés. In Sik E. (ed.) A migráció 
szociológiája 1. Szociális és Családügyi Minisztérium, Budapest.
McKeown A. (2004): Global Migration, 1846-1940. Journal of World History, 15 (2): 155–189.
Melegh A. (2013a): Net migration and historical development in Southeastern Europe 
since 1950. Hungarian Historical Review, 1 (3–4): 144–182. 
Melegh A. (2013b): Diverging historical development of migration in Southeastern 
Europe since 1950. Working Papers on Population, Family and Welfare. No 17. 
Budapest: Demographic Research Institute, Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃ  ce. 
Melegh A. – Sárosi Annamária (2015): Magyarország bekapcsolódása a migrációs 
folyamatokba: történeti-strukturális megközelítés. Demográfi a, 58 (4): 221–265. 
doi: 10.21543./dem.58.4.1
Melegh A. (2016): Unequal Exchanges and the Radicalization of Demographic 
Nationalism in Hungary Intersections. EEJSP 2(4): 87–108. DOI: 10.17356/
ieejsp.v2i4.287 http://intersections.tk.mta.hu
Melegh A. (2017): Európa a globális migrációban 1990–2015 között az ENSZ és a 
Világbank statisztikái tükrében. Demografi a.hu/Korfa 2017. Március XVII(1). 
http://demograﬁ a.hu/kiadvanyokonline/index.php/korfa/issue/view/549
Mihályi P. ‒ Szelényi I. (2019): Rent-Seekers: Proﬁ ts, Wages and Inequality. Th e top 
20%. Palgrave. London
Nagy B. – Krízková A. – Kanjuo-Mrčela A. (2012): A munkaerő-piaci politika hatása 
a nemek közötti egyenlőségre a gazdasági átalakulás és az EU csatlakozás 
időszakában: Csehország, Magyarország és Szlovénia összehasonlítása. Szociológiai 
Szemle, 22 (1): 30–60. 
Obádovics Cs. – Bruder E. – Kulcsár L. (2011): A gazdasági és szociális helyzet területi 
egyenlőtlenségei a vidéki Magyarországon – hasonlóságok és eltérések. In Bódi F., 
Fábián G. (eds.): Helyi szociális ellátórendszer Magyarországon. Debrecen: Debreceni 
Egyetemi Kiadó. 143–157.
Parreñas S. R. (2001): Servants of Globalization Women, Migration and Domestic Work. 
Stanford CA: Stanford University Press. 
Polanyi K. (2001) (1944): Th e great transformation: the political and economic origins of 
our time. Boston: Beacon Paperback.
Portes A. – Böröcz J. (1989): Contemporary Immigration: Th eoretical Perspectives 
on Its Determinants and Modes of Incorporation.  Th e International Migration 
Review, 23 (3): 606–630.
Portes A. (1995): Economic Sociology and the Sociology of Immigration: A Conceptual 
Overview. In Portes A. (ed.): Economic Sociology of Immigration – Essays on Networks, 
Ethnicity, and Entrepreneurship. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 1–41.
Rosenthal G. (1993): Reconstruction of life stories: principles of selection in 
generating stories for narrative biographical interviews. Th e narrative study of lives, 
1 (1): 59–91.
Attila Melegh – Dóra Gábriel – Gabriella Gresits – Dalma Hámos: Abandoned Hungarian... 85
Sarkar M. (2017): Constrained Labour as Instituted Process Transnational Contract 
Work and Circular Migration in Late Capitalism. European Journal of Sociology, 58 
(1): 171–204.
Sassen S. (1988): Th e Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment 
and Labor Flow. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Stark O. – Bloom D. E. (1985): Th e New Economics of Labor Migration. Th e American 
Economic Review, 75 (2): 173–178. 
Szelenyi I. (2016): Pakistani guest workers in the United Arab Emirates. Demográfi a 
English Edition, 59 (5): 5–47.
Szépe A. (2012): Prekariátus: Miért pont most és miért pont itt? Fordulat, 5 (19): 10–27.
Szigeti P. (2017): Kapitalizmusfogalmak és a tőkés termelési mód elmélete. Eszmélet, 
115: 1–59.
Turai T. (2016): Globális szerveződés, otthoni ápolás. A migráns gondozói szektor 
belső rendszere. Demográfi a, 59 (2–3): 201–230.  
Turai T. (2018): Kelet- és közép-európai nők a globális idősgondozói ellátórendszerben. 
Budapest: Balassi ‒ MTA BTK.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Aﬀ airs. Population Division 
(2017): Trends in International Migrant Stock: Th e 2017 revision (United Nations 
database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017).
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (2016): Deﬁ ning and Measuring 
Circular Migration 20 January 2016 https://www.unece.org/ﬁ leadmin/DAM/
stats/documents/ece/ces/bur/2016/February/14-Add1_Circular_migration.pdf 
accessed Conference of European statisticians
van der Linden M. –  Roth K. H. (eds.) (2013): Beyond Marx: Th eorising the Global 
Labour Relations of the Twenty-First Century. In collaboration with Max Henninger. 
Leiden, Th e Netherlands/Boston, Massachusetts: Brill. Historical Materialism 
Book Series.
Váradi M. M. – Durst J. – Fehér K. – Németh K. – Virág T. (2017): Kényszerű mobilitás: 
migrációs utak hátrányos helyzetű vidéki terekben. Socio.hu, 3 (25): 25–46.
Xiang B. – Lindquist J. (2014): Migration Infrastructure. International Migration 
Review, 48 (1): 122–148. 
Online references:
https://g7.24.hu/elet/20180102/az-osztrakok-kiszamoltak-mennyit-hoz-nekik-egy-
evandorlo-es-mennyit-visz-egy-menekult/ (Last download: 2018.06.21.)
Review of Sociology, 2018/486
Appendix
Table 1.: Selected demographic and employment characteristics of interviewees 
Interviewees in the research sample
Code Name Age Marital status Shift Rotation Status
D01 Anna 53 Married 4 weeks Active
D02 Beáta 56 Widow 2 weeks Active
D03 Diána 41 Married 2 weeks
Manager, former 
care-worker 
D04 Gáspár 56 Married - Husband
D05 Csenge 74 Widow 4 weeks Former care-worker 
D06 Katinka 61 Divorced 4 weeks Active
D07 Ilona 57 Married 4 weeks Intermittent
D08 Lídia 67 Married 2 weeks Active
D09 Franciska 43 In relationship 2 weeks Intermittent
D10 László 73 Married - Husband
G01 Juliska 62 Widow 4 weeks Active
G02 Timea 48 Divorced 4 weeks Active
G03 Vivien 27 In relationship 2 weeks Former care-worker 
G04 Réka 54 Divorced 2 weeks Active
G05 Fanni 60 Married 4 weeks Intermittent
A01 Borbála 68 Married 4 weeks Active
A02 József 74 Married - Husband
H01 Margit 60 Married 3 months Active
H02 Ferenc 61 Married - Husband
R01 Emma 68 Divorced 2 weeks Former care-worker 
E01 Edina 57 Divorced 2 weeks Active
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Table 2: Wages and some of the reported costs of care workers employed abroad 
Wages earned abroad, and reported costs of labor migration 
Code Wage abroad Travel expenses Commission fee
Contributions 
(to state)  paid 
abroad 
Total amount 
after deductions 
(as calculated by 
interviewee)
D01
1596 €/4 weeks 
(57€/day)
95€/ each way, 
pays for herself
None
570 €/ three-
months’ social 
security (pays for 
herself)
900 €
D02 Not mentioned
60€/each way, 
family pays
Not mentioned
social security 
(family pays)
Not known
D03
clients: 770 € 
minimum/2 
weeks
Pays for herself Not mentioned
social security 
(paid for herself)
Not counted
D05 1200 €/4 weeks Family paid Not mentioned Not mentioned Not counted
D06
1100 €/4 weeks 
(40 €/day)
Family pays
180 euros, family 
pays to the 
agent. 250-400 € 
for one offer
Not mentioned 150,000 Ft
D07 Not mentioned Not mentioned 10% of salary Not mentioned Not known
D08 700 €/2 weeks Family pays Not mentioned
182 €/month 
social security 
(family pays)
700 €
D09 Not mentioned Family pays Not mentioned Not mentioned Not known
G01 Not mentioned Pays for herself Not mentioned
Non-legal (no 
social security)
Not known
G02 1000 €/4 weeks Family pays 100 €/month Not mentioned 900 €
G03 700 €/2 weeks Pays for herself Not mentioned Not mentioned Not counted
G04
Germany: 1200 
€, then Austria: 
1030 € /2 weeks
100€/way 108,000 Ft /year
200 €/month 
social security 
(pays for herself)
700 €
G05 Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned No social security Not known
A01
1500-1600 €/4 
weeks
Pays for herself None No social security Not counted
H01 800 € /not known Family pays None No social security  Not counted
R01 Not mentioned Pays for herself Not mentioned Not mentioned Not known
E01 Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned Not known
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Abstract: Th is paper aims to create a better understanding of the interplay between structural constraints 
and individual agency in the process of international labor migration based on empirical evidence collected 
in Hungarian small towns and villages. Drawing on Amartya Sen’s capability-based concept of development, 
and a theory of agency elaborated by Emirbayer and Mische, the paper focuses on live-in care migration as a 
speciﬁ c form of female circular migration from Hungary to Western European countries, and highlights the 
varying and dynamic nature of migrant women’s agency within the complexity of structural constraints. Th e 
object of this paper is twofold: ﬁ rst, it compares and systematically analyzes Hungarian migrant elderly care 
workers’ coping strategies in the face of constraints set in the global context of care work. Second, it aims to 
provide a comprehensive theoretical framework based on the concepts of agency in which diverse empirical 
ﬁ ndings – human games within a host household and narratives problematizing these speciﬁ c social roles – 
can be interpreted. Our empirical evidence shows that human games and tactics are triggered precisely by 
structural constraints; they are directly inspired by limitations. Although these tactics are potential tools for 
enlarging individual room for maneuver situationally, they evidently cannot alter structures. Th e asymmetry 
of structure and agency is clearly demonstrated in the fact that the overwhelming majority of Hungarian care 
workers describe individual gains from their jobs as fragments of development. Th ese fragments reﬂ ect not 
only structural constraints, but also highlight potential gains from this speciﬁ c type of circular migration, 
pointing out that the concept of “remittances” is more complex than a mere increase in ﬁ nancial stability. 
Keywords: migration and development, care migration, agency, tactics, narratives 
Introduction: Migration, Development and Agency
In the debate about the nexus between migration and development, the emphasis 
has been placed on ﬁ nancial remittances and the contribution migration makes 
to economic progress on a national level and to income-generating capacity on a 
household level (see de Haas 2005; de Haas–Rodríguez 2010; Kapur 2004). From 
this one-sided, instrumental, rather utilitarian perspective about migration and 
development, the complexity of the social, cultural, political, and gendered impacts of 
migration on the lives of migrants and their family members cannot be grasped. Th e 
limited understanding of migration and development can be overcome by drawing on 
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Amartya Sen’s notion of development, conceptualized as “a process of expanding the 
real freedoms that people enjoy” (Sen 1999: 3). Sen operationalizes these freedoms by 
using the concept of human capability, which he deﬁ nes as “the capabilities of persons 
to lead the kind of lives they value – and have reason to value” (Sen 1999: 19). 
Drawing on Sen’s concept of capability, Hein de Haas (2014) interprets migration 
capability as people’s freedom to decide where to live, irrespective of whether they 
aspire to leave or to stay, as their freedom to control their own lives. To develop a 
meaningful understanding of agency in migration processes, de Haas proposes a 
meta-theoretical conceptualization of “migration as a function of aspiration and 
capabilities to migrate within the given set of opportunity structures” (de Haas 2014: 
4). As he points out:
Because people have agency, their mobility is also a potential force for structural 
change, because it can play an important part in altering the social and 
economic conditions in both sending and receiving countries. (…) However, 
it is important to emphasize that all migrants face structural constraints and 
(that) the degree to which they can exercise agency is fundamentally limited. 
Th is also limits the extent to which migrants can bring about structural change 
(de Haas 2009: 2).
Th is paper aims to create a better understanding of the interplay between structural 
constraints and individual agency in the process of international labor migration 
based on empirical evidence collected in Hungarian small towns and villages.1 We 
will focus on live-in care migration, a widespread form of female circular migration 
from Hungary to Western European countries, because of its speciﬁ c features which 
highlight the varying, dynamic nature of the agency of migrant women within the 
complexity of structural constraints. 
In the research on international care migration, the agency-based approach is 
anything but novel. In her seminal book, Rhacel Salazar Parreňas explored the means 
by which Filipina migrant domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles resist or negotiate 
the eﬀ ects of the structural “dislocations” they face in their lives in both cities (Parreňas 
2001). Helma Lutz emphasized in her book on the “new maids” of Europe that migrant 
care workers are “not puppets” of economic and social constraints, but “human 
individuals seeking to improve their living conditions across frontiers” (Lutz 2011, 24), 
and also analyzed the strategies and tactics migrant domestic workers adopt to achieve 
(relative) autonomy and self-determination in their relationships with employers. In 
accordance with Lutz’s analytical approach, Tünde Turai considers Hungarian migrant 
elderly care workers in diﬀ erent countries as active and inﬂ uential actors maneuvering 
within structural limits and controlled social spaces (Turai 2017, 2018). 
1 The project “International Migration from Hungary and its Impacts on Rural Society” (2015-2018) was funded by NFKI/
OTKA (K 111 969). Research team members were Judit Durst, Katalin Fehér, Krisztina Németh, Monika Mária Váradi (principal 
investigator) and Tünde Virág.  
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Drawing on this theoretical and empirical background, the object of this paper is 
twofold: ﬁ rst, we will compare and systematically analyze Hungarian migrant elderly 
care workers’ experiences, coping strategies, and tactics within the constraints set in 
the global context of care work. Second, we will provide a comprehensive theoretical 
framework based on the concepts of agency and tactics in which diverse empirical 
ﬁ ndings can be interpreted. 
Context, Methods, Scope and Limits 
Selection of the research sites2 was based on prior research experience. We had 
previously built contacts with respected local people, mostly women, who helped us 
to ﬁ nd interviewees involved in international labor migration. Th is support seemed 
necessary for overcoming the potential distrust of interviewees stemming from the 
sensitivity of the topic of migration and their vulnerability, given that many of them 
worked informally. We conducted a total of 250 semi-structured interviews at three 
diﬀ erent research sites with international labor migrants and their family members, 
as well as with local stakeholders and experts. From all the interviews, 25 were 
conducted with women who were working as live-in migrant care workers in Austria 
and Germany at the time of the research, or had done so at a previous time.
In order to understand the migrant trajectories of Hungarian elderly care workers, 
it is important to emphasize that the context of migration from Eastern and Central 
European countries diﬀ ers from global patterns of transnational care migration. In 
this region, shorter geographical distances as well as national and European-level 
migration regimes trigger a speciﬁ c circular migration pattern organized in a shift 
rotation system in two-, four-, or six-week periods (Lutz–Palenga-Möllenbeck 2011, 
2012, 2016; Palenga-Möllenbeck 2013, 2014; Turai 2017, 2018). Shift-based care 
work also shapes transnational family ties and parenting strategies (Lutz 2011; Turai 
2018). Due to the shift rotation system, migrant elderly care workers maintain a more 
balanced life between their workplace in host households and their families at home 
than migrant women from “developing” countries who spend long years working 
abroad, often without visiting family members left behind.
Compared with the literature on international care migration (Parreňas 2013; 
Lutz 2011; Fedyuk 2015), the striking feature in the Hungarian case is that among 
women who decided to go and work abroad, only a few had small children (see also 
Turai 2018). It seems as though migratory decisions in Hungarian families conform 
to rather traditional gendered roles in the nuclear family.3 Consequently, most of our 
interviewees migrated to perform care jobs only after their children had grown up 
2 The scope and scale of the research sites were not equal across settlements. Although we began our fieldwork in two small 
towns and one village located in different regions of Hungary, we soon extended the research to the surrounding settlements 
following the networks of our interviewees.
3 Analysis of the Hungarian census of 2011 shows that it is mostly men who work abroad, usually circulating between the host 
and origin countries (Blaskó–Szabó 2016). 
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and left home. As a result, the overwhelming majority of our sample of women were 
middle-aged or even of retirement age. All of our interviewees had worked for years 
or decades as employees of local/regional enterprises, factories, or in services, and 
only a few were qualiﬁ ed in health and social ﬁ elds. Because of the lack of professional 
training and expertise in care work, they could only rely on their personal experience 
to guide them in caring for elderly and sick people. In addition, most of them could 
not speak the host language at all when they began working in German-speaking 
households. As our empirical evidence shows, elderly Hungarian care workers rarely 
made an eﬀ ort to improve their language skills in order to become more competent 
in their host countries. Th e main reason behind this phenomenon is that the women 
involved in circular care migration did not aspire to settle or re-unite their families 
in the host countries. Th ey decided to go abroad as care workers not because of 
any personal aspiration to do so, but because of the existential crises faced by their 
families – unemployment, decreasing incomes, and indebtedness – and the fear of 
impoverishment.
Interviews were conducted when the women were at home (between two shifts). 
Although we also planned to ask the husbands of the former about their own 
experiences, emotions, and opinions about their wives’ migration, we had very little 
success. We were only able to speak with three men (two of them were present during 
the interviews with their wives), while in other cases we could not speak to them 
because of their reluctance to participate (Turai [2018] reports the same situation). 
In this paper, we follow two strategies for analyzing our empirical evidence. 
Instead of providing case studies of women’s entire migratory history, we explore 
the common patterns of migrant elderly care workers’ perceptions and interpretations 
of their controversial situation. We crystallize and synthesize their experiences and 
modes of operation as the tactics and narratives they use to resist, negotiate and adopt 
to the eﬀ ects of their dislocations. In the last part of the paper we analyze two speciﬁ c 
types of narratives (housemaid and self-development narratives) by describing certain 
cases in more detail. Th ese examples also reﬂ ect the limits of their agency in the host 
households.
Th eorizing agency: perception, problematization, tactics, and 
narratives
We interpret our empirical ﬁ ndings through the conceptual framework of agency 
developed by Emirbayer and Mische (1998), which allows us to focus on the perception, 
the framing of everyday experiences, and the problematization of elderly care-giving 
as a social role. Given that all these cognitive processes require signiﬁ cant mental 
activity and strongly inﬂ uence action, they are elements of agency. Th ey are also the 
preconditions for the negotiation of this speciﬁ c role, and consequently have the 
potential to create greater room for maneuver for elderly care workers in the host 
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households. For the analysis of these eﬀ orts and games (see Kordasiewicz 2016), 
we used de Certeau’s notion of tactics (de Certeau 1984) as an inspiring tool for 
scrutinizing migrant women’s multi-layered experiences and their reactions to their 
positions.
Human agency is temporal: it is simultaneously embedded in the past and present 
and oriented towards the future. Th e agentic orientation can dynamically shift in 
terms of action through the selective re-activation of past experiences and patterns 
of thought that stimulate practical evaluation or judgment of the present situation, 
or facilitate the development of alternatives by the projection or imagination of the 
possible future outcomes of the action. Although habituated, routinized action is 
overwhelmingly oriented toward the past, even the employment of repetitive practices 
and know-how requires cognitive eﬀ ort throughout typifi cation, since there is never 
a perfect match between schemas and actual situations. Problematization “requires 
the contextualization of habitual practices within the concrete circumstances of 
the moment” (Emirbayer–Mische 1998, 997). Th e perception of situational settings 
and the capacity to frame by characterization presupposes the mobilization of past 
experiences. Since emotions and cognitive eﬀ orts are intertwined, “perception is a 
complex response of the entire personality” (Nussbaum 1986, 309, cited by Emirbayer–
Mische 1998: 998). Th e practical-evaluative aspect of agency is predominantly oriented 
towards the present, and enables actors to react to the contingencies and ambiguities 
of the present situation and/or to intervene. Th e projective character of agency is 
dominant in an action orienting toward the future, and is exercised by imagination and 
“role-experimentation” (Emirbayer 1998, 996; Goﬀ man 1956). Th ese experimental 
or “local actions” (Emirbayer–Mische 1998, 1001) are based on the recombination 
of existing schemas and models, which allows for the performance of a role without 
long-term engagement or the claim to canonization (Emirbayer–Mische 1998). 
Th e notion of tactics highlights how agents creatively play against the routine modes 
of the exercise of power and control mechanisms, and gain inspiration by their everyday 
practice and thereby practical sense. Although de Certeau tacitly shares Foucault’s 
vision of social reality penetrated by power, he emphasizes individual agency and the 
potential for resistance. “Th e goal is not to make clearer how the violence of order is 
transmuted into a disciplinary technology, but rather to bring to light the clandestine 
forms taken by the dispersed, tactical, and make-shift creativity of groups or individuals 
already caught in the nets of ‘discipline’” (de Certeau 1984, xiv-xv). 
A deeper examination of everyday practices reveals how the determining power of 
structures can be temporarily eased by creative improvisation. Tactics are calculated 
in the sense that they cannot rely on “proper” resources (controlled space, or 
institutions). Th ey must be operated by the creative combination of heterogeneous 
elements of dominant structures. Consequently, a tactic is an intrinsically temporary 
and unﬁ nished synthesis; that is, a way of making, or the “art of making” (de Certeau 
1984). 
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Tactics are created against the predominance and determining power of the 
structure (de Certeau 1984). While they inherently involve a spirit of resistance 
and innovation, they must also encompass some level of adaptation to hegemonic 
structures in order to be successful. Agents adapting these tactics wish to play them 
out for a moment by unexpected recombination, or unanticipated improvisation. 
Although the relationship between employers and migrant live-in elderly care workers 
is based on mutual dependency, it also includes multiple asymmetrical, unbalanced 
power relations. Living and working in “other’s places,” care workers are restricted 
to exercising their agency in rather indirect ways: by manipulating situations or 
performing hidden forms of resistance. Consequently, in this analytical framework 
tactics involve human games and struggles for the control of spaces and situations, for 
shaping relations, and for establishing a clear system of obligations and competences which 
deﬁ ne their role as care workers and also require complex boundary-making processes 
in the host households. 
Beyond their improvisations or practices of adapting to enlarge their room 
for maneuver, migrant care workers’ narratives crystallize their experiences 
retrospectively, which helps them to re-interpret their social role and to typify their 
position while changing from family to family. Migrant women’s narratives highlight 
the dynamics of perception, framing and interpretation through problematization, and link 
diﬀ erent dimensions of time. 
Although tactics give intrinsically rapid feedback about challenging situations, 
their adaptability depends on their availability. Th e more often the common stock of 
knowledge is mobilized – meaning the more often experiences are recalled and shared 
with others – the more available and adaptable they are (de Certeau 1984). Narratives 
as crystallized experiences gain their reproductive potential through performance 
and narration, but they can be future-oriented as well if we consider their potential as 
a transformative power. Th e narrative dynamics of role-taking or role-distancing reveal 
not only the perception and the framing of elderly care, but also the potentialities 
for resistance and changing future aspirations. Migrant care workers’ tactics and 
narratives, whether understood as a diagnostic or prognostic function, reveal 
Hungarian rural women involved in international care migration much more as active 
agents than as passive individuals completely determined by micro- and macro-level 
economic and power relations and systems of dependency. 
Live-in elderly care in host households as arenas of agency
As Emirbayer and Mische (1998) assert, the more complex the relational setting is 
and the wider the range of possible factors that come into play, the more likely the 
provocation of communication and (self)-reﬂ ection which makes actors negotiate 
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their situation or generate alternatives.4 Domestic work and elderly care, especially the 
live-in forms, are situated at the intersection of traditional and modern female roles. 
Paid domestic work involves many ambiguities and paradoxes. Th e “commodiﬁ cation 
of care” (see Anderson 2004; Rivas 2004; Parreňas 2001) on one hand provides an 
opportunity for migrant women to undertake a paid job, while on the other hand 
it (re-)produces the complex system of global economic and gender hierarchies by 
reinforcing the need for traditional female work and the dependency of migrant care 
workers’ families on remittances (Parreňas 2001). 
“Th e global re-division of women’s traditional work” (Ehrenreich–Hochschild 
2004: 11) has led to the “feminization of migration,” further deepening many 
dimensions of inequality and pitting modern female roles against traditional ones 
(and vice versa). Th e “new gender arrangement” (Friese 1996, cited by Lutz 2011, 
10) exempts Western women from unpaid, low-prestige and invisible reproductive 
(house)work by relegating all these duties to migrant women, reproducing the multi-
dimensional inequalities and dependencies within these households (Lutz 2011). 
It may create hierarchical relations between employer and employee, and reinforce 
traditional (gender-based) patterns of the division of labor instead of cooperation 
based on mutual respect (Ehrenreich–Hochschild 2004). 
Care work inevitably includes elements of emotional work (see Parreňas 
2001; Lutz 2011; Hochschild 2000). Th e very presence of care workers in foreign 
households represents a “care-drain,” which causes a “care deﬁ cit” in the family left 
behind. Domestic work is “a ‘labor of love’ and a ‘labor of sorrow’” (Jones 1985, cited 
by Parreňas 2001: 120), since care work undertaken in the host family constantly 
reminds these women of the painful choice between their family’s ﬁ nancial and 
emotional security, and recalls the pain of family separation. Domestic work demands 
a continuous response to the diverse needs of the person being cared for, and also 
requires all-day availability and preparedness, which isolates women and encloses 
them in the household. 
Moreover, housework and caregiving are relatively undeﬁ ned social roles. 
However, they can hardly be detached from the role of their historical precursor, 
the housemaid. Th is historical-cultural heritage, together with the changing 
transnational context and a struggle for professionalization and formalization, is a 
seedbed of further uncertainties, contradictions and frictions (see further: Lutz 
2011; Németh 2016). Th e low prestige of reproductive work is stigmatized even now. 
Stigmatization stems from the housemaid’s role and vulnerable position within the 
patriarchal family model in which “service was inﬁ ltrated by relations of personal 
dependency” (Gyáni 1983, 22). Informal jobs and illegal immigration status still 
increase migrant workers’ vulnerability, especially in the case of caregivers who live in 
4 David Stark (2009) demonstrates in various case studies how different “orders of worth” or modes of thinking trigger creative 
frictions that stimulate innovation in various fields. He reveals that certain economic organizations in fact exploit ambiguity 
and dissonance, transforming them into creativity and innovation. 
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the host family’s private space (Rivas 2004; Lutz 2011). Moving into the employer’s 
private household, however, also involves further contradictions since it might be a 
seedbed of exploitation and abuse, or a place of shelter and satisfaction of basic needs. 
Besides overt degradation, moderately changing but persistent forms of social or 
racial stigmatization are still adapted in both the global and regional context. Coping 
with (potential) stigma requires signiﬁ cant cognitive and emotional eﬀ ort, as well 
as bridging cultural diﬀ erences by adapting to the host family’s needs and everyday 
routines. 
Th e persistent ambiguities, contradictions and frictions stemming from this 
speciﬁ c social role stimulate negotiations about the role and its content (i.e. tasks, 
competencies, and responsibilities), and trigger tactics (active or passive forms of 
resistance and imaginary or real role experimentation). Elderly care workers may 
take advantage of these inherent paradoxes, but at the same time these ambiguities 
also indicate the limits of exercising and expanding agency within this context. 
Th e intersection of household and family and traditional and modern female roles 
increases the complexity of the situation, requiring boundary-making mechanisms 
and the management of emotional tensions resulting from a demanding but low-
prestige job. All of these factors make the host household an arena for agency. 
Spatial dimensions of agency 
Emotional tensions do not only stem from family separation and the demanding 
character of the job, but from the interplay of individual aspirations and structural 
constraints. Parreňas (2001) uses the notion dislocation to grasp the inherent 
diﬃ  culties and strains related to the contradictory class mobility of Filipina migrant 
domestic workers in Rome and Los Angeles. Dislocation in a social sense refers to 
these usually highly qualiﬁ ed women’s feelings of being forced to undertake such 
low-prestige, stigmatized jobs to maintain the ﬁ nancial stability of the families they 
have left behind. Additionally, domestic work is considered to be a “natural” female 
job which does not require any speciﬁ c qualiﬁ cations. Th e experience of de-skilling as 
a loss of competency is deeply intertwined with the decline of former social status, 
while improvements in ﬁ nancial situation – the higher salary earned as a domestic 
worker – provides primarily material compensation. (As we also see below in Agnes’ 
narrative, dislocation in terms of de-skilling was the most frustrating and degrading 
experience among professionally trained and experienced nurses who began working 
as live-in elderly caregivers.)
Dislocation also denotes a loss of home. Habitual aspects of agency are related to 
well-known places where repeated actions, habits and routines provide the actor with 
a feeling of control (Emirbayer–Mische 1998). Consequently, well-known places are 
constitutive parts of identity through emotional bonds to place (place attachment, 
place identity): they are sites of developing agency where the individual feels safe and 
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conﬁ dent. In contrast to this, a loss of space can cause a temporary loss of agency, 
as well as distress, crises, and disorientation. Loss of space and relocation aﬀ ects 
primarily social identity and demands the “ﬁ tting” of the new place into the frame of 
the old place, maintaining continuity throughout diverse psychological processes such 
as eﬀ ects, orientation, systematization, categorization, manipulation, memorization 
and recollection (Dúll 2015 a,b).
Consequently, individual agency is embedded in both the social and private space. 
Th e home and private sphere are places for creating emotional and social bonds, and 
are ultimately sources of self-esteem and positive personal identity. Moving abroad 
challenges these spatially and socially embedded relations, and makes the host 
household a place (an arena) for building up personal autonomy through claiming 
a private place within the house. Th ese eﬀ orts are manifested in boundary-making 
processes and human games that are played to gain control over at least a small part 
of the other’s private space. Th e control of the outside social space encompasses 
various processes such as “taming the unknown” by adoption of a daily routine, and 
inventing places for socializing. In this sense, meeting points or community places do 
not simply dissolve loneliness and isolation, but are the preconditions for any kind 
of coordinated social action.5 Consequently, isolation involves signiﬁ cant emotional 
work while it continuously menaces the subject by narrowing social ties and contacts.
Hungarian elderly caregivers in our sample often complained about feelings of 
isolation, conﬁ nement or even boredom that they had experienced while being 
“locked-in” to host households. Kata cared for an old man who had had both of his 
legs amputated. 
His daily routine is strongly regulated, in fact, I cannot go out and leave him alone. I 
do not like to talk to him, because he is always telling the same stories. I am bored. In 
the evenings I Skype with my boyfriend, and in my free time I play on the internet, 
watch fi lms and series. But you can get bored with this too, there are no series I did 
not see in these four years. Th e old man goes to sleep early, but “I do not go out, 
I do not like to walk around in strange places. I rather stay at home all the time, 
waiting for the three weeks to pass. 
Elderly Hungarian caregivers have very limited opportunity to discover the places 
where they work or create spontaneous social encounters, even when they work for 
years in the same households. Th eir daily routines allow them only a small amount 
of free time (if any), restricted to short encounters in shops and on the streets. Th e 
possibility of such social contacts is also limited by the fact that most Hungarian 
care workers work without legal permission in Germany, and thus carefully 
avoid spending too much time alone in public spaces. Occasional neighborhood 
5 Housemaids in this sense were highly separated and atomized in the past because they lived in separate households. This 
spatial setting, among other factors, prevented almost any kind of collective action (Gyáni 1983). Parreas used the term 
“hidden transcript” to refer to the discourses that Filipina domestic workers maintained outside of their employers’ homes. 
As she points out, there are different sites in Los Angeles and Rome (such as churches, community centers of the Philippine 
diaspora, buses, and magazines) where migrant Filipina domestic workers “brew tactics” for negotiating their everyday 
experiences, challenges and strategies (Parreňas 2001: 194).
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relationships or spontaneous encounters with other Hungarians working in the same 
area show precisely how narrow, homogeneous and fragile these social contacts are. 
Due to circular migration, workers usually do not aspire to build up deep contacts 
with Hungarian migrant communities, and do not wish to be integrated into host 
countries. Given that they are constantly moving between the sending and the host 
countries, they need a special kind of (limited) support, which includes emotional 
support and the sharing of information. Access to the telephone, the internet and 
Skype are important matters which contribute to the maintenance of social and 
family ties and prevent total isolation. 
However, there are some “extreme” examples of expanding one’s agency in the host 
household. Lena, one of our interviewees, took care of an old woman for ﬁ ve years in 
a small town in Germany. Lena was able to capitalize on her communication skills, 
personality and endurance. She organized a place for other Hungarian care workers on 
the terrace and in the basement of the host house where they could smoke and drink 
coﬀ ee together, and built up many social contacts that allowed her to undertake short-
term, occasional jobs in addition to full-time care, such as cleaning or mowing lawns for 
other families once or twice a week. She used her free time to do other jobs and save 
more money. However, the precondition for this large-scale room for maneuver was the 
fact that her employer and other local contacts were of Hungarian origin and there was 
no language barrier between Lena and them. Another precondition was the tolerance 
and the mental and physical state of the old woman, who did not require all-day care 
and attention. As Lena summarized her exceptional situation: “We were allowed to do 
everything, there was no other place in the world like this.” 
Agency is strongly attached to the household as a site of privacy, while elderly 
care can be characterized by the “absence of privacy” (Parreňas 2001:159). Th e host 
households are “other’s places” (de Certeau 1984) where employees need to ﬁ nd a 
place for themselves, but in doing so can mobilize a very limited range of their own 
resources. Consequently, everyday actions and even possible resistance must be 
performed and developed in a setting deﬁ ned by asymmetric power relations. Tactics 
in this sense are the “power of the weak” as they exploit and recombine separate 
elements of dominant power structures through unexpected, innovative reactions 
and improvisations to enlarge the horizon of action and room for maneuver. 
Playing with roles – tactics
In most cases, elderly care is not restricted to the task directly connected with the 
old person, but demands a holistic approach that improves the recipient’s well-being, 
including working with the human body, nurturing and reacting to the other’s 
emotional, social and mental needs, tidying his/her personal environment, and 
running the household. Th e situation is even more complex when more elderly people 
and their family members live together. Th e presence of a paid employee represents 
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a paradox: it reﬂ ects a deﬁ cit of care, but may lead to a surplus of “housewives” at 
the same time. Th e female employer (the person being cared for, her daughter or 
daughter-in-law) probably has her own “housewife” routines, ideas of order, values, 
expectations and competencies, but these are partly delegated to the employee, who 
in turn brings her own routines and preferences into the setting. Th us, housewife 
routines, competences, and systems of expectations must be negotiated or divided 
up. Consequently, human games usually aim at negotiating the roles and struggling 
for the recognition of individual merits and competencies. Given that these women 
can usually mobilize a limited range of skills, their room for maneuver, their 
autonomy, and even one potential source of positive self-esteem might be at stake 
when negotiating competencies related to the role of housewife. Th e question here 
is who makes decisions about everyday shopping and food budgets, or whose needs 
and tastes must be taken into account and which cuisine or diet is to be followed. 
Enlarging competencies as a housewife, nevertheless, can be a controversial strategy, 
since the “overplaying” (the exaggerated performance) of traditional female roles can 
easily become a seedbed for exploitation, which partly stems from the reproductive 
character of housework and partly from the dominant historical pre-ﬁ gure of the 
housemaid (Gyáni 1983; Czingel–Tóth 2014). 
At her ﬁ rst workplace, the aforementioned Lena could overcome the distrust 
of her employer by overplaying her housewife competencies. As she said: “She 
was a sweet, nice, small aunt, but as I fi rstly recognized, she did not love me, she 
was German, and said ‘nicht gut Frau’ [not a good woman], because I could not 
speak German. Th en I said Damn your mothers!, you will see. And [I cleaned the 
windows], washed and hung all the curtains. Th en I was good. Everything was good. 
Th e whole family loved me.” Recalling her experiences in diﬀ erent households, 
Lena emphasized that she always used her housewife competencies, especially 
cooking, to “tame” the families of the elderly person being cared for. Th is meant 
cooking lunch every day, for example, even for those family members who did 
not live in the household of the cared-for elderly person. Although she likes 
to cook and proudly considers the daily visits for lunch as recognition of her 
competency as a housewife, the fact is that cooking for the whole family was 
not originally a part of her duty. Since there was no legally recognized work 
contract (only a verbal employment agreement) she had no other opportunity 
but to satisfy the new demands of her employer’s family.
Th e negotiation of competencies is even more complex when human games involve 
the search for balance in personal relationships instead of one-sided dependency. 
Elderly care does not simply involve a vulnerable household worker, but often an old, 
ill, often bed-ridden, physically dependent person, who is also ﬁ ghting the loss of 
their own competencies and to maintain agency. While complex and professional care 
must reﬂ ect these personal problems and help the elderly to maintain their skills and 
capabilities, it remains a crucial question whether the mutual negotiation of agencies 
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is a zero-sum or a win-win game between two vulnerable people. Consequently, 
intimacy and care can be an arena for relative empowerment as well as abuse. 
Caregivers can cause harm intentionally or unintentionally. 
As our interviewees attested, it was a permanent challenge to tame the 
unpredictably aggressive behavior of the elderly who suﬀ ered from dementia. 
Some of them tried to attenuate or deﬂ ect this aggression through “clowning,” 
humor, and laughter, while others emphasized feelings of empathy and 
compassion for patients suﬀ ering from dementia. However, there were also 
women who answered aggression with aggression: “When he hit me, I hit back.” 
One woman, who often changed workplaces, said: “Every time I decided to leave I did 
not say anything to anyone.” Th is is a typical “white lie”; the caregiver promising that 
they will return to their workplace from home when the time for their shift starts. But 
ultimately they do not, because they can easily ﬁ nd a better place. Leaving without 
any warning may help care workers to cope with changes, but can cause uncertainty, 
emotional distress and a loss of trust for the elderly. Th ere are further examples of 
unbalanced relationships: infantilization may occur when an old person is handled as 
a child due to their dementia and loss of capabilities. However, if a mental disorder 
prevents the building up of contact with the elderly, it increases the social isolation 
and frustration of the caregiver. Successful mutual negotiations are marked by 
instances when situations of vulnerability dynamically change in interpersonal 
relations, increasing self-reﬂ ection and leading to the mobilization of personal skills 
(including caregiver competencies as mother, (house)wife, etc.). 
Some interviewees referred to the cared-for elderly as “Oma” or “Opa” – “I care 
for her as if she were my grandma” – re-positioning themselves in these relations 
as a grandchild, irrespective of their actual age (there were a few cases when 
the care worker was older than the cared-for person). Others reformulated the 
mutual but asymmetrical dependency between the care workers and the cared-
for persons: “You should keep a distance, but it is impossible in an atmosphere of 
intimacy like when you wipe her bottom – it is like the relationship between mother 
and child.”   
Th is dynamic may simultaneously link elderly care in the realm of personal 
attachment (perceived as friendship or familial kinship) and work as (friendly) 
professionalism (see: Parreňas 2001, 2004; Kordasiewicz 2014). 
Juggling with roles – problematization in narratives 
Games played to “manipulat[e] circumstances to turn [them] into possibilities” (de 
Certeau 1984, ixx) are even more complex when they are performed as roles to be 
systematized and accepted. When the role itself is at stake, no temporary (“Pyrrhic”) 
victories are “proper.” Claims may become holistic (even if the process is only partly 
conscious): for example, balancing asymmetric relationships or re-framing elderly care 
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as a job in the familial context. Th ere is the potential for resistance in both the silent 
but persistent rejection of stigmatization and oppressive working conditions, on 
one hand, and the hidden transformation of roles by changing the practices (tactics) 
and narratives on the other. From a theoretical point of view, tactics in this context 
are manifested as role performance or role distance in the Goﬀ manian sense. Role-
performance fundamentally means taking on a role, at least temporarily, without 
totally identifying with it (role-enactment). Role-distance is used when someone 
wishes to express at least some doubt or disagreement with expectations related to 
the role, or wants to demonstrate that they are not entirely engaged in role-taking for 
various reasons (Goﬀ man 1959). 
Kordasiewicz (2014) analyzed two strategies of Polish migrant women working 
in Napoli: professionalization is based on the re-framing of household work, including 
elderly care, as a profession. Th is framework enables migrant women to express their 
needs and interests as employees, emphasizing their wish for their working conditions 
to be regularized. It also facilitates a decrease in their personal dependency within 
the informal, intimate sphere of the host family. Overall, it is an active but defensive 
way of dealing with potential oppression and exploitation (Kordasiewicz 2014), while 
it shapes not only the perception of a job but the aspirations and even narrative 
accounts of workers. Personalization can be considered a withdrawal from asymmetric 
power relations by emphasizing personal relations and a struggle for equality and 
distance based on mutual respect. 
However, Polish women working in Napoli found it unacceptable that their “overt 
degradation” was masked in the discourse of “fi ctive kinship” that appealed to their 
sense of loyalty. Th is strategy is based on the declaration that the elderly caregiver is a 
quasi-family member. Th e main function of this approach was to legitimate overwork 
by integrating carers into the familial system of unreciprocated duties and services 
without any remuneration or respect. Th is is rather manipulative rhetoric from the 
host family, since it indeed integrates the worker’s role into the informal hierarchy, 
which is hard to control (Kordasiewicz 2014). As Parreňas (2001) also noted, there is a 
wide consensus in the literature that the perception of domestic workers as “one of the 
family” reproduces unequal, hierarchical power relations. However, domestic workers 
might also be interested in maintaining this self-identiﬁ cation in order to upgrade 
their low and dependent status in the host family (Parreňas 2001, Lutz 2011). 
When some of our interviewees conﬁ dently stated that they were treated as 
family members, they conﬁ rmed this claim by mentioning that their presence 
and work were appreciated, and that they ate and spent coﬀ ee breaks at the 
same table as their employers – “Because I was a family member and not a maid.” 
Th ey also told us stories about gifts received from their employers on their 
birthdays and Christmas, or chocolates, toys, and clothes sent by the employers 
to their children and grandchildren. From the point of view of our Hungarian 
interviewees, having a “good workplace” typically means being considered one 
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of the family. Th is discourse glosses over the status of elderly care workers as 
paid domestic employees and their vulnerable position in the respective host 
families. 
However, we also identiﬁ ed certain fragments of the counter-discourse of “true 
love,” which inverts the discourse of ﬁ ctive kinship from the perspective of the 
caregiver: “In my opinion, nobody loves the people we are caring for. I must also love 
them. Because nobody loves them – even if they have a family.” In this discourse, 
the emotional ambiguities and tensions inherent in the role and position of the care 
workers within the host families are reﬂ ected in a way that provides them with a 
sense of moral superiority, since they oﬀ er more (true) love than the real family of the 
cared-for person.6 
Turai (2014, 2018) identiﬁ ed three types of discourses among Romanian and 
Hungarian women from Hungary, Romania and Ukraine working as elderly caregivers 
in Hungary, Italy and Israel. Hungarian women working in Israel represent their 
experiences through an exotic discourse, while the ethnocentric discourse was organized 
along with ethnic Hungarian identity, as well as geographic and cultural proximity 
to Hungary. Th e victimhood and suff ering discourse emphasizes Romanian women’s 
experiences of family separation and exploitation in Italian host households and 
reveals their coping strategies. 
In our research, elderly care workers represented themselves through two speciﬁ c 
narratives. Th e housemaid narrative as well as the self-development narrative share 
commonalities with the aforementioned strategies and discourses. One of their 
main functions is to interpret retrospectively the contradictory class mobility and 
ambiguous status of domestic workers at the intersection of family and household. 
Creating a more or less coherent narrative also enables them to systematize their 
everyday experiences and mitigate ambiguities by re-framing the experiences and the 
perception of this role. Problematization of the role eventually facilitates adaptation. 
Th e housemaid narrative 
Th e housemaid narrative can be considered a rhetorical tool for expressing or releasing 
tensions originating from this speciﬁ c social role. Th is narrative’s primary function 
is to articulate (possibly repressed) emotions such as anger, disappointment and 
frustration stemming from dislocation, ambiguities of contradictory class mobility, 
and the pain of family separation (see Parreňas 2001, 2004). 
It also reveals how the perception and the (re-)framing of experiences work 
throughout the problematization of the role of domestic worker. Since concrete 
emergent situations and models stored in the common stock of knowledge never 
completely match (Emirbayer and Mische 1998), the analogy in itself demonstrates 
how the dominant historical pre-ﬁ gure of the housemaid is used for interpreting the 
6 Unconsciously, the discourse of “true love” reflects the concept of “emotional surplus value” developed by Hochschild (2000). 
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role of the former, and how it helps to articulate problems, needs and expectations 
relating to their actual jobs. Due to the stigma related to the ﬁ gure of the housemaid, 
role-enactment in the sense of role fulﬁ llment is hardly possible. Th e function of the 
housemaid narrative is not even about role-taking; on the contrary, this rhetoric aims 
to increase role-distance through problematization (Németh 2016). Role-enactment 
would also mean that one is totally absorbed by the role,7 immersed in the totality of 
informality, which may even prevent the taking on of other social roles (Kordasiewicz 
2014). Th erefore, the role-dynamic is a crucial issue for these women who want to 
represent themselves not only as employees, but also as mothers, wives or competent 
housewives, as well as human beings in host households, emphasizing that they do 
have a personality beyond these roles. Consequently, dealing with social isolation is of 
special importance from their point of view, as are self-defense mechanisms against 
being neglected in the presence of family and excluded from communication. Th is is 
non-person treatment in the Goﬀ manian sense (Goﬀ man 1956; Kordasiewicz 2014; 
Parreňas 2001, 2004; Turai 2018). 
Th e metaphor of housemaid was reﬂ ected by most of our interviewees (see 
also Turai 2018),8 but only a few of them used it deliberately while describing 
their position. One of the former was Agnes who, following retirement, began 
working abroad as a caregiver because of ﬁ nancial diﬃ  culties. In Hungary, she 
was trained and worked for long years in social services and health care, and 
thus found it degrading that in most cases the families of the elderly she cared 
for did not need or appreciate her professional knowledge and skills. In her 
narrative, the ﬁ gure of housemaid was clearly linked to her social dislocation 
as a professional caregiver and served to increase role-distance. Th e employer 
family wanted her to do everything around the household and on the family 
farm without remuneration or any appreciation of her overtime work. “Th e 
maid is expected to work as a stupid animal.”
In her narrative, the metaphor of maid was also used for those women who 
allowed themselves to be exploited instead of developing resistance and 
defending their own interests. Now, Agnes has ﬁ nished working as a care 
worker abroad. 
When we met Ilona, a woman of about 80, she had been working for 10 years in 
Germany. She decided to migrate because she felt morally obliged to meet the 
needs of her family; she helped her daughter to pay back her debts, ﬁ nanced 
the studies of her grandchild, and supported her poor relatives. She planned 
7 Elderly care might be a total social role: the absence of privacy and autonomy, the informality, the requirement for day-
and-night availability aggravated by emotional involvement, and the mix of hierarchy and intimacy may limit the caretaker’s 
autonomy. Most menacing in a total social role is that the personality may be dissolved by role-expectations (Kordasiewicz 
2016).
8 According to Turai (2018), the ambiguity characterizing the work and position of elderly caregivers is reflected in the confusion 
with which her interviewees tried to identify their status. The women used terms such as “family member,” “maid,” “nurse,” 
“relative,” “worker,” “friend,” “guard,” and “master” to describe themselves. She found that the most frequently mentioned 
was that of “maid” (“servant” or “slave”) which was most often reflected even in cases associated with the work and status of 
caregivers when not used to describe their own work and position (see details: Turai 2018, 111-131).
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to return home for good. She reported an experience of non-person treatment 
when she was not oﬀ ered a drink at a family event while sitting at the same 
table as the host family. “It was Christmas Eve, the son and daughters came to 
visit their mother. Everyone but me was off ered champagne. It was so humiliating 
– not that I like champagne, but I was sitting there to help the aunt to drink. And 
neither the daughters nor one of the grandchildren said, ‘pour a drink for Ilona’.” 
Her housemaid narrative was built not only around her humiliating position 
as care worker but also her vulnerable situation in her own family. She felt that 
her family members (tacitly) expected her to work abroad without respecting 
her advanced age because they needed her earnings.
Similarly to the aforementioned victimhood and suﬀ ering narrative (Turai 2014, 
2018), the housemaid narrative emphasizes the structural constraints, economic 
pressure and hardship which push women into this job. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that these women are totally passive in their roles as care workers.9 
Th e narrative is in fact an example of active, but mostly hidden resistance, since it 
is used to express a rejection of subordinated situations and exploitation, a refusal 
of undeﬁ ned competencies and unlimited tasks, and of working day and night. Th is 
rhetoric exploits the power of stigma to express a rejection of exploitation and de-
skilling. Non-person treatment or the experience of exploitation trigger the metaphor 
of housemaid, but, as in the case of Ilona, it may uncover inter-generational conﬂ icts 
within the worker’s own family, mutual dependencies, and the pain of self-sacriﬁ ce 
for other family members. 
Th e self-development narrative 
Th e housemaid narrative is far from being universal, but a complete self-development 
discourse is even more rare (see also Turai 2018). However, rarity does not necessarily 
undermine the relevance and explanatory power of these narratives. In many cases, 
narratives thematized individual harm and suﬀ ering without using the housemaid 
metaphor, while fragments of (self-) development – that is, individual or family 
gains from circular migration – were more often displayed. Various fragments of 
self-development discourse made the whole narrative more open and proactive. 
Th e interviewees referred to ﬁ nancial and social remittances encompassing 
improvements to living conditions, material goods and skills thereby obtained, 
strategies for adaptation, and various tactics for overcoming problems as evidence for 
development in the sense of expanding freedom. Besides eﬀ orts to secure ﬁ nancial 
stability, maintain the social and economic status of the family and facilitate the next 
generations’ mobility, they pointed to the skills they had obtained (limited language 
skills, bits of know-how), changing values, and moreover, a kind of openness toward 
the world and an increased level of spatial mobility. Some women showed their ability 
9 Emirbayer and Mische (1998) also emphasize that “empirical social action will be never be completely determined or structured. 
(...) There is no hypothetical moment in which agency actually gets ‘free’ of structure.” (Emirbayer–Mische 1998: 1004).
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to entirely re-frame unfavorable situations related to the role of care worker, and 
emphasized the power of negotiations and prudent but persistent manipulation of 
circumstances. 
Th e most powerful form of resistance seems to be the self-development narrative, 
which highlights how people exercise their agency by projectively orienting towards 
the future, while recollections in interviews also encompass and systematize past 
experiences. Th e re-composition of experiences can give a hypothetical resolution to 
current problems through role-experimentation. In this sense, these narratives are 
not simply imaginary tools of agency, but “provide maps of action,” as Ricoeur states 
(Emirbayer–Mische 1998, 989). In this way, they might become a possible tool for 
resistance by rejecting subordination or inventing new frames of perception. 
Ditta, a middle-aged woman, went to Germany to save only enough to buy 
a family car. After a few months this goal was achieved, but she decided to 
continue her work as a caregiver, and [at the time of interview] had been 
working abroad for six years. During her ﬁ rst experience she had faced 
enormous diﬃ  culties – “I cried so much” – but she had learned how to “tame” 
the shouting patient until she recognized that “Th e elderly need someone to help.” 
Since then, Ditta’s aim has been to ﬁ nd the perfect way to meet the elderly’s 
diverse personal needs. She was not content with everyday practices, so she 
began to study, and is now qualiﬁ ed as a social and domestic care worker and is 
also trained in pedicure, manicure, and massage. She said, “Ten years ago I had 
not thought I would fi nd the job I love to do in elderly care.” For her, caring for the 
elderly had became a “nice profession,” and now she works in the elderly care 
home in her village in Hungary.   
Th e self-development narrative in its most developed form makes not only role 
performance but even role-enactment possible throughout the complete re-framing 
of the perception of care work. Consequently, the self-development narrative is 
independent of the metaphor of housemaid, which is exactly how it changes the 
evaluation of elderly care. Changes in perception and evaluation, as the case of Ditta 
shows, can lead to the (partial) re-formulation of the whole life story which articulates 
the aim of the migration. In the most elaborate narrative of this type, elderly care 
becomes a real profession, a “calling,” and a tool for self-development through learning 
and obtaining new skills. In other words, care work performed in foreign households 
becomes the aim of migration and provides freedom in the sense that Sen deﬁ nes 
it: it is the capability of living a valuable life even in a situation deﬁ ned by structural 
constraints. Th is type of narrative involves the core elements of both personalization 
and professionalization strategies, as it represents elderly care as a professional way of 
reacting to one’s complex needs while keeping personal relationships balanced. It is 
regulated by distance, but also emotions. 
Th e fact that self-development narratives are independent from housemaid 
narratives does not necessarily mean that everyday practices do not involve at least 
Krisztina Németh – Monika Mária Váradi: Development in the Context of Care... 105
some elements of tactics. Th is contradiction still implies that asymmetrical power 
relations underlie the determining power of structural constraints and shows precisely 
the limits of exercising agency in this speciﬁ c context. 
Limits of agency
Non-professional elderly care workers have a limited set of assets and skills to 
mobilize in the elderly-care work personal relationship; it is indeed their interiorized 
pieces of know-how and certain elements of traditional female roles that they can 
use. Because of the inherent contradictions in paid care work and a lack of proper 
language skills, our interviewees tended to express their care and attachment through 
touching, caressing, goodnight kisses or gestures of care such as cooking, dressing, or 
shaving their elderly charges. All these limitations may trigger overplay (exaggerated 
performance) of the caretaking role. 
In those cases when caretakers lack professional and language skills, role-overplay 
can be manifested either in emphasizing personal attachment or a strategy of 
overwork. Th e latter is primarily used to prove personal qualities by highlighting 
caregiver and housewife competencies, and may even trigger competition with 
other caretakers. At the micro-level, this strategy is an important characteristic 
of the Eastern and Central European context of care migration: in the shift-work 
system, elderly care workers are substituted when they return home, which can 
lead to competition that emphasizes individual performance and the interests of 
the working pair instead of their cooperation. At a macro-level, competition is even 
sharper between care workers who come from diﬀ erent Eastern and Central European 
countries. Th ere is a labor surplus on the European domestic and care work market, 
so employers can easily select between care workers and choose the “cheaper” ones. 
Hungarian migrant care workers often complain that women from Romania, Poland 
or Ukraine take jobs with lower wages and longer shifts. Th ey tend to downplay their 
vulnerable situation by creating symbolic boundaries, emphasizing their superiority 
to the “dirty,” “lazy” and “unreliable” Romanian, Polish and Ukrainian caregivers. Th e 
creation of moral superiority is one of the most prevalent self-defense mechanisms in 
this context, played out against either a replacement person or a care worker from a 
diﬀ erent country (see further: Parreňas 2001; Turai 2014, 2018; Melegh et al. 2018). 
From a social-psychological point of view, this moral superiority is provoked by 
asymmetric power relations or stigmatization, while it is manifested in overplaying of 
roles. Indeed, the creation of moral superiority can be considered the fragmentation 
of stigma (see: Goﬀ man 1956; Kovai 2017), which implies that individuals attempt 
to maintain their self-esteem by emphasizing their competence and deﬂ ecting stigma 
to other caregivers. Th is strategy, played for temporal or personal recognition, may 
result in increasing exploitation through the carer’s undertaking of an unlimited 
range of tasks to prove their qualities by role-performance. While the “ﬁ ctive kinship” 
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strategy is adapted by the host family to extort the greatest amount of work without 
proportional remuneration (Kordasiewicz 2014). Th e strategy of overplaying is rather 
self-exploitative as it has its own stake of self-representation and self-defense. 
Although various tactics are adopted in response to overwork and exploitation, 
this tactic is performed in order to gain respect. However, it is somehow “distorted” 
and counter-productive, since it may trigger a tendency to self-exploitation, even if 
the fundamental motivation of the tactic is to enlarge one’s room for maneuver by 
the temporary subversion of the hegemonic order (Emirbayer–Mische 1998). Even 
if the most elaborate self-development narrative featured stories about at least the 
temporary or the “strategic” acceptance of subordination. Ditta told stories about how 
she “tamed” elderly men and how she made eﬀ orts to ﬁ nd out their uncommunicated 
needs and wishes. Her repertoire of “taming” included responding tenderly to verbal 
aggression, tolerating shouting or even outbursts, and coping with the (temporary) 
rejection of her personal presence and help by the ill elderly person. 
Th e strategy of “taming” as an “extreme case” (Takács 2017) therefore highlights 
the limited range of assets that may be mobilized and the limited room for maneuver 
in this context. It also points out that it is an intrinsically double-edged strategy which 
usually does not challenge but rather reinforces elements of the hegemonic order and 
expectations related to the traditional female role. Th e overplaying of a role by self-
exploitation reveals the inherent limits of playing with traditional female roles either 
in host households or in this speciﬁ c segment of the labor market, aggravated by 
mostly temporal and informal home-stays and harsh competition between employers 
(Melegh et al. 2018). Besides other and more direct tactics that are performed to 
evade structural constraints, these “distorted tactics” – irrespective of their situational 
success − show the hard barriers to playing with traditional female roles and the 
limits of exercising agency in the context of domestic care. Our empirical evidence 
shows that even if migrant Hungarian care workers become the breadwinners in 
their households, this fact does not alter their traditional gendered roles and role 
expectations regarding the gendered division of labor in the families. Nor does the 
traditionally gendered and undervalued care work performed in foreign households 
challenge patterns of traditional (power) relationships, either in the host families or 
in their own families. 
Finally, one additional note should be made regarding the limits of agency of 
the migrant caregivers. Care workers always have the ultimate choice to leave “bad 
places” or even “good places” when they have the chance to ﬁ nd better ones. Because 
their (mostly illegal) employment is based on verbal agreements, they can leave 
without risking their reputation and will always be able to ﬁ nd new workplaces due 
to the continuous demand for care on the labor market. However, the possibility of 
leaving and changing their workplaces does not alter the structural constraints and 
contradictions inherent in their status as care workers. 
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Conclusion
Agency cannot be interpreted by itself; it exists in a dynamic interplay with 
structure. It is, like tactics, inherently situational. Our micro-level approach aimed 
to grasp diﬀ erent manifestations of agency in the context of domestic care based on 
the systematization of literature and our empirical evidence. Our empirical evidence 
shows the (limited) power of tactics and narratives at a micro-level, but also implies 
macro-level structural constraints; that is, the limits of agency. 
Live-in elderly care is deeply embedded in the systems of global economy and 
transnational migration, and is also located at the intersection of traditional and 
modern female roles. Consequently, it reproduces the need for undervalued and 
underpaid female jobs in both sending and receiving countries, as well as in the 
sending and host families, and reinforces the overlapping patterns of constraints 
and dependencies that exist from micro- to macro-, and even global levels. With 
regard to the agency of migrant Hungarian care workers, however, we emphasize 
the uniqueness of the Eastern and Central European context which deﬁ nes a speciﬁ c 
room for maneuver shaped by regional peculiarities. 
In analyzing agency we have seen that tactics are dominantly present-oriented, 
inherently temporary, and unﬁ nished. Th ey may, however, have a hidden 
transformative power through the cumulative eﬀ ects of unintended consequences. 
Narratives are more future-oriented, and they may have some transformative power 
through problematization and role-experimentation. While the housemaid narrative aims 
to create distance between live-in elderly care and its dominant historical pre-ﬁ gure 
– the housemaid –, the self-development narrative makes role-enactment possible 
through the complete re-framing of care work; it can also reformulate the life story in 
relation to scrutiny of the aim of migration.
Human games and tactics are triggered by structural constraints; they are directly 
inspired by limitations. Our empirical evidence shows that human games and tactics 
are potentially tools for enlarging individual room for maneuver situationally, but they 
evidently cannot alter structures. Th e asymmetry of structure and agency is clearly 
demonstrated in the fact that the overwhelming majority of Hungarian care workers were 
able to describe the individual gains of this job only in terms of fragments of development, 
while consistent and complete self-development narratives were extremely rare. 
Th ese fragments, however, highlight possible gains from this speciﬁ c type of 
circular migration which are more complex than the improvement in the situation of 
the migrant workers or an increase in their ﬁ nancial stability. Th ey speciﬁ cally refer 
to social remittances in the larger sense: (limited) language skills that are obtained, 
acquired know-how, moderately changing values, increased openness toward the 
world, and an increased level of spatial mobility. Th ese fragments of development not 
only open narratives toward the future by scrutinizing the experiences of agency, but 
may also challenge the one-sided conception of development and oﬀ er alternative ways 
to interpret migration and development. Th e analysis of interviews also highlights 
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that, despite the overlapping structural constraints, live-in elderly care may increase 
control over one’s life and provide an opportunity to enlarge one’s freedom in the 
sense that Sen develops it: freedom as the capability of living a valuable life even in a 
speciﬁ c and limited situation. 
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Abstract: Th is paper examines informal credit practices in a remote Hungarian village. It explores the 
central role informal credit plays in people’s present and future social security as they strategize about using 
various resources amid large-scale unemployment and limited local resources. It furthermore explains the 
reasons for the local prevalence of the former, the ways such credit is used by individuals and families vis-à-
vis other informal and formal arrangements, and how the users are morally judged. Th e analysis puts special 
emphasis on the links between individual practices of informal credit, the distributional practices of the local 
state, and broader socio-political tendencies. In doing so, the study reveals that the indebtedness of the local 
government and its short-termist distributional practices on the one hand, and the indebtedness of local 
unemployed people and the short -termism evident in their spending on the other can be linked to the same 
phenomenon; namely, the rescaling of insecurities. 
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[Exciting, frightening music plays]… Little birds happily chirp in a nest of straw, but 
suddenly the nest breaks and one falls. Th e fallen bird, chirping with fear, tries to 
climb back into the nest with no success. A big scarecrow appears, looming over 
the birds, it moves towards the broken nest; the birds chirp anxiously… [the music 
suddenly changes into a relaxed and comforting tune]… Th e scarecrow takes his hat oﬀ , 
carefully creates a more stable nest inside his hat, placing the fallen bird back into the 
new and safer home…  “If you only need a little more, don’t hesitate to call Evident”1 
– purrs the voice-over as the TV advert ends. Evident, which was set up in 2001, is 
the biggest private loan company in Hungary. Its success lies in oﬀ ering, according 
to their website, “short-term, small-scale loans for customers with no guarantor or 
ﬁ nancial coverage.”2
Another quite diﬀ erent “advert” appeared in several places across Budapest before 
the local government elections in October 2010. Featuring a picture of a mosquito in 
1 The name of the company is anonymized; the pseudonym is borrowed from Judit Durst (2015a).
2 This was particularly true during the time of research.
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the middle of a red circle, ﬁ rmly crossed out with a red line, the poster, which was part 
of the campaign by the far-right political party Jobbik, asked, “Do you also want to 
put an end to parasitism?” Although the imagery was utilized by an extremist political 
force, it resonated with the predominant sentiments of many.
Eight years have passed since the appearance of these two events, yet the processes 
that they signify have only intensiﬁ ed. Th e main line of division, on which the Jobbik 
election poster visibly played, has become even stronger. It is located between those 
who have permanent employment and hence contribute (or have contributed) to the 
“common good” as “good tax-payers,” and those who live from social transfers, and 
hence are the “parasites” of the system. Th e social policies of the current conservative 
government, which clearly favour those with regular employment, and redistribute 
from the poor to the rich, have only exasperated this situation, making the distinction 
between deserving and undeserving citizens even stronger (see Ferge 2017). Th e 
latter are left without any or very little assistance, and face the curbing of social rights 
and increasingly punitive measures (Szikra 2014), further exacerbating feelings of 
insecurity. Th e value of diﬀ erent welfare transfers has not been increased since 2008, 
while the criteria for receiving means-tested beneﬁ ts has become stricter, reducing the 
number of recipients. Moreover, the central state has considerably reduced its role as a 
welfare provider, with insecurities notably aﬀ ecting a much wider circle, and the most 
marginalized long-term unemployed are left, for the most part, to look after their own. 
Th e popularity of Evident and similar credit companies is more closely related to 
the above-described processes than ﬁ rst might appear. At the time of research, Evident 
had 225,000 customers,3 predominantly from poor rural areas, without permanent 
income, and who were stuck in spirals of indebtedness (see Miklósi 2006; Durst 2015a). 
Amid ongoing discursive (re)negotiations that focus on which citizens are deserving or 
undeserving of state support,  the possibility of obtaining social security has altered 
signiﬁ cantly. Th is is especially true in rural areas, where the changing role of agriculture 
and transforming ownership relations have signiﬁ cantly altered the access of diﬀ erent 
groups to productive resources. In many places this has resulted in a massive reduction 
in available jobs. Further to this, while in the early 1990s the political economic 
transformations brought new opportunities, more recently many remote rural areas 
have increasingly been faced with limited or no external investment or funding, and the 
shrinkage of services and lack of institutions leave the oft-changing state-run “public 
work programs”4 as the only larger employer (Velkey 2017).
In these places, smuggling, collecting wood and mushrooms, reliance on “loan 
sharks” or the buying of food on informal credit in shops can be of utmost importance 
in the social security arrangements of large segments of the population (cf. Messing–
3 According to statistics on their website.
4 This is a scheme that links the receipt of social aid by the unemployed to attendance in publicly organized communal work. 
It involves low-skilled temporary jobs provided by local governments, paying salaries below the minimum wage, financed 
primarily from central government budgets. It was first introduced in 2009 and has since become one of the main government 
measures for tackling unemployment.
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Molnár 2011; Durst 2015a). While all these strategies might not be available in every 
settlement, in Tiszacseke,5 a remote village in North-East Hungary, some of these 
practices are widely present. In fact, half of the regular customers of local shops buy 
on informal credit on an everyday basis. Furthermore, advances on aid and public-
work-related wages are regular occurrences at the local government, and many locals 
report they have taken Evident loans multiple times in their life.
Th roughout my study, I use the concept of informal credit to describe all 
moneylending arrangements which do not abide by any institutionalized, legally 
binding format. In this paper I particularly focus on two forms: arrangements in 
local shops between shopkeepers and their customers, and arrangements at the local 
government between the mayor and social beneﬁ ciaries/public workers. What is 
particularly important about these two forms of credit is that no interest is charged, 
and they are so frequently used in the village that they have become part of the regular 
household budgeting of many locals. 
In addition, I discuss some of the ways these informal practices are linked to the 
regular use of Evident loans, which were particularly prevalent at the time of research 
in the village. Even though this is not an informal practice, the credit constructions 
and the logic and the conduct of the company’s local employees were often strongly 
connected to usury and the activity of loan sharks by the villagers, especially because 
most villagers used the “home service” credit package whereby an agent personally 
brings the loan and then collects the installments from the customer on a weekly 
basis. While there are no loan sharks in the settlement, Evident loans were discussed 
as a kind of usury and were often only used as a last resort if one could not turn 
elsewhere. As I will later show, the intensiﬁ ed use of this formal practice can be linked 
to the same broader socioeconomic transformations that exacerbated the frequent 
use of other informal credit options in Tiszacseke.
Th e paper examines the role that these widespread practices of informal credit 
and Evident loans have in the social security arrangements of the inhabitants in the 
village: What are the reasons for their prevalence? How are they used by individuals/
families vis-à-vis other arrangements and how are they judged in the local context? 
Th e analysis highlights the multiple connections between individual practices of 
informal credit and the distributional practices of the local state, underlining that 
they are all related to the same broader phenomenon: the rescaling of insecurities. 
Informal credit, state restructuring and social security
Anthropologists have long been concerned with various credit practices (cf. Peebles 
2010), emphasizing that debt cannot be reduced to mere economic relations; it also 
involves social relations loaded with and constituted by moral values and obligations 
5 All names in the text are anonymized, and pseudonyms are used for the names of the settlements.
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(see e.g.: Gudeman 2001; Hann – Hart 2011; James 2014; Durst 2015b). Furthermore, 
diﬀ erent meanings can be attached to debt, which, while constantly negotiated by 
individuals, is also strongly connected to local contexts and structural constraints 
(Guérin 2014). Informal credit relations have been increasingly examined along these 
lines and my analysis adds to these eﬀ orts.
Informal lending has been an important constituent of local socioeconomic 
relations in diﬀ erent historical and geographical contexts (see Latea – Chelcea 2003; 
Graeber 2011). However, its current form and prevalence in Central and Eastern 
Europe is strongly related to the socioeconomic transformations of capitalist 
restructuring accompanied by the more recent withdrawal of the state from some of 
its social functions (Latea – Chelcea 2003; Messing – Molnár 2011; Durst 2015), which 
has particularly strongly aﬀ ected remote rural areas. In these places the disappearance 
of former employment options, the gradual erosion of the means of commuting to 
industrial jobs, the break-up of collectives, the transformation of land ownership and 
more general access to land, and the changing productivity of agriculture has resulted 
in the narrowing of local resources and intensiﬁ ed people’s anxieties and feelings of 
insecurity both about their present and future situation. At the same time, informal 
practices, including accessing credit, have gained renewed importance among people’s 
coping strategies. 
Ethnographic work that strictly focuses on informal credit practices and their link 
to the survival strategies of the poor in Hungary is still very limited (with only a few 
exceptions, such as Messing – Molnár 2011; Durst 2015a, 2015b). However, these 
studies focus, for the most part, on usury, (an exception in the ﬁ eld of sociology is the 
recent PhD dissertation of Gosztonyi [2018]). Undoubtedly, usury is one of the most 
dominant forms of informal credit in poor rural areas, although other forms of the latter, 
such as buying on credit in shops or taking advances on social beneﬁ ts, appear similarly 
signiﬁ cant for poor households that are trying to cope with multiple insecurities. Latea – 
Chelcea (2003) discuss the sudden rise and new form of such practices in rural Romania 
that accompanied post-socialist restructuring. In the former case, cash scarcity aﬀ ected 
a much wider segment of society and was related to continuously delayed payments 
of all kinds (credit from banks, taxes from ﬁ rms, wages from ﬁ rms/state, and social 
transfers from the state) that permeated the entire economy. 
While the situation is somewhat similar in Tiszacseke, there is a crucial diﬀ erence. 
In the Romanian example, precisely due to the dominance of a “delayed payment 
economy” and a widespread shortage of money at various levels, informal credit was 
a socially accepted practice based on strong communal ties and thus was also given to 
people who were tightly linked to the local community, (i.e. not only the long-term 
unemployed and poorest inhabitants, but also pensioners and low-wage earners). 
In comparison, the people who participate in these transactions in Tiszacseke (and 
similar villages in Hungary, as shown by Kozma et al. 2004; Virág 2009; Messing – 
Molnár 2011) are usually marginalized; they are less advantageously positioned 
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in local social structures and networks, hence are left with very limited resources 
to draw on. What is more, buying consumer goods on endlessly renewed credit is 
considered shameful and invites the moral judgment of the local majority with regard 
to consumption practices, ﬁ nancial management, and the lifestyles of the users of 
credit, despite being common practice among the local unemployed (Szőke 2012).
While the importance of informal credit for the survival strategies of the poor is 
often discussed, no systematic eﬀ ort has been made to analyse these practices within 
the wider social security arrangements of individuals/households. According to Franz 
and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, a broader anthropological understanding of social 
security should go beyond formal institutional provisions and include all forms of state 
and non-state, formal and informal arrangements, practices, relationships, ideologies, 
policies and institutions that are utilized by individuals, groups or families to overcome 
present and future insecurities related to their existence (1994: 4). According to this 
approach, people make various arrangements and draw on diﬀ erent resources in order to 
cope with present and future insecurities, often rooted in past experience. Accordingly, 
insecurities are not only material but are often experienced as feelings of anxiety rooted 
not necessarily in actual present needs but rather linked to the possibility of having such 
needs satisﬁ ed in the present or the future. As Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann 
put it, “the most devastating uncertainties concern people’s most basic needs: food, 
shelter, health and care; and in connection with them the experience of destitution, of a 
sudden loss or severe reduction of the means of existence and of access to other people 
or social institutions which might provide help” (1994: 7).
Analyzing informal credit relations by deploying the above social security 
approach leads to two important results. First, we can uncover the complex and 
multiple connections between these individual credit practices and the distributional 
practices of the local state, which although important is usually overlooked. Second, 
it furthers current eﬀ orts which highlight that, contrary to the dominant view, taking 
on informal credit without ﬁ nancial coverage is not due to “irresponsibility” or “bad 
planning” inherent to the poor, but rather is related to particular socioeconomic 
situations and larger structural processes that push the responsibility of dealing with 
insecurities down onto individuals, families and localities. 
Th e political economic transformations after the collapse of the socialist regime 
in 1989 triggered a substantial restructuring of the state in Hungary. Th ey entailed, 
among other things, the decentralization of welfare provisions, changes in ﬁ nancing 
and the institutional frames of development, and the setting up of autonomous 
local governments. As a result, local oﬃ  cials along with a number of regional, micro-
regional, civic, and – with EU accession – supranational actors gained prominence in 
mediating access to various resources (Szőke 2012). 
However, state restructuring did not mean the hollowing out or withdrawal of the 
state (cf. Goodwin – Painter 1996; Peck and Tickell 2002; Brenner 2004), but rather the 
reorganization of the spatial scales on which regulations, welfare and responsibilities 
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are constituted. It involved the devolution of a large number of responsibilities from 
the central state to local authorities, as well as to individuals and their families. 
Actors at these scales are increasingly encouraged to look after their own needs and 
contend with the aggregated eﬀ ects of political economic restructuring, while central 
ﬁ nancing and welfare provision are continuously shrinking. As part of the neoliberal 
restructuring process, there was a move to ﬁ ght against perceived dependency on 
state assistance, the introduction of workfare measures, and the narrowing of social 
rights (cf. Peck 2002; Castel 2005; Clarke 2005). Th is was particularly apparent at 
the time of and immediately after the 2008 economic crisis in Hungary. Whereas 
current waves of re-centralization, ongoing since 2010, have taken away many of the 
former powers of local authorities, they still bear a large part of the responsibility for 
dealing with unemployment, poverty, and related social tensions, while the centrally 
allocated means of doing so have been continuously reduced (Ferge 2017). Similarly, 
the individualization of social problems coupled with the punishing of poverty has 
further intensiﬁ ed (Szikra 2014 ; Ferge 2017).
Th ese ongoing undulations of state restructuring have signiﬁ cant impacts on 
the ways people can make arrangements for their present and future social security, 
drawing on and strategizing between both formal state provisions and arrangements 
with relatives, neighbors, NGOs and religious organizations, among others. I 
describe these broader processes as the “rescaling of insecurities,” which refers to 
the relegation of certain (often formerly centrally provided) securities to the level of 
local government or individuals/families (often with no parallel ﬁ nancial coverage), 
but also the structural constraints emanating from capitalist state restructuring that 
are fundamentally changing the ways in which individuals, groups, and organizations 
can mobilize their eﬀ orts and resources to establish their social security. Th is paper 
deals with one particular aspect of this phenomenon – the ways local families, on 
the one hand, and local government, on the other, try to cope with the concomitant 
insecurities. As will be seen below, the two issues are closely interlinked.
Th e research context
Tiszacseke has a young population: most of the 1600 inhabitants are of active age 
and the number of children is relatively high. One quarter of the local population are 
considered to belong to the Roma minority. Unemployment has seriously aﬀ ected 
the area, especially since the closing of the manufacturing branches of collectives and 
due to the decline of the agrarian sector. Th ere are only two large enterprises, both in 
the nearest small town, but only a handful of people from the village work there. Th e 
region preserved its predominantly agricultural orientation even during socialist-era 
industrialization, during which a large number of people commuted to other regions 
and within the area for their livelihood, or worked in local collectives. After the local 
cooperatives were dissolved, many lost their employment opportunities and the 
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possibilities for commuting were severely disrupted, which also contributed to the 
high unemployment rate in the area. 
Currently, the local government is the largest employer, operating numerous 
institutions such as a school, kindergarten, and assistance for the elderly. Besides 
these opportunities, the few larger farm owners employ two-three regular workers 
and rely on further seasonal laborers for a few months a year. Th ere are also a few small 
family businesses in the village, such as shops, pubs, a hairdresser, a restaurant, a few 
guest houses and a camping site. Th us local employment opportunities are scarce and 
for many are restricted to seasonal agricultural labour in orchards or cucumber ﬁ elds. 
I have had more than a decade-long involvement in the village, during which time 
I returned several times for shorter and longer research visits. However, most of 
the material I use in this article is based on nine months of ethnographic ﬁ eldwork 
spread between two visits from July 2009 to August 2010.6 Th e research7 involved 
repeated semi-structured interviews with all important state oﬃ  cials in the village, all 
the shop-keepers, and a total of 60 in-depth interviews with local inhabitants. Th ese 
focused on their interaction/relations to local state oﬃ  cials, their social situation 
(sources of living, position in local society, relations to other groups/locals), and their 
practices or strategies of establishing their own and their families’ social security. In 
addition, I regularly made ethnographic observations in shops, as well as in various 
local state institutions such as the mayor’s oﬃ  ce and various sites of public work, 
and frequently accompanied the nurse and the family assistant on their family visits 
and became part of the everyday life of numerous families, observing their practices 
and everyday conduct. Th rough these observations and interviews I gained access 
not only to the ways locals describe their practices, motives, values and relations to 
each other, but also how these interpretations relate to their actual everyday conduct 
of using credit, making calculations and plans for their immediate or far future, 
earmarking money according to the source of money and spending purpose, and 
reproducing or negotiating public norms about deservingness and undeservingness. 
While I had access to most of the actors involved in the credit relations I describe in 
the article, my material on Evident is restricted to how the company is interpreted by 
local customers, local state oﬃ  cials and using online material.
“It’s not possible to live from this” – Individual insecurities
Th e number of people who have had no permanent employment for a long period is 
very high in Tiszacseke. According to the local government, 90 percent of the active 
aged population are aﬀ ected. Many live on social transfers (among which childcare 
and family beneﬁ ts constitute a large part) and from wages for public work. Since 
6 The ethnographic present described in the text refers to this period.
7 The research was conducted within the frame of a comparative research project called “Local State and Social Security in 
Rural Hungary, Romania and Serbia 2008-2011” based at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, funded by the 
Volkswagen Foundation. 
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the 1990s the mayor has organized a large-scale public work program, employing 
200-240 beneﬁ ciaries8 yearly, long before the nationwide 2009 “Road to Work” 
program saw similar practices throughout Hungary. He considers it one of his major 
responsibilities and an important way of preventing people from falling into deep 
poverty and curbing a rise in usury or crime (Szőke 2015).  
Th e local government is the only large-scale employer in the village and public 
work has substituted permanent employment for many locals for over two decades. 
In several cases it has become a permanent job for participants; numerous informants 
reported that they have worked in the program continuously for over ten years, albeit 
on short consecutive contracts. It also involves a wide range of people, from unskilled 
to qualiﬁ ed, from fresh job-seekers to aging inhabitants, and both men and women. 
Another signiﬁ cant factor is that great emphasis is put on equally employing Roma 
and non-Roma inhabitants, who usually work together in both skilled and unskilled 
jobs, although the Roma are more frequently found in the latter. Th is eﬀ ort also 
relates to the fact that in the village both groups are equally aﬀ ected by the widespread 
unemployment.9
In addition, seasonal work in agriculture, tourism or opportunities in the 
“informal” economy (such as reselling goods brought from Ukraine, smuggling petrol, 
or doing small-scale informal repair work) can bring additional resources to many 
families. A growing number also engage in cucumber cultivation, which brings some 
extra income during summer months. Apart from this, families in which there is one 
or more unemployed member receive the social beneﬁ t of 28,500 Ft a month, which 
since 2010 has only been available to one person per family and has since decreased 
to 22,800 Ft. In such cases, the other adult members a) receive childcare allowance; 
b) are taken onto the public work program and receive the minimum wage10 for a 
few months, which also counts in terms of the number of days in employment that 
can result in higher unemployment beneﬁ t; c) receive a pension (or usually old-age 
assistance); or d) do not receive any social aid. However, due to the encompassing 
public work scheme in Tiszacseke, the latter cases are relatively few, although they 
still exist. 
Most people in permanent employment in the village receive the minimum 
wage. Even in families where one member works in a local state institution, the 
other member(s) are often unemployed or only have irregular income from small-
scale selling of fruit, unoﬃ  cial repair work, or periodic involvement in public work. 
However, those unemployed villagers whose partner has a stable job and regular 
source of income are still in a somewhat better position than those who do not have 
such an option. Th e former can ﬁ nd small jobs here and there through the network 
8 At the time of the research an average of about 80-120 people were usually employed for 3-6 month periods, thus the 
programme overall affected over 200-240 people yearly.
9 For more details on the local public work program and its effects, see Szőke (2015).
10 Its value has changed several times since the time of research. Currently, the public work wage is around 60% of the minimum 
wage.
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of their better positioned partner, whose connection to a local state institution 
provides access to several other resources, including information about temporary 
job opportunities, occasional work at local government assets, or in private houses/
gardens, and free goods distributed among local state employees. Such free items can 
include regular food from the institution’s kitchen, used furniture or leftover building 
material, or house furnishings from the renovation of institutions, and were often 
mentioned as a big bonus for those who work in or are connected to people working 
for local state institutions. 
Moreover, their partner’s stable income also makes the family eligible for bank 
loans. A  better social position  in local society – here meaning that one has friends 
or members of one’s extended family in long-term employment or in other strategic 
positions (i.e. close to the mayor or other oﬃ  cials) in the local social structure – also 
contributes to social security. Th is can secure support, information, and access to 
other resources from parents, colleagues or friends who are likely to engage in long-
term reciprocal relations of mutual help. Th is was mentioned often by several families; 
the sentence “you can never know when you yourself will need help” was a frequently 
used explanation for such mutual help relations. At the same time, this might not 
be available so easily to (or often even known about by) those families in which all 
members rely on beneﬁ ts or occasional earnings, hence have narrower networks and 
less intense contact with people in strategic positions. 
Th e case of the local family assistant, Szerénke, is one such example. Her husband 
has been unemployed for several years, only doing occasional jobs as a welder. 
However, she has been employed since she ﬁ nished college, ﬁ rst in the nursery, and 
then in the local social service oﬃ  ce. For that reason, her husband was never taken 
on for public work, as according to the mayor their situation was not so bad with 
one regular earner in the family. But Szerénke can participate in village festivals on 
a regular basis, from which all oﬃ  cials take home a large amount of free food, and 
she gets additional food vouchers at her workplace. Her husband has undertaken 
several repair jobs for other oﬃ  cials and local government institutions. And, more 
recently, he became employed in the water company for a short-term period when 
they needed an extra worker, with his personal contact with the dam keeper, another 
well-embedded person in local society, securing the job.
In spite of oﬃ  cially relying on only one minimum-wage income for years, the 
couple have managed to ﬁ nance their child’s higher education and language exam, 
buy a larger house with a bank loan, and live a relatively stable life in the village – 
i.e., they do not have debts in shops, they do not rely on (but also could not receive) 
beneﬁ ts, and they do not have problems with paying their bills. Furthermore, they sell 
apples from their half-hectare orchard every autumn which brings in some additional 
income; they have a web of relatives and friends with whom they are in a close helping 
relationship, and thus during the harvest they do not have to pay helpers. However, 
in return they also do the same for those who have helped them, or return the favour 
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in other ways, such as through electrical repair work. Such arrangements appeared 
to be very prevalent in the village with families or individuals that are socially more 
advantageously positioned having a much wider network and access to a greater 
variety of resources.
A diﬀ erent villager, Éva, and her husband were out of regular employment for 
over four years, as were many of their friends. Éva used to work for one of the local 
shops, but after she reached the end of her maternity leave, she was not taken back. 
Th en the couple decided to have a third child, and she now receives child support 
and has been unemployed for over seven years. Th e couple grow cucumbers, and last 
year Éva worked as a day labourer for a few days in orchards, but she could not ﬁ nd 
other employment opportunities. Her husband used to work for one of the largest 
landowners in the region but had been poisoned with pesticides, and since then 
could not ﬁ nd regular employment. He was engaged in “small business” (i.e. “getting, 
reworking and reselling stuﬀ ”) as well as working as an agricultural day labourer 
whenever possible. He was ﬁ nally taken on for public work in Spring 2010 for six 
months. Th e couple bought their house with a loan through a social scheme which 
they are still repaying, continuously rely on credit in shops, and often struggle to 
pay their bills and other household costs (for example, when their washing machine 
broke). Th ey ﬁ nd it especially diﬃ  cult in the winter months when there are reduced 
opportunities for seasonal work or additional jobs.
Th e situation of these two families is in many ways typical of others in Tiszacseke 
regarding social security; the example of Szerénke for those who work in oﬃ  cial, 
long-term employment, and Éva for those who rely on social beneﬁ ts and irregular, 
often unoﬃ  cial labor opportunities. According to my ﬁ eld experience, as well as the 
accounts of local social workers, the main dividing line in local society in terms of 
social security arrangements does not unfold along the usual ethnic lines (between 
Roma and non-Roma) as often mentioned in relation to poverty in the context of 
Hungary, but rather between those with permanent employment on the one hand, 
and those who only have occasional jobs on the other and thus who rely on public 
work or social aid.11 As the two above-described stories show, having a regular wage 
does not necessarily mean receiving a larger income, but it oﬀ ers a kind of security, 
allows future planning, and gives access to a wider range of resources than small 
irregular jobs. Linda, a local mother, summarized the problem thus: 
You cannot save up from social aid. [Th e related amount] 28,500 Ft is hardly enough 
to live on. And the banks don’t give credit to you unless you can prove six months of 
employment. Also, public work… some are taken on for years and years non-stop, you 
can see, but my husband wasn’t called in to work for ten years, only now they gave him 
three months of work. And again, for three months you cannot ask for bank credit, 
and even if they extend his contract and he can stay for another three to four months, 
11 This is, of course, not to say that racism plays no role in securing permanent work in the village or in the region.
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it won’t be enough. Th ey will give a new work contract for the new period. So again, 
we can’t go to the bank. How can one advance then? It’s impossible, it’s impossible…  I 
would also like to renovate my house, of course I would. I also don’t like to live like this 
– do you think I do? But I can’t, this social aid is only just enough to live on. 
Having a regular income makes saving possible, even if with diﬃ  culty, and above 
all it permits some sort of future planning. Th e latter is almost impossible when 
inhabitants are exposed to continuously ﬂ uctuating and shrinking social beneﬁ ts 
or constantly shifting public work schemes, both of which have changed multiple 
times during past decades. In addition, one cannot plan when engaged in agricultural 
or minor manual jobs, especially when many orchards are increasingly remaining 
untended due to the low price of fruit, or employ Romanian laborers from across the 
border at a lower wage. As the lives of the above families show, when you only have 
a very small income, which is hardly enough to satisfy your most immediate needs, 
the practice of economizing to obtain future rewards remains only an idea. Th e mayor 
very acutely summed up the issue:
When they come to me and complain that they don’t have enough money, I tell 
them “what do you want? How come you cannot live from 28,500 Ft?!” And then 
I tell them, “you go and buy some bread every day, that’s 310 Ft,” because here the 
cheapest bread costs 310 Ft per kilo, not 160 Ft like in the city, so that’s 10,000 for 
a month. Th en you go and buy a bucket of fat, which is 2500 forints, that’s again 
10,000 Ft a month, and then I tell them, “at least you won’t starve.” But then I 
pause. Because what am I saying?! We are already up to 20,000 Ft, and they have 
only bought bread and fat for the family. Th e rest they pay the bills from, and that’s 
it, we haven’t done anything yet, just eaten. So, I stop, because what can I tell them?! 
I also feel that something is very, very wrong.
Th e instabilities and insecurities caused by ﬁ nancial poverty, the impossibility of 
future planning due to frequent central changes in social beneﬁ ts and public work 
programs, and the dependence of families on the discretionary decisions of local 
oﬃ  cials are visible in people’s living standards; for example, with regard to house 
renovations and investments in furniture or other household goods. One crucial 
practice that is only undertaken by those without regular employment is buying 
everyday goods on credit. My interviews reveal that regularly buying on credit in local 
shops is considered to mark this dividing line between those who have regular jobs 
and those who do not. Th e shameful situation of having to rely on credit is strongly 
connected in the minds of locals to unemployment and a reliance on social beneﬁ ts. 
Th is situation was also reﬂ ected in the account of the head of elderly assistance 
program when she talked about her earlier experience of being unemployed, and the 
feeling of insecurity and shame that had accompanied it:
I was also unemployed and my husband too. So, I know. My colleague, Szerénke, 
doesn’t know yet, that’s why she cannot value her job. She was always in employment. 
I was unemployed for several years before I started to work here... And my husband 
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also didn’t have a job at the time. So, I know how it feels…. It was horrible. Constantly 
waiting and hoping that one of us at least will be taken on for public work. And then you 
never know for how long or when it will happen. So, you had to do all sorts of things. 
Many times I went and did the worst jobs, like shoveling snow or collecting rubbish 
from the street. And I did it for very little money, because if you didn’t, you might not 
be called in for better jobs when there was a chance. So now I really appreciate my 
job, because I know how it felt to be so insecure. And OK, it still happens sometimes, 
because it happens to everyone here, but my biggest fear is that I will have to “go on the 
list” (iratkozik12) again. I’m trying everything to avoid this.
However, even though such possibilities can easily threaten everyone in 
Tiszacseke, as the above account shows, most people in permanent employment or 
with regular income such as a pension have a rather negative view of the practice of 
regularly buying on credit. Th e nationwide discourses about being lazy, over-spending 
and thoughtlessly buying “luxurious goods” (such as cola, crisps, or cigarettes) are so 
deeply inscribed that even personal experiences do not contravene them. It is these 
nationally dominant images that are also used by many in Tiszacseke to delineate 
those who are “deserving” and “undeserving” in the local context. Similarly, having 
many children in poor families is often evaluated as a strategy to “take as much out of 
the state as possible”; i.e. to give birth to children in order to receive family support 
and numerous child beneﬁ ts.
Many inhabitants with permanent employment even believe that the various 
beneﬁ ts the unemployed receive amount to a greater income than their minimum 
wage. Th ese opinions, however, reﬂ ect more the injustice that those in permanent 
employment (who as noted above receive only the minimum wage) feel towards those 
who receive several beneﬁ ts and are without a job, than the actual amount the latter 
receive. Rather, it reﬂ ects broader social tensions and feelings of injustice towards the 
redistributive logic of the state, and deep-rooted public sentiments also enhanced by 
current social policies concerning the stigmatization of beneﬁ t users as “misusers” 
and “parasites” on the state. Such tensions between those who work in low-paid 
jobs and those who are long-term unemployed are especially high in areas with poor 
economic assets and scarce opportunities like Tiszacseke. 
In addition to the particularly benevolent social policy of the local mayor, there are 
certain additional resources that the oﬃ  cially unemployed can turn to. One of these is 
small-scale agricultural production, mostly cucumber-growing for those who do not have 
additional resources to invest in anything larger, or who have not inherited much land. 
In terms of area, cucumbers can bring in as much as 1800-2000 Ft per square meter if 
the soil is good and the weather is favourable. Accordingly, for 600-800 square meters 
of cucumbers, which is the most common size of plot in Tiszacseke, one can earn more 
12 This is a local expression used to describe the situation when someone asks a shopkeeper if they can be written onto the list 
of debtors, but it also became a local colloquialism to express the entire phenomenon of buying on credit. As such, it not 
only describes one particular instance, that the interviewee here mentions that may still often happen to anyone, but rather a 
continuous regular and prolonged practice, when debts can never be fully balanced.
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than 1.5 million Ft in a season. Even in less favourable conditions growing cucumbers can 
bring in at least 600-800,000 Ft for 3-4 months of work. Even if one deducts the initial 
loan given by the wholesaler13 and the smaller investment into nets, sticks and additional 
treatment materials, people can augment their income by a signiﬁ cant sum. However, 
the work is very intensive, and involves a minimum debt of 150,000 Ft for 600 square 
meters that needs to be paid back to the wholesaler once the cucumbers start growing. 
Furthermore, cucumbers are very sensitive plants that are easily aﬀ ected by the weather 
and various diseases, so one can end up with a debt at the end of the season. All the above 
factors therefore make cucumber growing an attractive yet risky option.
As mentioned above, people living from an irregular and small income can ease 
their situation by purchasing goods on credit from local shops.14 According to one of 
the biggest shopkeepers, 50 percent of her customers regularly buy on credit. Another 
recently opened shop oﬀ ers credit to every customer without exception and without 
limit as a customer attraction strategy. Th us, by the second month after opening, many 
people were shopping there, accumulating as much as 30-50,000 Ft debt per month. 
Th ose who regularly buy on credit balance some of their debts at the beginning of each 
month after receiving their social beneﬁ ts or public work wage, but the next day come 
again and ask if they could buy on credit. Borrowing from family or friends, another form 
of informal credit, also plays an important role in local social security arrangements. 
However, this is mostly limited to small sums and occurs during exceptional events 
or crises such as sudden sickness, the death of a relative, the threat of being refused 
informal credit at one of the local shops due to a large outstanding balance, weddings, 
baptisms or school graduation parties. Similarly, the mutual practice of borrowing 
everyday food products such as ﬂ our, sugar, coﬀ ee and cigarettes is also important in 
times of need (for example, when credit in shops is frozen when the mutually agreed 
limit is reached). Of course, such practices have long existed. However, the regular use 
of credit in shops, Evident loans, and advances from the local government are relatively 
new, and are more closely linked to ongoing socioeconomic transformations.
Th e dilemma of the shopkeeper, Evident, and their best 
customers
“You cannot refuse to give bread or milk to a mother when you know she has three 
children,” explained Kati, the owner of a shop located near the main road in the village,
13 This involves a formal arrangement whereby a farmer signs a contract with the wholesaler. The wholesaler pre-finances the 
initial plants, the nets, sticks and pesticides which are given to the farmer at the start of the season. Once the cucumbers 
finish growing, the farmer delivers them to the wholesaler, who first deducts the initial loan from the price to be paid for the 
cucumbers. Only once this debt is balanced does the farmer get the money for the cucumbers delivered to the wholesaler. 
In some cases, other constructions also exist, mostly based on long-established personal trust relations (e.g. by gradually 
deducting the loan from each batch of cucumbers delivered throughout the season, so the farmer can receive some money for 
the very first batch delivered to the wholesaler).
14 There are a total of five grocery shops in the village, and they all sell on credit to a number of customers.
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...[but] it is a diff erent thing if they ask for alcohol, then I often don’t give credit. But, for 
example, for cigarettes, I do. I somehow think it is not my job to teach people what is good 
or bad. But they often buy other goods too. When they ask me if they can get another 
1000 Ft credit, and I tell them “yes,” thinking that they will get some yogurt or some 
bananas for their children and they will eat better, then they go and buy tomatoes for 
800 Ft per kg. In winter! Even I don’t buy them in the winter! Or the Bonduelle tinned 
corn which costs double the price of the other type. Th en I get very mad. But I still give the 
credit to them... what can I do?!
As she went on to explain, it is mostly larger families with many children who rely 
on credit. Elderly people are too ashamed to ask, even if they need it. However, these 
large families are considered “the best customers,” even if they buy on credit, because 
they shop daily and for numerous goods. While elderly people usually just buy bread 
and milk (as they grow vegetables and keep livestock in their gardens), larger families 
usually buy several things to cook with; meat from the freezer, vegetables, washing 
powder, sweets for the kids and soda such as Sprite or Coke. “If it weren’t for them, 
we might close the shop,” admits Kati. Other shopkeepers also felt they were in a way 
forced to oﬀ er credit to these families (cf. Latea and Chelcea 2003), otherwise they 
would lose their biggest and most frequent customers, even if this means they only 
get a part of their money back and always with some delay. As one shopkeeper put it, 
“we know that eventually they will pay for it, otherwise they won’t get more credit. 
And if they don’t pay here or the other shops, eventually no one will give them credit, 
then they can go to the city. Th ey will see who gives them credit there!”
Th rough the continuous giving of credit, the shopkeepers bind their customers to 
their shops. Indeed, this is a part of some shopkeepers’ strategy for dealing with local 
competition. As Angéla, a 43-year-old mother of four children, explained in regard to 
the newly opened shop which started to attract customers by oﬀ ering unlimited credit,
...Th e fi rst time I just asked for 1000 Ft credit, as I didn’t have enough money with 
me for the washing powder. I forgot to buy it at the nearest city. We usually go there 
when we get social aid and shop for the whole month. Th en the next day I went to 
the shop again, and he [the shopkeeper] said I could shop some more if I needed to, 
he’d just write it on the list. So, I bought cola, the expensive one, not the cheap one, 
some crisps, and some cigarettes and some other stuff  I don’t remember, food to eat. 
I didn’t really need all that, but since he said I could buy things…. I know it was 
wrong. We usually don’t drink Coca Cola, just the cheap type. But he said I could get 
more credit, so I bought it. It all came to over 8000 Ft, so then I owed 9000 Ft. By 
now, I owe over 30,000 Ft, and I don’t know what will happen, because it’s only the 
beginning of the month, and we [the family] only have 120,000 Ft altogether. If I 
pay this debt, and buy our monthly food for 60,000 Ft, there are still the bills, and 
we will have nothing left. Th en I will have to buy on credit again.
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Shopkeepers15 entangle some of their regular customers in webs of attachment 
and deepening debt. Customers feel they can take more and more goods. Even though 
they cannot balance their debts now or in the foreseeable future, they nevertheless 
keep on buying and, as they do so, any reservations they have about being in debt 
evaporate, as they return each month to pay oﬀ  some of the debt, and also take a 
little more (cf. Latea – Chelcea 2003). Another, much larger creditor, Evident, works 
according to an alarmingly similar logic. 
In answer to my question about what happens if individuals suddenly need larger 
sums (in the case of sickness, for a ﬂ at renovation, or for a new electrical appliance, 
etc.), Sándor, a charismatic member of the Roma local government, answered without 
hesitation, “we call Evident.” In contrast to a bank, this loan company oﬀ ers credit to 
people who have no secure income or guarantors. He went on to explain,
Th ey ask for almost 100 percent interest, it’s like usury, nothing diff erent. A person 
comes as soon as the next day after you call, asks about your income. You tell them 
you only get the 28,500 Ft of aid, and family benefi ts. And then he gives you the 
money as soon as the next day, he brings it to your house. Th en you have to pay 
back some part at the end of every week. Th e agent from the company comes to your 
house and asks for your weekly instalment. It is just like the loan sharks. Th e only 
diff erence is that it is legal, it’s a company. And they really give credit to anyone, it 
doesn’t matter if you don’t work or have no salary, just your social aid and the family 
benefi ts. … I was also in it [borrowed from Evident], twice. It took me two years to 
get out of it. But I had to take it. Once I took 60,000 Ft for the funeral of my aunt, 
and once another 30,000 Ft – we needed it for food, there was no other option then, 
nowhere else to go. I paid the installments for two years, often I had to borrow from 
friends to pay them, and still didn’t manage to clear my balance… It really is the last 
option – you only go there [borrow from Evident] when there is nowhere else to go.
Evident is often the only option (apart from loan sharks) for those without a 
permanent job if they want to obtain larger sums of money. At the time of the research, 
the company oﬀ ered loans of up to 220,000 Ft even to people whose sole income 
was social aid or public work, and often asked for 80-100% interest on short-term 
small loans through the home service scheme.16  While it was not detailed as such 
on their credit scheme table, a closer look showed that if one took 100,000 Ft credit 
over a 30-week instalment period, 153,000 Ft would have to be paid back. Over 60 
weeks the sum could amount to 177,750 Ft, which could further increase if the client 
failed to pay back the amount by the end of this period, which often happens. Th is 
15 The perspectives and motives of the shopkeepers are also multiple; however these did not constitute the focus of my research. 
Yet it was often said that selling on credit is not advantageous to them, and in most cases ends up in losses, thus they need a 
minimum number of cash-paying customers in order not to run at a loss. However, the former reasoned that in a locality with 
a limited number of cash-paying customers, offering credit was needed for survival, as eventually most credit is balanced, even 
though only in small sums and stretched over an extended period. Giving credit furthermore binds customers to the shop; the 
loyalty of customers (in terms of where they bought, and what) was a constant topic of shopkeepers during my research.
16 This service is used by the majority of clients from poorer and/or rural backgrounds as it does not require a bank account and 
assistance is offered with all related paper work, arranged directly at the home of the customer.
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situation changed slightly with the 2014 regulation on credit rates, and the company 
has also changed its credit proﬁ le, although its most often used services still target 
the “unbanked.”  
Buying on credit and borrowing from Evident entangles people in circles of debt 
with little possibility of repayment in the near future. What is more, constantly oﬀ ering 
new credit without ever expecting full repayment incites further consumption – this 
has parallels with the logic of giving credit cards or large bank mortgages to clients 
without comparable guarantees, discussed extensively in relation to the 2008 global 
crisis. Whereas some of these options (i.e. buying on credit or taking Evident loans) 
may be vital for securing the present and future needs of many families, in the longer 
term it appears that such practices are strategies for dealing with the insecurities 
generated by structural processes at higher levels. 
Delineating various reasons for the current spread of consumer credit, Rona-
Tas and Guseva (2018) argue that the current culture of consumerism fueled by 
advertisements and cultural messages incites various classes to go into debt to ensure 
their status quo, which they can only reach by upscaling their consumption. Th e 
authors explain that, following the neoliberal turn, “curtailing social programs and 
government spending amounted to pushing the problem of demand management onto 
[...] households, which had no other choice but to deepen their reliance on consumer 
credit” (p. 57), creating a second form of exploitation. In Tiszacseke, this is also partly 
true. Elsewhere I argue (Szőke 2012) that the seemingly luxurious or irresponsible 
spending of the poorer segments of the village is in fact a way to renegotiate their 
social belonging and counteract dominant notions about deservingness. 
Th e local government, and informal credit
Buying on informal credit appears to be entangled with the practices of the local 
government in several ways and on many levels. Th e ﬁ rst and the most obvious is that 
the mayor himself also engages in distributing informal credit of a type. Advances are 
frequently given from the public work wage and then deducted from the public work 
salary at the end of the month or over consecutive months if the advance is large. 
Numerous workers told me that this option was of great help to them. Undoubtedly, 
it is sometimes used to save families from immediate crises (for example, surviving 
until the next payment if every other resource is already used up),  meaning they do 
not need to go to loan sharks or Evident, where high interest would be due on the 
sum they borrow. In these cases, only a few thousand Ft is advanced that is usually 
spent on basic necessities such as food, or is used in case of sudden sickness or severe 
indebtedness to balance some debt. 
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Of crucial consideration here is that the local government could distribute a one-
time beneﬁ t called crisis aid17 meant exactly for such situations. However, according 
to local statistics and personal accounts, very few people have received it in past years. 
Th e social service clerk explained that oﬃ  cially it can be given, but since it should 
be covered entirely from the local budget, they cannot distribute it frequently. Th e 
case was similar with funeral aid, which could be also distributed from the local 
government budget. Th us, in the few cases when it was given, it was usually given 
in the form of credit (i.e. deducted in small installments from the applicant’s aid or 
public work wage). Th us, due to limited local government resources, advances on the 
public work wage partly fulﬁ lled the same role as crisis aid, although in the form of 
credit. 
Nevertheless, these advances were typically taken for a larger sum (80-160 
thousand Ft) and, similar to the income from growing cucumbers or day labour, were 
used for larger investments that could not be realized from the low public work wage/
beneﬁ ts. Most often the money was used for renovating houses, building bathrooms, 
or taking the ﬁ rst steps towards cucumber farming.18 Th e importance of these 
advances was emphasized by many, because it is not possible to obtain bank loans for 
such investments based only on a public work wage19 or social aid. 
Renovating houses has an importance that goes beyond increasing the immediate 
comfort of families. A signiﬁ cant portion of the unemployed families had had their 
children placed under supervision (védelembe véve) at one point, which means that 
the child protection oﬃ  cer visited them on a weekly basis, monitoring the parents’ 
child-raising practices, ﬁ nancial background and, above all, living conditions. Th ese 
supervisory orders were usually due to cases of under-age pregnancy, parents’ 
suspected alcoholism, or, most frequently – as the child protection oﬃ  cer put it – 
“ﬁ nancial circumstances that threatened the well-being and desirable living conditions 
of the children.” 
On the various occasions I accompanied the child protection oﬃ  cer and the local 
nurse (védőnő) on these visits, the houses were inspected for heating facilities, the 
presence of windows and doors (that were often missing), and clean rooms with 
proper walls and beds (preferable separate ones) for children. If the family failed to 
remedy at least some of these shortcomings over a period of time (usually one year), 
they were threatened with the permanent removal of a child or children. Whereas such 
extreme measures were only taken four times in the period 2005-2013, the threat was 
extensively used by local oﬃ  cials and discussed in families thus threatened, and was 
17 Since the 2015 changes in the social aid system, crisis aid does not exist any more, but a new benefit called local government 
aid (települési támogatás) may be awarded which now substitutes crisis aid, regular social aid, funeral aid, and irregular child 
protection benefits.
18 For more details about the earmarking of different sources of income and the values attached to them, see Szőke (2012).
19 Even those who are employed more or less constantly in public work as regular employment are taken on through short-term 
contracts which would not make the earner eligible for bank loans. This was explained to be a major barrier to making larger 
investments by many informants. 
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thus often mentioned in considerations about house renovations. Similarly, being 
selected for public work often involved a discretionary decision by the mayor about 
who was deserving and who not, something which was often inﬂ uenced by other 
local state oﬃ  cials’ opinions and information about the applicants. Keeping one’s 
house tidy or trying to “manage on one’s own” by, for example, growing cucumbers or 
undertaking small renovations and repair work on a house played an important part 
in this.
Th ough many people spoke in positive terms about the advances, some of the 
oﬃ  cials had serious reservations. Advances do not follow legally regulated structures 
(they are based on informal arrangements, but still have to be ﬁ nanced from a very 
strict, pre-calculated carefully balanced monthly budget). Th e local government 
struggled to carry out many of its tasks, as is often the case in remote villages with 
small assets and large social expenses, and was even forced to switch to heating the 
school and nursery with wood for two consecutive winters in 2009-10. Moreover, the 
local government has been struggling with the repayment of large bank loans, and 
often refused locals’ requests for emergency beneﬁ ts, as mentioned above.
Th ese practices of the local government can be associated with the indebtedness 
and spending practices of local needy on another level too. Namely, both seem to 
be linked to larger political economic phenomena that increase the insecurity of 
individuals/families and local authorities. Due to the devolution of responsibilities 
in the ﬁ eld of welfare, with no matching ﬁ nancial support, this is felt particularly by 
those who are least advantageously situated in the present structures, both at the level 
of individuals and the local government. Th e one-hundred-million forint deﬁ cit with 
which the local government starts the year cannot all be covered from local income as 
resources are scarce and the number of taxpayers (and enterprises) is limited. 
Th is is a problem faced by many local governments across the country: either 
some institutions are closed down and local services abolished (which many local 
oﬃ  ces are reluctant to do), or the local government relies on newer and newer bank 
loans to make up its budget deﬁ cits. Th e indebtedness of the local government sector 
rose from 14 percent in 1991 to 70 by 2010 (Vigvári 2011:69). After local resources 
from selling local government assets were exhausted by the end of the 1990s, local 
governments increasingly started to rely on loans to compensate for the decreasing 
central contributions and lack of monetary resources (Pálné Kovács 2008). Th us, by 
the end of 2000 indebtedness on a mass scale had occurred (Vigvári 2011:71), a fact 
which became particularly apparent as the central ﬁ nancial deﬁ cit after the 2008 
Hungarian economic crisis was pushed down particularly eﬀ ectively to the local scale.
Due to the continuing devolution of welfare provisions, local governments are 
also pushed to deal with the social consequences of capitalist restructuring, such 
as unemployment, social and ethnic tensions and poverty, on their own. Th e local 
government in Tiszacseke, due to the lack of appropriate ﬁ nancial coverage, has 
to resort to rearranging its targeted grants within its budget and to take on large 
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debts to maintain local institutions and services. Th us, in order to maintain a large 
and expensive public work program, which the mayor argues is key to keeping social 
tensions in check, it often uses money from central grants that is targeted at other 
mandatory tasks. Crucially, however, it is not within the local government’s power 
to create and maintain employment or to fundamentally change the long-term 
local socioeconomic situation of the settlement. In the same way, local unemployed 
inhabitants have little power to fundamentally change their situation and escape 
the spiral of indebtedness and poverty. Th ere are temporal similarities between the 
local government and those who buy on credit in shops; i.e. both focus on the most 
urgent matters, and invest resources into “ﬁ re-ﬁ ghting,” rather than trying to make 
investments for the future. 
Last but not least, the local state plays an important role in local informal credit 
practices in another sense. Several shopkeepers in Tiszacseke explained that they do 
get back some of their credit at the time of the payment of the public work salary. In 
addition, they added, it is best when many people are taken on for public work, because 
then less credit is asked for, and more of it is balanced each month. However, since 
public work programs have been more or less continuously operating for many years, 
shopkeepers are for the most part conﬁ dent that these debts will eventually be repaid. 
Conclusions
Th e neoliberal reforms, privatization, disappearance of employment opportunities 
and decreasing involvement of the central state in providing social security has led 
to new forms of insecurities in people’s lives. At the same time, discourses of self-
help and the repeated individualization of social problems, along with the increasing 
withdrawal of the central state from welfare provision, have also meant that the 
responsibility for ﬁ nding solutions to socioeconomic problems and the consequent 
socio-spatial inequalities have been devolved to  local and individual levels. Th ese 
processes have only intensiﬁ ed since the period when most of the above research 
was undertaken. Th e central state has further delegated its former responsibilities 
of providing and allocating social beneﬁ ts to local governments (with the 2015 
transformations of the social aid system) and strengthened punitive elements (Ferge 
2014), abandoning an even larger segment of society (and villages), whose fates are 
now left entirely in their own hands. However, the lack of resources, due to decreasing 
central support and a lack of local assets, poses a problem in terms of tackling these 
insecurities, and often pushes both local governments and individuals to deal with 
them by ﬁ nding immediate solutions, such as loans from Evident, bank loans, or 
informal credit in local shops, rather than by making long-term arrangements. 
Whereas to some degree the above-discussed processes have exacerbated anxiety 
and feelings of insecurity for many diﬀ erent groups in society, in the context of the 
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village the long-term unemployed are undoubtedly the most signiﬁ cantly aﬀ ected. 
Furthermore, as the study has revealed, diﬀ erent groups can draw on very diﬀ erent 
resources and practices to cope with these insecurities. Informal credit and Evident 
loans constitute an important part of the social security arrangements for people 
who face unemployment or irregular employment and have limited access to other 
resources through local ties to strategically positioned persons. 
Th e diﬀ erent formal and informal practices that people use for their social security 
arrangements are strongly intertwined. As this paper has shown, formal and informal 
credit permeate diﬀ erent practices, ranging from cucumber-growing through house 
renovation to everyday consumption, and are used to deal with various insecurities 
related to child protection, crisis situations, and negotiating social belonging. As such, 
public norms of deservingness strongly inﬂ uence who can access diﬀ erent resources 
and in what ways.   
Similarly, local governments like the one in Tiszacseke have also become 
increasingly indebted as they struggle to reconcile socioeconomic problems and carry 
out their mandatory duties in the face of a lack of appropriate resources, which makes 
long-term future planning/investment and structural changes unimaginable. Th e 
mayor believes that providing a certain level of social security through public work 
employment is an important job of the local government. However, in the face of 
shrinking central funding and the disadvantaged position of the village, it can only 
do so by taking away resources from other institutions and, for example, by oﬀ ering 
advances on beneﬁ ts instead of one-oﬀ  aid in crisis situations. At the same time, it 
is due to the wide-scale public work programme that shopkeepers feel conﬁ dent that 
the debts of their “best” customers will be balanced, and that, for the most part, loan 
sharks cannot be found in the village. However, as has been shown, even among the 
poorer groups this does not mean equal access to resources, as local advances and 
admittance to public work are largely dependent on the discretionary decisions of local 
oﬃ  cials, who are themselves inﬂ uenced by public views about deservingness. Both the 
poor unemployed villagers and the disadvantaged local government are attempting 
to navigate a moral ﬁ eld of acceptable spending and informal credit practices amid 
the rescaled insecurities that permeate the present and possible futures of remote 
Hungarian villages.
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Abstract: Th e paper is written to foster understanding of the function of primary school pupils’ high 
commuting rate in Hungary’s towns and cities and its role in the process of school choice. Based on 
two studies and on data collection covering all primary school pupils in the city of Pécs, I analyzed the 
pattern, direction and success rate of pupils’ eﬀ orts to ﬁ nd higher quality schools than their district 
schools. Th e aim of the study was to unpack the “commuting games” of the primary schools. Results 
indicate that, in contrast to national trends, the commuting rate of low-status and Roma primary school 
pupils is also very high within the city. However, while most of the commuting pupils have managed 
to enrol in higher quality schools than the ones in the catchment area of their homes, the majority of 
low-status and Roma commuters appear to be attending lower quality schools than those close to their 
homes, because prestigious schools informally deter them. My ﬁ ndings challenge the literature which 
claims that the selection mechanisms of public education are predominantly regulated by the mutual 
choices of prestigious schools and high-status pupils. Schools and their local or central maintenence 
agents are unable to control the processes against the background of a centralized system. 
Keywords: educational segregation; selection; pupils’ commuting; spatial and educational inequalities
Introduction1:
Th e right-wing liberal concept of society and the reforms that it has inspired are 
often criticized for creating and introducing a quasi-market system in education (van 
Zanten 2008). Th e per-capita-basis allocation of school budgets and other resources 
encourages schools to consider students their most important resources. Th is results 
in competition with two meanings: the aim of “ﬁ rst order” competition is to enrol 
as many students as possible in order to maximize resources, while “second-order 
competition” is aimed at enrolling the students considered the most academically 
able so as to enhance the school’s prestige (Gewirtz et al 1995). Th e possibility of 
1 The author thanks Erika Csovcsics and Ágnes Gosztonyi for their generous help and Gábor Havas for his valuable comments on 
the first draft of this paper.
Szociológiai Szemle, 2018/4134
school choice necessarily exacerbates inequities everywhere as it pushes schools to 
sort and select students (Musset 2012). 
Nevertheless, the quasi-market system of Britain and the USA which is based 
on free parental choice and indirect state control should be compared cautiously to 
the education liberalization that ensued the post-communist transition in countries 
such as Hungary (Kovai ‒ Neumann 2015). In the communist era, the admission 
quotas of secondary schools were predominantly determined by the annual 
decisions of the government, and inﬂ uential state-owned factories continuously 
and successfully lobbied for the majority of students to attend vocational schools 
after ﬁ nishing their primary education. Th e post-socialist liberalization of school 
choice had a signiﬁ cant inclusive eﬀ ect because secondary admission quotas were no 
longer determined by the government. However, until the nationalization of schools 
in 2013, extensive secondary expansion had concealed growing between-school 
inequalities within public education because, due to a co-ﬁ nancing system, school-
maintaining municipalities had had a vested interest in maximizing the number 
of secondary school students and, as a consequence, the proportion of pupils from 
secondary grammar (gimnázium) and secondary vocational schools (szakközépiskola) 
that were enrolled steadily increased (Fehérvári et al. 2010). Furthermore, the massive 
expansion of secondary education greatly improved the chances of disadvantaged and 
Roma pupils entering into secondary education.
At the same time, the fact that social background signiﬁ cantly determines 
educational outcomes in Hungary clearly originates from a regulatory system based 
on unlimited free parental choice at all levels of schooling, the unregulated and 
informal competition of schools for students, primary schools’ informal admission 
practices, and a diversiﬁ ed school system. One of the main reason for early tracking 
is that students can apply to eight- or six-year secondary grammar schools at the ages 
of 10 and 12. In this system, one’s school performance and educational chances are 
predominantly determined by early school choices to a much greater extent than in 
most OECD countries (OECD 2015). Th e  weak capacity of the educational system to 
compensate for pupils’ disadvantages resulted in the fact that in 2005 nearly 20 percent 
of the year’s cohort left public education having completed no more than eight years 
of primary school, despite the compulsory school attendance age having been raised 
from 16 to 18 years in 1996 (Kertesi ‒Varga 2005). 
Given these circumstances, educational authorities cannot uphold a stable and 
inclusive education system. Depending on their perceived particular interests, schools 
and parents will undermine its stability. 
It is highly doubtful whether a targeted voucher system would be capable of 
counterbalancing the eﬀ ect of private schools (Hsieh ‒ Urquiola 2006; Fiske ‒ 
Ladd 2000). Educational systems based on free school choice are often described 
as “universal” voucher schemes whereby all students are provided with a symbolic 
voucher which can be “redeemed” at any school in the country, although only district 
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schools are obliged to admit pupils without further consideration (OECD 2017). 
Accordingly, parents choose primary schools for their children based on the schools’ 
perceived quality and social composition. Th ey can put their children’s names down 
for any school they choose to, but pupils only have to be accepted by their catchment 
area schools. Beyond that, however, it is up to the individual schools, which act within 
the limits of the places they have available, to decide whether to accept children from 
outside their area. On the other hand, schools are not only interested in maximizing 
the number of students, but also in improving or at least defending their prestige and 
local status by admitting presumably well-performing students. Th e mutual choices 
of middle-class parents and prestigious schools2 necessarily leads to the unequal 
distribution of educational services.
Approximately 13-14 percent of students in Hungarian primary schools are Roma 
(Papp Z. 2015). It is a crucial and open-ended question whether the mutual selection 
process is basically “colour-blind”; that is, if the ethnicity of students adds to the eﬀ ect 
of the ESCS3 of Roma parents being lower than average, and if their children’s abilities 
and performance will subsequently also be below average. Th e literature implies that 
this is not the case; instead, the symbolic signiﬁ cance of ethnicity is far greater and 
non-Roma parents simply do not wish their children to attend the same schools or at 
least the same classes as Roma kids (Kemény et al. 2004; Dupcsik 2009). In the former 
case, the mutually presumed and perceived ability spectrum of schools and children 
would result in steady balance and student commuting trends would be predictable. 
Th is dilemma is particularly signiﬁ cant in Hungary, because the impact of 
parents’ ESCS on the educational performance of students is higher than in most 
OECD countries (Csapó et al. 2014; Radó 2014; Ostorics et al. 2016) and therefore, 
according to my research experience, the impact of the social background of families 
is an essential factor in the selection criteria for school principals. 
Roma pupils’ performance in reading may be explained explicitly by their social 
status, and their performance in mathematics only slightly lags behind that of non-
Roma pupils of similar socioeconomic background. On the other hand, their dropout 
rate from secondary and vocational schools is signiﬁ cantly higher than that of non-
Roma pupils of similar socioeconomic background, and they are less likely to continue 
their education in secondary schools than their non-Roma peers of similar abilities 
and results (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2010). 
High commuting rates are a characteristic feature of public education regimes 
based on free parental school choice. Th e high proportion of primary school students 
who opt for schools outside their catchment zone has been demonstrated in several 
previous studies4 (Havas ‒ Zolnay 2011). It has always been clear that pupil commuting 
2 I define parents as middle class if they have an opportunity to choose from the best, or allegedly best schools for their children. 
I define schools as prestigious if they have the opportunity to admit the best, presumably most academically able pupils.
3 Index of Economic Social and Cultural Status.
4 The commuting rate for primary school pupils who leave their local catchment area was 64 percent in larger Hungarian towns, 
and only 36 percent opted for their catchment zone school.
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is inherently unequal because pupils of higher status are signiﬁ cantly more likely to 
commute.5 Kertesi and Kézdi (2009) found a strong positive association between the 
number of schools in a vicinity and the commuting rates of middle class children,6 
but the fundamental signiﬁ cance of commuting was only proved by their research on 
the educational policies of 100 towns and cities in 2011. Th eir hypothesis was that 
in Hungarian towns and cities the ethnic segregation of primary schools is strongly 
related to the proportion of Roma pupils attending primary schools, the segregating or 
integrative nature and eﬀ ect of local educational policy, and the amount of residential 
segregation. Survey results conﬁ rmed the ﬁ rst two hypotheses, but, astonishingly, 
found that residential segregation has NO direct impact on level of school segregation. 
Th ere is also a signiﬁ cant association between the level of local educational segregation 
and the commuting rate of high-status students. Th is  means that the commuting rate 
is so high that it can neutralize the previously assumed impact of residential segregation on 
the level of school segregation (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2013). Accordingly, the selection process 
is predominantly regulated by the willingness to commute of middle-class students. 
Main research questions 
Th e novelty of my study is that it attempts to map and interpret the trends and 
direction of pupils’ commuting across catchment areas in a large city for the ﬁ rst time. 
Th is article is based on three comprehensive periods of data collection7 conducted in 
2007, 2009 and in 2014 in all primary schools of Pécs. Data collection concentrated 
on the presumed motivation, direction, and the success of diﬀ erent pupil groups 
in commuting, the commuting balance of the catchment areas of primary schools, 
and the “commuting games” of schools (Neumann ‒ Zolnay 2008; Zolnay 2010). Th e 
research questions of my third and second survey were designed to take forward the 
above-mentioned nationwide representative survey conducted in 2011 (Kertesi ‒ 
Kézdi 2013).
Th erefore, my core research questions concerned whether the vast majority of 
commuter pupils really manage to attend higher status schools, and whether only a 
small proportion of low-status pupils commute to schools outside their catchment area. 
More generally, the study focused on whether the school selection process is regulated 
predominantly by “white fl ight”; that is, the mutual choice of prestigious schools and 
high-status pupils. If white ﬂ ight does not exclusively regulate the commuting process, 
nor indirectly shape the selection mechanism of public education, then two relevant 
5 In urban settlements, less than 25 percent of lower-status students (whose mother’s education lasted a maximum of eight 
grades) commuted to a school other than their catchment school, while in the case of higher-status students (whose mothers 
had completed 12 grades or more) the rate was 50 percent.
6 In towns with only a few schools, fewer than 20 percent of middle-class students commuted. In towns with 10 schools, the 
proportion was over 40 percent, and 60 percent in towns with 40 schools. 
7 The first study  was conducted in the framework of EÖKiK (Public Foundation for European Comparative Minority Research), 
while its successor, CEC (Civitas Europica Centralis Foundation) (http://www.cecid.net/en/about-us), supported the second 
study. 
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additional questions must be raised. How can we characterize the commuting patterns 
of diff erent pupil groups, and how successful are the former in their eff orts to fi nd and enrol 
in schools better than their own catchment schools? What kind of school strategies can 
be identiﬁ ed in terms of the balance of their commuting infl ow and outfl ow, and what 
kind of strategies do schools use to improve their positions and enhance their real or 
perceived interests? 
I used the school’s results in the National Assessment of Basic Competences as 
an indicator of school quality. I do not suppose that the majority of parents are well 
aware of the National Competence Assessment scores of primary schools, not to 
mention their added value indexes, but I do contend that parental choice via pupil 
commuting can be approached by taking a rational choice perspective. Consequently, 
I assume that the school choice of Roma parents is similarly driven by the motivation 
of ﬁ nding primary schools perceived as better quality. 
Methods 
Th e study included all primary public schools and all pupils attending the public 
primary schools of Pécs.8 I collected data about the number of all pupils from each 
school, grade and class, specifying disadvantaged and multiply disadvantaged pupils, 
pupils with special educational needs, pupils with learning diﬃ  culties, and pupils 
perceived as Roma by the schools. Th ereafter I identiﬁ ed the catchment area of each 
pupil.9 Th is database allowed me to map the commuting patterns of school catchment 
areas for each pupil group. I could assess which schools attracted commuting pupils in 
each category and where these pupils commuted from. I ranked the primary schools 
based on the data from the national competence assessment which allowed me to 
assess the success and direction of pupil movements in each pupil category and the 
bargaining positions of the schools. 
Th e criteria deﬁ ning the categories of disadvantaged, multiply disadvantaged 
pupils, pupils with special educational needs, and pupils with learning diﬃ  culties are 
statutory. Roma pupils are not registered oﬃ  cially and formally but the researchers’ 
experience is that principals are acutely aware of who is Roma; likewise, non-Roma 
parents are keenly aware of alleged ethnic proportions, irrespective of the self-
identiﬁ cation of pupils. Tolerated ratios vary city-to-city and even by neighbourhood. 
In assessing the proportion of Roma pupils, I used the method of expert classiﬁ cation. 
Besides quantitative data collection, I conducted detailed interviews with school 
principals about their schools and pupils and concerning the local educational 
bargaining in which they are involved.
8 In 2014, approximately 7800 pupils attended the 17 primary schools of the city. 
9 I collected data anonymously, and data analyses were performed on aggregated data sets.
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Th e priorities of the city’s educational policy 
In recent decades the city’s education policies have been driven by two consensual 
core principles. Th e municipality yielded to the pressure of middle-class parents who 
wished to enrol their children into the most prestigious schools of the city, and year 
after year permitted these schools to launch as many fi rst-grade classes as possible, taking 
into account the building’s capacity. Furthermore, the municipality which operated the 
schools wanted to prevent the development of serious segregation across schools 
and periodically closed segregating schools or ghettoizing school branches. Following 
the closure of the latter schools in 2007, the scale of segregation decreased for some 
years, but after a while the proportion of Roma pupils started to grow in certain 
schools until it reached a level at which white ﬂ ight occurred. Outsourcing segregated 
primary school to church maintenance in 2013 has become the third element of the city’s 
educational policy. Urban planning considerations usually do not signiﬁ cantly impact 
educational policy decisions due to the characteristics of the social history of cities 
(Erdősi 1968; Márﬁ  2005). 
Results
Segregation and commuting trends in Pécs
Th e city has a signiﬁ cant Roma population of Beash (archaic Romanian-speaking) 
and Vlach (Romani-speaking) origin. During the communist era, most Roma families 
aimed to comply with forced assimilation requirements to such an extent that they 
exclusively talked in Hungarian with their children, so their native languages have 
almost totally vanished. Among primary school pupils, the proportion of Roma is 11 
percent, which rate has been constant for a decade. Th e proportion of pupils with 
special educational needs was also 11 percent in 2014, of whom approximately 57 
percent studied in mainstream schools while 43 percent attended special remedial 
schools. Th e proportion of pupils with learning diﬃ  culties studying in mainstream 
schools was 9 percent (see Table 1).
Table 1: Different pupil groups in the primary schools in Pécs (%)
Pupils 2007 2009 2014
Disadvantaged pupils 29 23
Roma pupils 11 11 11
Multiply disadvantaged pupils 4 6 4
Pupils with special educational needs 11
Pupils with learning difﬁ culties 9
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
Following a period of sharp increase, the extent of ethnic segregation has declined 
signiﬁ cantly in state schools in recent years (see Table 2 and Table 3). Th e commuting 
rates for primary school students slightly diﬀ ered from the data measured nationwide. 
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Th e rate of commuting students was similar but, unexpectedly, the proportion of 
multiply disadvantaged students and Roma students attending primary school outside their 
catchment area was signifi cantly higher than the average rate observed in large towns 
(see Table 4). However, surprisingly, the commuting rate of low-status students 
increased during the period when school segregation declined. 
Table 2: Average dissimilarity index of Roma pupils measured in each grade in 2007, 2009 
2014 in Pécs
Year Average dissimilarity index (DI) of Roma pupils measured in each grade
2007 0,04-0,05
2009 0,08-0,09
2014 0,05-0,06
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
Table 3: Distribution of Roma pupils in classes according to the proportion of Roma pupils (%)
Proportion of Roma pupils
Year 0-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-99%
2007 45 34 18 3
2009 42 28 20 10
2014 36 44 14 5
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
Table 4: Proportion of commuting pupils in different pupil categories in Pécs (%)
Proportion of commuting pupils
Pupils  2009  2014
Except those who attended 
special schools in 2014
All pupils 58 58 54
Disadvantaged pupils 52 53 50
Roma pupils 39 51 42
Multiply 
disadvantaged pupils
37 37 29
Pupils with special 
education needs 
n.a. 72 35
Pupils with learning 
difﬁ culties 
n.a. 60 60
Sources: EÖKiK and CEC data collection
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School types based on the infl ow and outfl ow rates of diff erent pupil categories 
We identiﬁ ed the catchment area of commuting students and deﬁ ned several school 
types on the basis of the inﬂ ow and outﬂ ow rates of diﬀ erent pupil categories.
We called those schools “undesirable schools” which have fewer students, fewer 
multiply disadvantaged students, and fewer Roma students than the proportion 
living in the catchment areas; in other words, the commuting balances are negative 
in the case of each student group. Apparently, all pupils, including prestigious and 
low-status students, are equally trying to escape from these schools. Th e illusory 
conﬁ dence of school principals that their positive relations to their neighbourhood 
might enhance their prestige is groundless; undesirable schools only manage to raise 
their student numbers when the maintainer “outsources” educational segregation by 
transferring the maintenance and the ﬁ nancial sources to a church, or, less commonly, 
to an NGO. Such undesirable schools should be obliged to enrol all students living in 
their catchment area even in the latter case, since in principle no one is compelled 
to attend a church-maintained school. But if there is a less prestigious (church-
maintained) school nearby, undesirable schools make every eﬀ ort to “persuade” 
the highest proportion of Roma families to choose the former because they wish to 
demonstrate that they also have the potential to select children.
We call “ghetto schools” those primary schools which have fewer students overall 
than those living in their catchment area but in which multiply disadvantaged and 
Roma students are over-represented in comparison to their representation in their 
catchment area. Th e student commuting balance is negative in total, but in the case 
of multiply disadvantaged and Roma students, the rate is positive. In other words, 
these schools are undesirable to primary school students in general, but they are quasi 
“attractive” to low-status students who practically have no choice in the school market. 
Ghetto schools are aware that their existence depends on the inﬂ ow of multiply 
disadvantaged and Roma students from outside their catchment area. Th erefore they 
cannot aﬀ ord to reject anyone. 
We term “selective schools” those primary schools which overall have more students 
than those living in their catchment area, but fewer multiply disadvantaged and Roma 
students compared to the proportion expected in light of their catchment area. Th e 
student commuting balance is positive in total, but for multiply disadvantaged and 
Roma students the rate is negative. Th ese schools are very attractive throughout the 
city, but nonetheless they reject many students who live in their catchment area whom 
they should be obliged to enrol without any further consideration. In practice, they 
do this by indirectly discouraging them and persuading them to choose other schools. 
A signiﬁ cant proportion of multiply disadvantaged and Roma students are rejected 
and displaced to less prestigious primary schools elsewhere in the city. Besides their 
quality and specialist curricula (for example, bilingual education), an important part 
of their hidden portfolio is that they can “guarantee” that middle-class children will 
not have Roma, or very poor classmates. “Selective schools” have few or no ties to the 
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neighbourhood, or may even seek to reduce their relationship with their immediate 
residential environment to a minimum. Th eir actual enrolment district is the whole 
city, and they can place anyone. 
We use the term “attractive schools” for those primary schools which have more 
students and more multiply disadvantaged students and also more Roma students 
than their expected numbers in light of their catchment area; here, the commuting 
balances are positive in the case of each student group. Th ese schools are attractive to 
all pupils, including prestigious and low-status students.
Pre-selective school: Twenty years ago, two schools and ﬁ ve pre-schools launched a 
joint preschool-primary school programme. Connecting pre-school education groups 
and primary school classes, the same teachers (who hold dual teacher-kindergarten 
qualiﬁ cations) teach children from the age of three to ten. Th e main purpose of this 
programme is to facilitate the transition of children  from preschool to primary 
school. However, the prestige of the two primary schools has started to diverge and it 
has become more and more important into which of the ﬁ ve preschools children can 
be enrolled because preschool choice determines in which school a child can continue 
their studies.
Table 5: Distribution of pupils among different types of primary schools: inﬂ ow and outﬂ ow 
rates of different pupil groups in Pécs in 2014 (%)
All 
pupils 
Disadvantaged 
pupils
Roma 
pupils 
Multiply 
disadvantaged 
pupils
Pupils with 
special 
education 
needs
Pupils with 
learning 
difﬁ culties
Undesirable schools 18,8 21,3 31,0 45,1 20,9 22,2
Ghetto schools 6,8 10,1 18,8 14,4 6,0 8,5
Selective schools 27,3 13,5 3,0 2,2 8,2 22,0
Attractive schools 23,6 25,8 15,5 3,7 10,0 22,2
Outsourced 
segregated school 
1,0 3,7 10,5 3,9 6,8 16,1
Pre-selective school 15,6 18,7 8,0 19,1 1,8 5,8
Special school 4,7 2,6 10,1 10,2 43,3 0
Other schools 2,2 4,3 3,1 1,4 3,0 3,2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Data collection by CEC 
We divided the city’s primary schools into quintiles based on their national competence 
assessment performance. Highly selective schools are located in the highest quintile. 
Th e primary schools ranked into the second quintile cannot be categorized clearly, but 
in general they can be described as slightly undesirable. Attractive schools fell into the 
third school quintile; and undesirable schools fell into the fourth school quintile, while 
the lowest quintile contained the ghetto schools. 
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Table 6: Distribution of Roma pupils across school quintiles of The National Competence 
Assessment in 2014 (%)
All pupils Roma pupils
Living in 
catchment areas 
(%)
Attending schools 
(%)
Living in  catchment 
areas (%)
Attending schools 
(%)
1. (The highest) 11,6 20,2 10,1 2
2. 28,4 26,2 11,3 8,1
3 9 20,6 8 19
4. 19,9 17,1 41,3 29,8
5. (The lowest) 21,1 11,3 23,5 30,9
Pre-selective 
school
10,2 5,7
Special school 4,7 10,1
Sources: Data collection by CEC
Commuting games in the city
Each school assumes that the size, social composition and urban status of its 
catchment area decisively inﬂ uences its prestige and position in the local educational 
market. Based on the ﬁ nding of a survey that assessed the educational policy of 
100 cities and towns in 2011 (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2013), this false assumption can be 
considered the fundamental “spatial perception” of primary schools which largely 
determines their enrolment policy. Th ree corresponding institutional strategies can 
be identiﬁ ed in Pécs.
Preventive strategy: Schools situated in slum areas want to avoid a further increase 
in the proportion of Roma pupils and therefore the possible closure of even less 
prestigious schools nearby seems to be the greatest threat to them. Th ey generally 
consider the size of their catchment zones to be irrelevant. 
Th e municipality attempted to close a segregated ghetto school located near the 
largest shanty town/segregated area of the city several times, but the preventive 
strategy of the neighbouring schools proved to be successful: the school principals 
worried about the consequences and successfully lobbied the municipality to prevent 
this occurring. One year before the nationalization of primary and secondary schools, 
the mayor of the city made it clear that the ghetto school was to be closed soon 
unless the school principal “found” a church or a foundation that would be willing to 
take over the maintenance of the school. Th e school principals approached the local 
pro-government MP to intervene on their behalf. Th e MP was happy to help, and 
“convinced” the Roman Catholic Church to take over the school’s maintenance despite 
its former reluctance. Segregation outsourcing became a new, previously unknown 
element of local education policy. Th e surrounding schools were thus able to avert the 
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“threat” that pupils of the ghetto school might “overwhelm” them, but each school’s 
status continued to deteriorate. Th e number of pupils declined drastically; the 
proportion of Roma and multiply disadvantaged pupils increased, and more children 
living in their vicinity seemed to prefer other primary schools. Nonetheless, these 
schools sustained their strategy.
Manoeuvring astutely in local politics, school principals of two “threatened” 
undesirable central institutions were successfully able to prevent the proposed closure 
of their small, segregated branch schools, but nevertheless they could only slow down 
the outﬂ ow of students from their catchment areas, and did not manage to stem the 
further decline of their status. Gentriﬁ cation of local neighborhoods did not increase 
the school’s attractiveness either. 
A signiﬁ cant number of commuting multiply disadvantaged and Roma pupils 
living near undesirable schools enrolled into ghetto schools. Th ese schools are “the 
winners“ of the “commuting game” – but only as long as they are indiﬀ erent towards 
the social and ethnic composition of their schools. Th e continuous decline of these 
schools’ prestige and their student population may induce a change in their strategy. 
Th e largest ghetto school in the city desperately tried to improve its music education 
to make itself more attractive, and also attempted to introduce a selective admission 
policy. However, they lacked the preconditions for selective recruitment and their 
student numbers further decreased. Finally, the school principal and the maintainer 
chose to invite the Roman Catholic Church to take over the school. In this case, the 
ﬁ nal aim was not to “outsource” segregation (the proportion of Roma pupils was 
about 23 percent and the school is far from being segregated), but rather to displace 
low-status pupils and to increase the school’s prestige. However, due to this the 
“preventive game” of the surrounding schools has restarted.
Isolation strategy: Highly prestigious schools with catchment areas that also 
comprise slum neighborhoods or disreputable streets wish to further decrease the 
already low rate of pupils living in their vicinity and to isolate themselves from their 
urban environment even more. In the case of a school closure nearby, their aim is to 
minimize the number of students they have to take in. 
Th e largest segregated school was situated close to the historic centre of the 
city and its catchment area was adjacent to the catchment districts of the two most 
prestigious primary schools that were also comprised of slum neighborhoods. Th e 
two prestigious elite schools successfully isolated themselves from their vicinity; 
nevertheless, they were anxious about the eventual closure of the segregated school. 
Th at fear proved to be irrational due to the extremely low proportion (10-26 percent) 
of pupils of the latter living in their vicinity. However, these schools consider each 
other as mutual rivals. 
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Pécs was the European Capital of Culture in 2010,10 and a major construction project 
started not far from the segregated school. A concert hall and a cultural centre 
were built, and the famous Zsolnay porcelain factory was converted and rebuilt as a 
cultural and educational complex. Currently, it accommodates several departments 
of the University of Pécs. However, on three sides the whole neighbourhood is 
surrounded by urban slums and even miserable Roma settlements. It was evident 
that the gentriﬁ cation of the surrounding neighbourhood would start soon and 
a decision about the immediate closure of the segregated school was motivated by 
urban planning considerations. Th is was the only occasion when a primary school 
closure was ﬁ rmly incited by urban planning goals. 
Th e splitting of the catchment area and the allocation of pupils who had been 
attending the segregated school was the subject of a kind of a barter deal. Th e two high-
prestige elite schools did not have any other choice but to acknowledge and accept 
that they had to share most of the catchment area of the former segregated primary 
school, but they were not willing to enrol and accommodate the Roma pupils of the 
area. Th ese schools were convinced that they simply could not aﬀ ord to admit Roma 
pupils at all due to their exceptional prestige and high reputation. Th ey assumed – not 
without reason – that they would be able to refuse or avoid admitting any undesirable 
pupils living in the slum area associated with their catchment area, just as they had 
earlier. 
On the other side of the historic city centre, relatively far away from the closed, 
segregated school and situated in an old and beautiful building, there is a primary 
school that was threatened with closure due to a drastic decrease in the student 
population. Th is school received the pupils from the closed segregated school in the 
hope that it could thereby stabilize its position. Th ese expectations were met only 
partially, because having been made aware of the decision, almost as many pupils left 
the school and chose to enrol elsewhere as many pupils arrived from the segregated 
school. Th e proportion of Roma pupils was not higher than 25 percent, but this 
proved to be more than the amount that the middle class was willing to tolerate in 
this urban environment. Moreover, the newcomers were stigmatized merely because 
they had attended the “ill-famed” segregated school. However, this game is also full 
of uncertainties. As the number of pupils continuously declines, closure of the school 
is just a matter of time. In this case, the “barter deal” might backﬁ re: the two highly 
prestigious schools that shared the catchment area of the former segregated school 
will still be forced to admit pupils living in the slum neighbourhood.
Area-enlarging strategy: Primary schools situated in socially homogeneous 
neighborhoods, usually in the middle of large housing estates, attempt to increase 
their catchment areas when a neighbouring school is closed or when catchment area 
boundaries are being redrawn. 
10 Three cities were chosen to be the European Capitals of Culture in 2010: Essen, Pécs, and Istanbul. 
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In Pécs, housing estates are socially more homogeneous than neighborhoods 
that encompass older buildings, suburbs, former miners’ colonies, or poor Roma 
settlements. Th e primary school situated in the southern part of the largest of the 
giant housing estates has a speciﬁ c position. Fifteen years ago, the school moved 
towards specializing in the inclusive education of pupils with special educational 
needs and learning diﬃ  culties. As a result, the number of pupils and the school’s 
prestige declined steadily. Th e catchment area of the school comprises a village-like 
neighbourhood where some wealthy carter Roma families11 live. Even though the 
proportion of Roma pupils is not higher than 13 percent, the school’s reputation is 
very poor and nearly 70 percent of pupils living nearby have opted to attend other 
schools in the inner part of the huge housing estate, about eight to ten bus stops 
away. Recently, the school drastically changed its enrolment policy and attempted to 
improve its image by refusing to admit pupils with special needs living outside its 
district. Other school principals in the area of the housing estate shuddered nervously 
due to the inﬂ ux of pupils arriving from the former school. 
Before nationalization, the municipal maintener decided to close the smallest 
school in the giant housing estate and to split its catchment area among neighbouring 
schools. Th ese neighbouring schools competed ﬁ ercely to add as many streets and 
blocks as possible to their district. Th eir area-increasing strategy was just the opposite 
of the isolation strategy of elite schools. All three large rival schools have maintained 
their positions during the last decade and the vehemence of the struggle over the 
streets is hard to understand, even when all three schools are recruitment rivals. Th e 
vast majority of pupils of the three schools commute and live outside their districts. 
Two of them have entered into an informal coalition and agreed to split some nearby 
streets, but in vain. Eventually, they both lost out on the “area-enlarging game.” Th e 
largest, most inﬂ uential complex which includes not only two primary schools but 
also ﬁ ve kindergartens and several secondary institutions obtained the majority of 
the “disputed” area. 
However, for pupils it remains uncertain whether the decision is favourable, 
because the two primary schools belonging to the complex have a single catchment 
area, and they operate pre-selection practices. Th us, the educational trajectories of 
children are largely determined by their kindergarten choice at the age of three. 
Th e direction and success of pupil commutes
I measured student mobility in two diﬀ erent ways. First, I measured in the case of 
each commuting pupil whether they attend better or worse schools compared to 
their catchment schools by ranking the city’s primary schools based on their schools’ 
national competence assessment performance data (I took into account their average 
results in the previous three years). 
11 Transporters of coal, building material or furniture by horse cart or lorry.
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Most of the primary school pupils commute within the city and the majority of 
them attend better quality schools than their district schools. On the other hand, low-
status commuters’ eﬀ orts to ﬁ nd a better school than their district school is not only 
unsuccessful, but the majority of them end up attending worse quality schools than their 
respective catchment school. Th e failure of this commuting strategy is most striking 
in the case of Roma commuters, especially considering that 51 percent of all Roma 
pupils commute and opt for a primary school other than their catchment school. 
But even if we disregard those Roma pupils who attend the city’s special school, 42 
percent of Roma students still commute. Only 22 percent of commuting Roma pupils 
have managed to enrol in better quality schools than their district schools, 62 percent 
of them have chosen worse quality primary schools, and nearly 17 percent have been 
diagnosed as pupils with special educational needs who must not study in integrated, 
mainstream classrooms.
Table 7: The commuting direction of pupils into schools ranked by schools’ results in the 
national assessment of basic competences in 2014 (%)
Attends better  
quality school than 
district school
Attends worse 
quality school than 
district school
Attends  special 
school
Total
All pupils 52,8 40,8 6,4 100
Disadvantaged 
pupils 
45,4 51,7 2,9 100
Roma pupils 22,2 61,0 16,8 100
Multiply 
disadvantaged 
pupils 
24,0 53,0 23,0 100
Pupils with special 
education needs 
24,9 23,8 51,3 100
Pupils with learning 
difﬁ culties 
48,0 52,0 0 100
Sources: Data collection by CEC
Second, I divided primary schools into quintiles based on their results in the national 
assessment of basic competences; this assessment is administered by the government 
annually (I took the average of the previous three years). 
According to their motivation or compulsion; direction and success, we divided 
commuter pupils into several groups. 
Pupils who successfully fl ee from low-status schools:
Th ese pupils commute because they wish to attend better quality, more prestigious 
schools than their catchment school, and these families are not willing to accept 
Roma children as classmates or schoolmates. Th eir motivation can only be precisely 
described by the concept of “white ﬂ ight.”
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Pupils who successfully retain their high status: Th ese pupils commute because they 
prefer to attend a prestigious school, although their catchment school is equally 
prestigious. 
Unsuccessfully fl eeing pupils: Th ese pupils commute because they wish to attend a 
better, more prestigious school than their catchment school, but they ended up 
enrolling in a school whose quality is as poor as their catchment school. 
Pupils excluded from a low-status school who enrol in segregated school: Th ese pupils 
commute because they were “persuaded” to opt for a segregated church-run school 
instead of the district school which would be obliged to enrol them without any 
consideration.
Pupils excluded from high-status schools: Th ese pupils commute because they were 
“persuaded” to opt for a much worse quality school instead of the prestigious district 
school which would be obliged to enrol them without any consideration. Th e most 
surprising and  shocking ﬁ nding is that families freely choose much worse quality 
schools than their catchment schools, and thereby opt for schools with signiﬁ cantly 
worse educational opportunities for their children. It is quite easy to exert pressure by 
indirect means on poor and ethnically stigmatized families with low self-esteem who 
cannot assert themselves suﬃ  ciently, and to “convince” and “persuade” them to make 
extremely disadvantageous decisions on behalf of their children. 
Table 8: The commuting direction of pupils according to school quintiles in 2014 (%)
  All pupils
Disadvantaged 
pupils
Roma 
pupils
Multiply 
disadvantaged 
pupils
Pupils with 
special 
educational 
needs
Pupils with 
learning 
difﬁ culties
Successfully 
ﬂ eeing from 
low-status 
schools
41.4 30 13.8 13 13 34.3
Successfully 
retaining high 
status
14.1 12.6 4.9 4 4.5 12.2
Unsuccessfully 
ﬂ eeing from 
low-status 
schools 
4.7 3.4 7.4 18 3.1 4.2
Excluded from 
prestigious 
schools 
22.3 24.4 40.5 27 19.4 34.1
Attending 
special school
6.4 3.9 17.7 23 51.3 0
Sources: Data collection by CEC
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Conclusion
Th e majority of commuter pupils in Pécs end up in higher status, better quality 
schools. However, my ﬁ ndings did not conﬁ rm the nationwide urban trends that 
just a small proportion of low-status pupils commute (Kertesi ‒ Kézdi 2013). In the 
examined city it is not true that the selection process is dominantly inﬂ uenced by the 
“white ﬂ ight” phenomenon, or in other words, by the mutual choices of prestigious 
schools and high-status pupils. In addition, the displacement of poor and Roma pupils 
from prestigious schools is an equally important factor in urban segregation. 
In an urban environment, the higher the prestige of the school, the greater the 
geographical scope from where it can recruit pupils. Th is is exactly the opposite of the 
ﬁ ndings in the British literature which describe how the most popular schools have 
the smallest catchment areas (Hamnet and Butler 2010). Th e more selective a school 
is, the more it displaces the unwanted, the poor, and above all, Roma children. But 
while the undesirable schools try to maintain ties with their catchment area and hope 
that the gentriﬁ cation of neighborhoods will increase their prestige, selective schools 
attempt to diminish all ties to their surrounding environment. 
Not only do the school maintainers and the recently created central educational 
authorities have limited opportunities to keep the process under control, but 
school strategies are also uncertain. Even if it is assumed that school principals are 
accurately aware of the commuting balance of their own school and other schools’ 
catchment areas for each pupil group, their diﬀ erent perceptions of residential 
environments hinder the stabilization of pupils’ distribution among schools. In this 
respect, “bounded rationality” means that the unpredictability of pupil recruitment 
compels primary schools to do everything at all cost to attract more pupils who will 
presumably enhance their reputation, and to refuse those who might spoil it. Th e 
extreme selectivity of Hungarian public education is a self-perpetuating process not 
only in terms of parental choice, but also in terms of school enrolment policies. 
Large-scale educational commuting fragments the urban space: boundaries cannot 
be drawn on a map because they are variable in the case of each school and each pupil. 
Any educational policy which uses regional targeting is bound to fail. Th e education 
map of the city is thus “illegible.”
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Abstract: In the recent national election in April 2018 in Hungary, the incumbent party (Fidesz) won again. 
During the campaign period, some of the media were full of stories about the scandals and corruption aﬀ airs 
of Fidesz. However, election results showed that these scandals did not decrease incumbent party support. 
What is the potential explanation for this? During the election campaign, we conducted an online survey 
experiment in Hungary, giving diﬀ erent treatments to respondents within the diﬀ erent sub-samples. Th e 
former were asked to read an article about a relevant corruption aﬀ air connected to diﬀ erent political actors. 
Our main hypothesis was that if people hear about scandals related to the government, support for the 
incumbent party will decrease. Results of the ﬁ tted logistic regression models suggest that information about 
incumbent-related corruption scandals did not aﬀ ect voting for the incumbents. Th e most interesting result 
was that dominantly pro-government media consumers were more likely to vote for Fidesz after treatment 
compared to the control group. We thus think that the selection of information, the perceived credibility 
of sources, and information processing were inﬂ uenced by partisanship.  In a natural reaction, partisan 
respondents recalled their party identity and tried to respond to questions from the related viewpoints. 
Keywords: corruption, information hypothesis, trade-oﬀ  hypothesis, incumbent support, experimental 
research
Introduction
Th e negative eﬀ ects of political corruption are widely known. Overall, it decreases 
economic performance and weakens trust and conﬁ dence in institutions and 
the government (Mishler – Rose 2001, Anderson – Tverdova 2003). Widespread 
malfeasance can create signiﬁ cant disillusionment with the whole political system 
(Seligson 2006, Olson 2014). One the one hand, if people do not believe they can 
change a corrupt situation, electoral participation may decrease (Manzetti and Wilson 
2007), while on the other hand, corruption may also lead to mobilization against the 
incumbent party (Kostadinova 2009). 
Eastern Europe is a good area to examine how corruption aﬀ ects political 
participation and the electoral arena. Between 2000 and 2010 corruption and scandals 
were a major issue in 70 percent of the elections in this region that were analyzed and 
the typical Eastern European voter perceives that their politicians are more likely to 
be corrupt than in the rest of Europe (Klasjna et al. 2016). Based on Transparency 
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International’s Corruption Index, Hungary is one of the most tainted countries in this 
region as far as corruption is concerned (Jávor – Jancsis 2016). Hungary was thirty-
ninth on the list in 2007, and had slipped to sixty-sixth by 2017.1 National elections 
were held in Hungary on April 8, 2018. Fidesz, the right-conservative party, has been 
in power since 2010 in Hungary and in the last few years the media has reported 
on several corruption scandals involving the ruling party. Even the son-in-law of the 
Prime Minister was accused of corruption in a European Anti-Fraud Oﬃ  ce (OLAF) 
report related to suspicious procurement activities.2 Th e opposition parties have tried 
to build their election campaign around this government malfeasance, and in social 
media these accusations have generated a lot of discussion (Index 2018). After a very 
intensive campaign, the turnout rate in 2018 reached 70 percent (the second highest 
since the regime change in 1990). However, this high participation level was not the 
result of a mobilized opposition but rather to the unexpectedly strong turnout of 
incumbent supporters. Fidesz received nearly half of all votes, and beneﬁ ted from an 
increase in the number of voters by 5 percent, or 400,000 people. Why is it that the 
corruption accusations did not harm the incumbent party? One possible explanation 
is that due to the highly centralized pro-government media system in Hungary 
(Bajomi 2013), some voters live in such a closed media bubble that they did not hear 
about these scandals in the news. Another explanation is that incumbent voters 
evaluate corruption as irrelevant because of their own personal gains or an overall 
positive evaluation of economic conditions.
Based on an online survey experiment conducted before the election, we tested 
whether information about the government and the scandals involving Fidesz 
politicians might decrease support for the incumbent party. In this paper, we 
present the result of this survey experiment and oﬀ er a possible explanation for the 
unexpectedly high level of support for the incumbent party. 
Th eoretical Background 
Corruption can be hard to quantify, and it is also hard to identify its exact boundaries. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, we can distinguish between experiential corruption 
and perceived corruption. Th e prior is usually connected with minor or petty issues, 
while the latter is the consequence of grand corruption scandals (Ruhl 2011). Th ere 
is some evidence that experiential corruption might have a greater eﬀ ect on political 
behaviour than perceived corruption (Klasjna et al. 2016) but the latest results in 
Hungary have proved that perceived corruption plays a substantial role in voting 
behaviour (Kostadinova – Kmetty 2018). Th us, in this paper, we focus on perceived 
corruption.  
1 https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview
2 For more details see, for example: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/12/how-hungarian-pms-supporters-profit-
from-eu-backed-projects
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Th e relationship between perceived corruption and political participation is highly 
controversial. Perceptions of corruption may boost participation aimed at removing 
incumbent parties from power, but a high level of perceived corruption might also make 
the incumbent party’s supporters unsure about the value of their votes. Widespread 
perceptions of malfeasance can also decrease trust in the whole political system and 
can cause massive withdrawal from voting. Overall, these complex mechanisms might 
balance each other out (Kostadinova 2009). 
But how do supporters of an incumbent party deal with the corruption aﬀ airs of 
a government in power? Th ere are two alternative hypotheses (Winters and Weitz-
Shapiro 2013): one is the information hypothesis, while the other is the trade-oﬀ  
hypothesis. As opposed to experienced corruption, political corruption is not part 
of everyday life. If voters are not aware of politicians’ malfeasance, they might easily 
support the party again in the following election. Media investigation of political 
corruption requires plenty of resources, and a lack of the former might leave corrupt 
activities hidden. In addition, the source of the accusations counts. If incumbent 
supporters do not trust sources, they might also mistrust their information. However, 
if they receive credible information about corrupt activities, they might withdraw 
their support. Th is so-called information hypothesis has not been clearly supported 
by experimental studies that focused on this issue, but more papers have backed the 
hypothesis (Ferraz – Finan 2008, Chong et al 2011, Figueiredo et al 2011, Winters – 
Weitz-Shapiro 2013) than have rejected it (Banerjee et al. 2010). 
Th e other possible explanation focuses on the overall advantage of supporting the 
incumbent party. Even if the pro-governing party voters are aware of the malfeasance 
of the politician they support they might evaluate this as irrelevant when they cast 
their ballots. Many reasons can be listed here to support this behaviour. If overall 
economic conditions are good in the country and it is on a solid path of development, 
the governing party can withstand even the biggest corruption scandal. Th is is also 
true if incumbent party voters feel that the other parties are also corrupt, and thus 
perceive that corruption is the nature of politics and it is inevitable that there are 
corruption scandals in a long-term government cycle.  It is also possible that voters 
will not punish their party if they also obtain private goods from the current system 
(Manzetti – Wilson 2007). Several studies have supported this trade-oﬀ  hypothesis 
(Rundquist et al. 1977, Manzetti – Wilson 2006, Banerjee – Pande 2009), but there 
are contradictory ﬁ ndings too (Winters – Weitz-Shapiro 2013). 
When analyzing the eﬀ ect of corruption scandals, it is also crucial to understand 
and consider how people get their information about politics and public life. Th e 
Hungarian political media is polarized and strongly allied along partisan lines (Szabó 
and Kiss 2011). Th e Fidesz government controls a strongly centralized media system 
which continuously echoes their messages (Bajomi 2013). Th e country is highly 
polarized (Körösényi 2013), the distance between government and anti-government 
supporters is very wide, and political homophily (Kmetty – Koltai 2012) is very strong. 
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All these factors increase the chance of that “opinion bubbles” will form. Recently, 
many scholars have talked about such opinion bubbles (Iyengar et al. 2012), which 
refer to the fact that people watch/read/listen to only those channels that are in 
line with their own political views and where they ﬁ nd only similar opinions to their 
own. Th is homogenous opinion milieu signiﬁ cantly decreases the quality of political 
orientation and increases the distance between political sides. Such a fragmented 
political ﬁ eld can strongly hinder political information ﬂ ow (Pariser 2011). Such a 
political and media space might prevent voters from getting information about 
scandals released to the other side of the political ﬁ eld.
In this paper, we test how polarized media consumption aﬀ ect incumbent party 
support when voters are confronted with information about real scandals.   
Hypotheses 
Following the unexpected election results in Hungary, we tested whether the 
information hypothesis is relevant in Hungary regarding corruption issues and 
incumbent support. We hypothesized (H1) that if people hear about scandals related 
to the government (negative framing of Fidesz), support for the incumbent party will 
decrease. Th is is a classic test of the information hypothesis (Ferraz – Finan 2008, 
Chong et al. 2011, Figueiredo et al. 2011, Winters – Weitz-Shapiro). 
Since the media is very polarized in Hungary, and Fidesz has taken over a lot of 
media sources in recent years, we might assume that some voters have not heard 
reports about government-related malfeasance. Based on this, we hypotheses that 
support for the incumbents of those who consume dominantly pro-government 
media will be weaker (H2). 
Th e ﬁ rst two expectations were built on the information hypothesis. However, we 
wanted to test whether the trade-oﬀ  hypothesis holds as well. In H3 we hypotheses 
that Fidesz corruption treatment would not aﬀ ect those who were satisﬁ ed with their 
own living conditions (H3a), and/or those who perceived a high level of exposure to 
the corruption of the opposition parties (H3b).  
Design of the experimental surveys 
During the election campaign, we conducted an online survey experiment (Mutz 
2011a). Th e survey was administered3 between December 12, 2017, and January 10, 
2018, four months before the general election of April 8, 2018. Th e sample size was 
1000 respondents; the survey was representative for Hungarian internet users aged 
18 or older. 
3 A professional polling company (Marketingcentrum) conducted the survey using their own online panel commissioned by the 
Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Acadeny of Sciences.. 
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Th e survey was broken down into four sub-samples (see Table 1) each of whose 
respondents we gave diﬀ erent treatments to. Th e former were asked to read an article 
about a relevant corruption aﬀ air connected to one of three political actors. We chose 
scandals which had been heavily cited by news channels within the last one year. Th e 
present Hungarian political arena is dominated by three political entities (Kovarek 
and Soós 2017): Besides the incumbent party (Fidesz), there is a (formerly) extreme-
right party (Jobbik),4 and a fragmented left political coalition with three bigger 
parties: the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), Demokratikus Koalíció (DK), and 
Lehet Más a Politika (LMP). We chose one scandal connected to Fidesz, one scandal 
connected to Jobbik, and one connected to MSZP. Th e fourth sub-sample was the 
control group which did not receive any treatment. Th e stories involved real scandals, 
and the articles were based on published news (we simply shortened the texts).5 
Table 1. Structure of the questionnaire design
Fidesz corruption 
treatment (N=255)
Jobbik corruption 
treatment (N=253)
Socialist party (MSZP) 
corruption treatment 
(N=247)
Control group (N=245)
Questions about corruption
Questions about party support and political participation
After the corruption treatment, respondents were asked to evaluate the level of 
corruption in Hungary, the dynamics of the spread of corruption, and the exposure 
to corruption of each party. After this block of questions, respondents provided 
information in response to standard political survey questions such as voting 
intention, party support, party sympathy, etc. 
Analytical strategy and variables 
In the analysis, we ﬁ tted multivariate statistic models using the dependent variable 
incumbent (Fidesz) support. We measured Fidesz election support with a dummy 
variable based on the “Which party would you vote for?” question. We coded “1” 
those who said they would vote for Fidesz, and the others “0”. As the dependent 
variable has two categories, binomial logistic regression models were used in the 
analysis.6 To present the results, we calculated the average marginal eﬀ ect (AME7) of 
the explanatory variables. Th e AME helps to overcome the problem of interpreting 
4 Jobbik has started to move to the centre from the right over the last few years.
5 For the corruption treatment condition, see the questionnaire. 
6 To test the robustness of our models we calculated all of the models with a  linear predictor too. Results were the same as in 
the case of logistic regression models.  
7 We used the statistical programme R’s margins package (Leeper 2018) to calculate the AME. 
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interaction terms in logistic regressions. To test our hypothesis, we ﬁ tted several 
models with diﬀ erent independent variables. 
In Model 1 (M1 – for testing H1) the incumbent corruption treatment (ICT) 
variable was used as an independent variable besides the control variables. Th e ICT 
variable was coded with two categories: “0” – control group or other party corruption; 
“1” – corruption treatment related to Fidesz corruption.
To test the eﬀ ect of selective media consumption (M2), we added a composite 
media orientation variable to the ﬁ rst model with two categories: “0” – dominantly 
not pro-government media consumption, “1” – dominantly pro-government media 
consumption.8 To test H2, the interaction term of the ICT variable and the media 
orientation variable was added to the model. 
To test the trade-oﬀ  hypothesis (M3), we added two additional variables to the M1 
model: opposition parties’ corruption exposure (an 11-category scale ranging from “not 
corrupt at all” (0) to “very corrupt” (10)) and the ﬁ nancial situation of the respondent’s 
household (5-category scale ranging from “we live in ﬁ nancial deprivation” (1) to “we 
live without ﬁ nancial worries” (5)). Th e interaction term of these two latter variables 
with the treatment variable was added to the model to test H3.
To control the basic demographic variables, gender, age-cohort (three categories) 
settlement type, and education (four categories) variables were included into the 
model. One-quarter of the sample read about a government corruption case, while 
one-quarter of them did not read anything (the control group). Th e other half of the 
sample was asked to read a news article about scandals involving other parties. To 
control for this eﬀ ect, two additional dummy variables were included in the models: 
Jobbik corruption treatment and Socialist party corruption treatment. Th e descriptive 
statistics for the variables are available in Appendix Table A1.
Results
Th e ﬁ rst regression model (Table1, M1) contains the three treatment variables as 
dummies (the control treatment group was the reference here), the pro-government 
media consumption variable, and the demographic variables. 
8 In the first step, we created four variables:
Watch pro-government television channel news (M1, DunaTV, Tv2)
Watch anti-government television channel news (RTL, HírTV, ATV)
Read pro-government newspapers and news sites (Origo, Lokál, Magyar Hírlap, Magyar Idők)
Read anti-government newspapers and news sites (Index, 24.hu, HVG, 444, Alfahír, Kuruncinfo, Magyar Nemzet, Népszava, 
Vasárnapi Hírek)
We coded as “dominantly pro-government media consumers” those who:
Either watch or read pro-government media sources and do not watch/read any anti-government media sources.
Watch and read pro-government media sources but do not watch and read anti-government media sources together. 
To categorize the sources, we used a classification by Mérték Média Műhely: www.mertek.eu.
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Th e model was signiﬁ cant (Chi-square sig=0.000), but overall explanatory power 
was quite low (Cox-Snell R Square: 0.074): only the settlement and media consumption 
variables had signiﬁ cant eﬀ ects. Fidesz had higher support in the county seats and the 
other cities compared to the capital city of Budapest. Th e media consumption variable 
played the strongest role in the model (based on Wald statistics): those who dominantly 
watch and/or read pro-government media sources support the incumbent party 30 
percentage points more based on the marginal eﬀ ects. Th e incumbent corruption 
treatment variable was not signiﬁ cant, and thus the information hypothesis did not 
stand in terms of the whole sample. Th is represents a rejection of H1.  
Table 2. Binomial logistic regression models. Dependent variable: incumbent voting
  M1 M2 M3
  B Sig. AME B Sig. AME B Sig. AME
Constant -2,543 0,000 -2,453 0,000 -5,615 0,000
Gender -0,152 0,391 -0.020  -0,157  0,376 -0,021 0,096 0,615 0,013
Age: 18-34 -0,119 0,594 -0.015 -0,138 0,539 -0,017 -0,397 0,102 -0,051
Age : 35-49 0,12 0,563 0.016 0,094 0,651 0,013 -0,074 0,738 -0,010
EDU4 - ISCED 
categorization
0,195 0,116 0.026 0,199 0,11 0,026 -0,05 0,713 -0,007
Settlement: county 
seat
0,556 0,047 0.067 0,532 0,057 0,064 0,538 0,07 0,062
Settlement: other 
city
0,589 0,026 0.072 0,567 0,033 0,069 0,668 0,018 0,081
Settlement: village 0,503 0,082 0.06 0,496 0,085 0,059 0,806 0,009 0,101
Treatment: Fidesz -0,362 0,145 -0.048 -0,657 0,026 -0,051 -5,932 0,005 -0,087
Treatment: Jobbik -0,343 0,166 -0.045 -0,349 0,154 -0,046 -0,341 0,189 -0,046
Treatment: Socialist 0,062 0,792 0.008 0,05 0,83 0,007 -0,044 0,862 -0,006
Dominantly pro-
government media
1,602 0,000 0.291 1,379 0,000 0,295      
Treatment: Fidesz 
* Dominantly pro-
government media
      0,993      
Opponent party’s 
corruption exposure
            0,277 0,000 0,05
Treatment: Fidesz 
* Opponent party’s 
corruption exposure
            0,461
Financial situation 
of the household
            0,384 0,002 0,06
Treatment: Fidesz * 
Financial situation 
of the household
            0,304
Model test (Chi2) 0,000 0,000 0,000
Cox and Snell R2 0,074 0,078 0,098
To test if Fidesz corruption treatment played a special role within diﬀ erent segments 
of media consumption groups, we added the interaction term of pro-government 
media consumption and ICT. In this model (Table 2 – M2) the signiﬁ cance level of the 
ICT variable declined to under 0.05 in a negative direction, meaning the treatment 
decreased incumbent support. In the case of the non-linear models, the standard 
calculation of the signiﬁ cance level of the interaction term is biased (Ai-Norton 
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2003) so we omitted it from the tables. It is not easy to understand and interpret an 
interaction term, so we plotted the AME of the Fidesz treatment variable in diﬀ erent 
media environments (see Figure 1). Th ose respondents who did not read/watch pro-
government media have a negative average marginal eﬀ ect, but those who live in 
incumbent media bubble have a positive eﬀ ect.  
Figure 1.: Average marginal effect of Fidesz treatment in the case of different types of 
media consumption
We expected that the corruption treatment would decrease Fidesz support within the 
population who watch and/or read mostly pro-government media, but the ﬁ ndings 
contradicted our expectations. Fidesz support was even higher in the former group. 
Th is suggests rejecting the information hypothesis, and raises the question why we 
got the entirely opposite result to the one we expected. We come back to this point in 
the discussion.
Our last hypothesis involves the trade-oﬀ  hypothesis. We expected that individuals 
who live in good economic conditions (H3a) and/or those who feel that the opposition 
parties are (also) corrupt (H3b) would resist the ICT. We tested these hypotheses 
(H3a, H3b) in Model 3 (Table 2 – M3). Th is model had the greatest explanatory power 
(Cox-Snell R square=0.098). To test H3 we needed to focus on the interaction terms. 
Th e Fidesz treatment group’s AME value for diﬀ erent levels of economic situation 
was quite uniform with very limited variation, so we rejected H3a. Th e interaction of 
Fidesz treatment and the opposition party corruption variable was more interesting. 
Figure 2 helps us understand the mechanism here. Th e ICT did not aﬀ ect those who 
assumed that opposition parties are corrupt, but for those who did not associate 
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opposition parties with strong corruption, ICT decreased level of support for Fidesz. 
Th is result reinforces Hypothesis 3b about the trade-oﬀ  eﬀ ect. 
Figure 2.:  Average marginal effect of Fidesz treatment on perceptions of different levels of 
opposition party corruption
Discussion 
Fidesz won the recent election of April 2018 in Hungary, and was able to increase their 
proportion of supporters and absolute numbers of voters compared to four years ago. 
During the campaign period, some parts of the media weres full of stories about the 
scandals and corruption aﬀ airs of Fidesz which generated an extremely high level of 
interaction in social media (Index 2018). 
An OLAF report was released about the possible corruption exposure of Prime Minister 
Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law (István Tiborcz). Another emblematic government ﬁ gure, 
Zsolt Semjén, was accused of accepting a high-value invitation to a hunt ﬁ nanced by 
an entrepreneur. Photos of their hunt in Sweden (the shot reindeer was transported 
by helicopter9) dominated the media for several days. However, election results 
showed that these scandals did not decrease incumbent party support. What possible 
explanation is there for this? Th ere is evidence from other experiments (Klasjna – 
Tucker 2013) that in countries where the perception of corruption is very high, new 
scandals or accusations do not change anything. As people already have negative 
opinions about the whole system, and all the parties, they use diﬀ erent criteria when 
they choose between parties. Th is claim is somewhat similar to that of the trade-oﬀ  
9 For the whole story, see: https://budapestbeacon.com/semjen-might-have-illegally-downed-a-reindeer-in-sweden/
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hypothesis which was partly accepted in this paper (H3b). Our results showed clearly 
that those who felt that other parties are also corrupt supported Fidesz at the same 
level in the treatment and the control group. In opposition to the trade-oﬀ  hypothesis, 
we therefore reject the information hypothesis. Th e ICT did not aﬀ ect voting for the 
incumbent (H1). 
Th e most interesting result came from the analysis of the media consumption 
eﬀ ect. We hypothesized that the support of those who watch/read dominantly pro-
government media sources for the political incumbents would weaken after the ICT. 
Th e results showed just the opposite tendency: dominantly pro-government media 
consumers were more inclined to vote for Fidesz in the ICT groups than in the control 
group. What might have happened here? 
Th ere is a growing body of literature that deals with the mechanisms behind 
partisan identity (Janky 2018). Partisanship may inﬂ uence the selection of 
information, the perceived credibility of sources, and information processing (Mutz 
2011b). If a voter receives information which is not in line with their partisan identity, 
they might refuse to pay attention to it and start collecting counter-arguments 
(Bolsen et al. 2014). As a natural reaction, the partisan respondent recalls their party 
identity and tries to answer any question from this perspective. Th e literature calls 
this “motivated reasoning” (Leeper – Slothuus 2014). Bechtel et al. (2015) found in 
an experimental study conducted in Switzerland that media-framing associated with 
immigrants alienates diﬀ erent political sides as it leads to recall of the partisanship 
identity of respondents. We might assume the same process in the case of ICT. Th ose 
who dominantly watch/read pro-government media sources receive a comprehensive 
narrative about events in Hungary. Th is is a relatively small group (15 percent of the 
sample), but the proportion of Fidesz voters is above 40 percent within this group 
(but only 13 percent of the rest of the sample). When these individuals read a framing 
that is diﬀ erent to the one they are used to hearing, their political identity starts to 
work, and they start to defend their political side. Th is is a very important ﬁ nding 
because it might help with understanding why previous experiments and research 
have produced mixed results.
Th ere is other possible explanation for the weak mobilizing eﬀ ect of ICT. Overall 
perceptions of corruption are very high in Hungary, with all parties considered to be 
corrupt by 70 percent of all voters (Kmetty 2018). When corruption is so widespread, 
voters might feel hopeless about changing the situation. As ﬁ ghting corruption 
requires collective action, people have to believe that others will also ﬁ ght against 
corruption. Without this, corruption cannot be a deﬁ ning phenomenon behind 
political behaviour.
It seems that, despite growing access to online space, media consumption is heavily 
deﬁ ned by partisanship. Real news and fake news are not always easy to diﬀ erentiate. 
Politicians have started questioning the truth promoted by media outlets. Trump 
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does this in the USA, and Viktor Orbán does the same in Hungary. Th is may have 
serious consequences for media consumption and media evaluation. From a research 
perspective, this is an important challenge. When testing the type of treatments 
that we did in this study, we should monitor not just the media consumption of 
respondents but also the evaluation of diﬀ erent media sources from the perspective 
of trustworthiness. 
In our experiment we used real scandals and conducted our survey during 
a campaign period. In a politically more stressful period such as this, recall of 
partisanship identity may be much stronger than in a calmer period. Further research 
is needed to understand this mechanism better.  
Appendix
Table A1.: Descriptive table of main variables
Variable  Response categories Frequency (%)
Party support
Other party, does not vote 82,3
Incumbent party 17,7
     
Media orientation variable
Dominantly non pro-government media 
consumption
84,6
Dominantly pro-government media 
consumption
15,4
     
Gender
male 47
female 53
     
Age (3-cat)
18-34 years 25
35-49 years 28
50+ years 47
     
Settlement
Budapest 21,2
county seat 23,7
other town 32,1
village 23
     
Financial situation
we live in ﬁ nancial deprivation 4,9
we have ﬁ nancial problems every month 14,6
we make ends meet 42,8
get along well ﬁ nancially 32,9
we live without ﬁ nancial worries 4,8
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